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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses micro-econometric analysis to examine the impact of Islamic debt 
on firm value and firm financial performance by observing two groups, namely 
Malaysian firms and Indonesian firms. The study in particular considers (i) the 
impact of Islamic debt on firm value and firm financial performance, (ii) the 
Islamic debt announcement effect on stock return, (iii) the relationship between 
Islamic debt characteristics and stock return. 
 
A number of significant contributions to corporate finance arise from this research 
in relation to Islamic debt instruments and firm financial performance. First, it 
provides evidence of the Islamic debt impact on firm value and firm financial 
performance. Second, it provides evidence of the Islamic debt announcement 
effect on stock returns. Third, it provides evidence of the Islamic debt 
characteristics’ impact on stock return. Fourth, and very importantly it provides 
new insights, adding substantially to the very few studies that have been 
conducted on these types of instruments. It is expected that the empirical results 
from this study will be a starting point for significant future research on similar 
instruments. 
 
Islamic debt became increasingly popular for the last decade as companies sought 
to raise funds by offering corporate Islamic debt (sukuk). It has become 
significant for raising funds in the international capital markets through Islamic 
law (shariah). Moreover, Islamic debt has become a topic of research interest in 
Islamic finance since the financial crisis which affected major countries and firms 
around the world. The rise of Islamic debt, initially in Asia (Malaysia) is due to 
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the fact that (i) Malaysian firms want to tap into investors from the Middle East 
(oil money), who have a considerable amount of money to invest, but also have to 
adhere to their religious view, (ii) the government’s policy regarding the Islamic 
Capital Market establishment along with its instruments, (iii) Islamic debt appears 
to offer more security and therefore has become an attractive market both for 
Muslim and non-Muslim investors. This is reflected by the increase in the issue 
size from year to year, for both sukuk issuers and sukuk holders, receiving 
increased support in the form of market surveillance and regulation, and from 
market participants. 
 
Data employed in this study are obtained from the Islamic Finance Information 
Service (IFIS) database. The sampling period is 2000 to 2009, which is ten years 
and quarterly observations are used. These quarterly data are important since the 
issuance of Islamic debt for every firm is in different quarters with 227 companies 
from Malaysia issuing Islamic debt from 2000 to 2009. From those 227 Malaysian 
companies, 106 companies were public companies, and 121 companies were 
private companies. Of the 106 public companies, 31 are excluded from the data 
list due to the non-availability of their respective financial statement data. In 
addition, the sample of Islamic debt offering must have data availability on the 
size of the offering, the maturity length, the history of the issuance, and other 
accounting data information. There were 26 Indonesian firms that issued Islamic 
debt for the range of this study period, however only 14 firms had complete data. 
 
A balanced panel of 80 Malaysian and 14 Indonesian companies are employed in 
this study. For panel data analysis, the availability of ten years’ worth of data is 
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required, particularly quarterly data. For an event study and multivariate 
regression method analysis, the data of the daily closing stock prices for two years 
prior and one year after the announcement date are required in order to calculate 
the abnormal return using the abnormal return benchmark (mean adjusted return, 
market adjusted return and market model return). 
 
The choice of model employed is specified according to its diagnostic testing 
results for non-normality, heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, endogeneity and 
linearity in both Malaysia and Indonesia. A test is conducted to confirm that there 
are no outliers in the data set prior to the diagnostic testing. Poolability and co-
integration testing are also included. Based on the diagnostic results, Malaysian 
data are analysed using the dynamic panel generalised method of moment and 
Indonesian data are analysed using the panel corrected standard error. These two 
methods are employed to investigate the impact of Islamic debt issues on firm 
value and/or firm financial performance. Next, the analysis examines the impact 
of Islamic debt announcement on abnormal return using an event study method. 
The abnormal return benchmarks used are mean adjusted return, market adjusted 
return and market model return. Finally, the relationship between the Islamic debt 
characteristic and stock return is analysed using the generalised least square and 
the ordinary least square for Malaysian and Indonesian data respectively. 
 
The findings for the impact of Islamic debt on firm value and/or firm financial 
performance using Malaysian and Indonesian data reveal that when Islamic debt 
was first introduced to the market; it affected higher firm performance as 
indicated by market-based and accounting-based measures. However, the issuance 
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of Islamic debt for a second time lowers firm performance which suggests that 
Islamic debt expansion has a detrimental effect on firm value. The Islamic debt 
issuance for more than two issues improves a firm’s financial performance, 
indicating that after having a few experiences in issuing Islamic debt, the issuance 
of Islamic debt impacts positively on firm performance. This may be attributed to 
the holders of Islamic debt closely monitoring the management of the firm to 
ensure that the firm can generate profits and distribute a periodic stream of cash 
flow over time. Thus, Islamic debt also reduces the agency problem within the 
company and hence increases firm value. From the view point of markets, this 
may indicate that the markets learn through several issuances of Islamic debt and 
therefore have greater confidence in subsequent issuances compared to the second 
issuance of Islamic debt. 
 
The second observation is that when Islamic debt proportion is below the average 
or at the average, it has a positive significant impact on firm value and/or firm 
financial performance. However, the greater the proportion of Islamic debt issued, 
the lower the firm performance. This result is similar to the empirical result for 
non-Islamic debt, in that the proportion of debt at a certain level may hamper firm 
performance as an additional incurrence of debt gives no guarantee that firm 
performance will be higher. This is mainly because as the leverage increases, so 
does the risk of default, which provides a greater incentive for lenders to monitor the 
firm. Moreover, the proportion of Islamic debt at the average represents the best 
likelihood of affecting higher firm value and/or firm financial performance. 
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The third observation is that debt-types and equity-types affect firm performance, 
while asset-types have a positive but not significant effect. The result supports the 
notion that certain types of debts have a different impact on shareholders’ wealth. 
Overall, the findings, both for Malaysia and Indonesia, indicate that Islamic debt 
has a positive impact of on firm value and/or firm financial performance. The 
positive findings are consistent with theory covered in prior research and showing 
that this theory can also be applied to Islamic debt. Moreover, Islamic debt makes 
a greater contribution to the improvement of firm financial performance than non-
Islamic debt.  
 
The findings for the event study analysis, using three benchmarks, reveal that 
there is a negative and significant impact for both average abnormal returns (AAR) 
and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for Malaysia. This negative 
finding supports the negative impact hypothesis. Overall, the result for one day 
prior to and one day after the announcement is positive and significant. In contrast 
to the findings for Malaysia, the impact of Islamic debt announcement, using three 
benchmarks, is positive and significant both for AAR and CAAR for Indonesia. 
This positive finding supports the positive impact hypothesis. Overall, the result 
for one day prior to and one day after the announcement is positive and significant. 
Moreover, the impact of the announcement for the event window spanning 31 
days (-15 to +15) is varied for the three benchmark returns used in this study. The 
results for this window span reveal that the majority of AAR and CAAR are 
negative and significant. Furthermore, the results for AAR and CAAR for 
Malaysia are almost similar to the results found for Indonesia. The unit root test 
result for Malaysia indicates that the market is efficient in the context of weak 
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form efficiency, which suggests that the price movements are unpredictable. In 
contrast to Malaysia, the unit root test result for Indonesia indicates that the 
market is inefficient in the context of weak form efficiency, which suggests that 
the price movements are predictable. 
 
The findings for Islamic debt characteristics’ impact on stock return reveal that 
the Islamic debt characteristics, which are debt to equity ratio and firm size, have 
a positive and significant impact on shareholder wealth, while Islamic debt 
offering size and maturity have no significant impact on shareholders’ wealth for 
Malaysia. For Indonesia, the result is similar to the result obtained for Malaysia 
except for debt equity ratio and firm size which have positive and significant 
impacts. With regards to the frequency and types of Islamic debt issued, only the 
first issuance of Islamic debt and Islamic debt-types have a positive and 
significant impact on shareholders’ wealth for Malaysia and Indonesia, with 
exception that there is no debt-type for Indonesia. In terms of the firm value 
and/or firm financial performance; higher firm value or firm financial 
performance of firms issuing Islamic debt has a positive and significant impact on 
shareholders’ wealth for Malaysia and Indonesia. 
 
This study makes substantive contributions to the financial understanding of 
Islamic debt instruments. The analysis is novel in that it breaks away from the 
typically religious discussion of instruments and the very detailed prescriptive 
approach. It provides a considered and carefully crafted micro-econometric 
analysis of market data built upon detailed diagnostic testing and robust model 
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building. This study points the way for future Islamic capital market-based 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the impact of Islamic debt on firm value and/or firm 
financial performance. By reviewing existing literature on emerging and 
developed markets, this study attempts to provide evidence as to whether the 
nature of Islamic debt is different compared to debts incurred in other cultures. 
Existing literature on Islamic debt has focused on the legal aspect of Islamic law, 
and very few studies investigate Islamic debt in the context of corporate finance. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by broadening the body of 
research on this scarcely investigated area. Furthermore, this study also provides a 
significant contribution in its use of large samples, its use of an econometric 
method that, according to data specification testing, is robust, and finally, the 
findings of this study itself, which proves the worthiness of this instrument. 
 
To investigate the impact of Islamic debt on firm value and/or firm financial 
performance, this study adopts three lines of investigation. The first section 
attempts to examine whether there is a difference in company value/and financial 
performance attributable to the proportion of Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt. 
The second section attempts to examine whether the market reacts favourably in 
terms of securing its prices in response to a firm announcing that it has incurred 
debt. The third section attempts to examine whether Islamic debt characteristics, 
Islamic debt issuance frequency, Islamic debt type, and firm performance create a 
wealth effect to shareholders and/or investors. A series of specific research 
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questions relating to these three sections are discussed further on.  Diagnostic tests 
indicate that the methods employed for each section are appropriate and robust.  
 
The data used in this study are firms issuing Islamic debt in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. This study uses ten years’ worth of financial data, spanning from 2000 
to 2009. It is important to note that this data is quarterly data. The significance of 
quarterly data is that the issuance of Islamic debt for every firm occurs in different 
quarters. There are 106 firms issuing Islamic debt in Malaysia and 26 firms 
issuing Islamic debt in Indonesia.  However, due to the fact that some firms have 
incomplete information, only 80 firms for Malaysia and 14 firms for Indonesia are 
analysed in this study. 
 
Finally, by using an appropriate model to test the hypothesis proposed in this 
research which stated in chapter four, the results of this study are significant.  If 
the results reveal that Islamic debt does not have a different impact on 
shareholders/investors compared to other types of debts, then no excuses should 
be made by issuers or investors, and after all, it’s just about how does this Islamic 
debt make a profit. The next section outlines the story of Islamic debt in Malaysia 
and Indonesia, including its development and growing number of issuance. 
 
Recently, there has been growing interest in Islamic instruments such as Islamic 
debt. The growing interest can be seen through an increase in the number and 
diversity of Islamic instruments issued. Moreover, the Islamic instruments are also 
available in non-Muslim countries such as the United Kingdom, and HongKong. 
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Furthermore, Islamic instruments are regarded as a solid instrument choice and 
are taken into consideration in the investment decision.  Most companies now also 
consider having Islamic instruments in their capital structure choice and their 
investment choice. Not only has the growing number of Islamic instruments 
attracted much attention, but the acceptance of Islamic instruments in non-Muslim 
has also attracted much scholarly attention, particularly in the area of its 
regulations and structures. 
 
In Middle East countries, Islamic financial instruments are not considered 
something unusual and new as Islamic financial instruments are a central part of 
their financial industry and are well-established. In Asia, particularly the South 
East Asian region, Malaysia and Indonesia are countries that have a Muslim 
majority. The Islamic finance industry first began with the formation of an Islamic 
bank, but after several years, the Islamic finance industry widened its scope by 
establishing other Islamic financial institutions and instruments including Islamic 
insurance, Islamic stocks, Islamic bonds, Islamic mutual funds, Islamic wealth 
management, and so on. These components working unitary and support each 
other, hence they grow side by side. In Malaysia, the Islamic capital market has 
become established and their products have been growing tremendously, 
particularly Islamic debt. 
 
Furthermore, Malaysia, as one of the pioneering places of Islamic 
instruments, ’has paved the way for the growth of the global Islamic finance and 
capital market in designing its framework and regulations.. Moreover, Malaysia is 
known as the biggest issuer of Islamic debt and the most successful country in 
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developing the Islamic finance industry. The factors contributing to the success of 
the Malaysian Islamic finance industry lie in the integration of key structural 
components, namely the Islamic banking sector, the Islamic debt capital and 
equity market, the Islamic money market, the takaful industry and many other 
peripheral Islamic institutions, and its regulatory infrastructure, including its 
liberalization and provision of incentives to promote the Islamic fund 
management industry. In addition, Malaysia is the first country to issue bonds on 
an Islamic basis. 
 
Unlike Malaysia, Indonesia has just begun implementing Islamic financial 
instruments, starting in the early 1990s. The first Islamic finance entity 
established is Islamic banking, Muamalat Bank. This bank was initially 
established as a pure Islamic bank. Later on, the development of Islamic banking 
in Indonesia was implemented under a dual banking system in compliance with 
the Indonesian Banking Architecture (API). Islamic banking and conventional 
banking systems jointly and synergically support a wider public fund mobilization 
in the framework of fostering financing capability of national economic sectors. 
As time passes, the needs of the Islamic financial supports arise, for example; 
Islamic stocks, Islamic debt and Islamic insurance. In the context of 
macroeconomic management, an extensive use of various Islamic financial 
products and instrument will help to connect the financial sector and real sector, 
creating harmonisation between the two sectors. In addition to supporting 
financial markets and businesses, the wide use of Islamic products and 
instruments will also reduce speculative transactions in the economy, assisting in 
the stability of the overall financial system. 
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This study focuses on Islamic debt in Malaysia and Indonesia, with a particular 
focus on how this instrument adds value to the firm and increases the wealth of 
the firm’s owner. The next section discusses the significance, objective, and 
research questions of this study. 
 
1.1 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Islamic debt, known as sukuk, has evolved to become a significant part of 
corporate capital trading in the secondary market. The development of sukuk is 
supported by many factors, including the development of Islamic banking (takaful) 
and an increasing demand for Islamic products in the debt market. The 
development of sukuk with its associated types of structure has given rise to much 
discussion and debate among scholars of Islamic law. 
 
Recent innovations in Islamic finance have changed the dynamics of the Islamic 
finance industry, especially in the debt markets. Sukuk became increasingly 
popular as companies sought to raise funds by offering corporate sukuk. It has 
become significant for raising funds in the international capital markets through 
Islamic shariah. Increases in this market have been strong all over the world, 
especially in Malaysia, UAE and Saudi Arabia. In 1996 total sukuk issued was 
USD 0.05b rising to USD 15.5b by the end of 2008. The most significant increase 
occurred in 2007 with more than 130 issues valued at USD 34.3b. The trend is 
apparent in Table 1.1 which shows a rapid expansion by value through to the 
financial crisis in 2008. 
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Table 1.1: Global Sukuk Issuance by Year 
Year 
Value USD 
billon 
Number 
1996 0.05 1 
1997 0.9 1 
1998 - - 
1999 0.2 4 
2001 1.6 16 
2002 2.9 23 
2003 4.2 32 
2004 3.5 50 
2005 7.8 96 
2006 19.5 99 
2007 34.3 130 
2008 15.5 174 
Source: Zawya Sukuk Monitor, 2009 
  
Malaysia accounts for 43.7% of sukuk issues followed by UAE with 30.1% and 
Saudi Arabia representing 10.4%. The size of offering by country for 2009 is 
shown in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2: Global Sukuk Issuance by Country in 2009 
Country 
Value USD 
Billion 
Value in % 
Malaysia 31.5 43.67 
Bahrain 5.2 7.21 
Indonesia 0.3 0.42 
UAE 21.7 30.08 
Pakistan 1.5 2.08 
Brunei 
Darussalam 0.7 0.97 
Kuwait 1.8 2.50 
Saudi Arabia 7.5 10.40 
Qatar 1.3 1.80 
UK 0.2 0.28 
Sudan 0.13 0.18 
USA 0.16 0.22 
Germany 0.14 0.19 
Total 72.13 100 
Source: Zawya Sukuk Monitor, 2009 
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In the early years of sukuk’s emergence as a financial instrument, murabahah and 
istisna were the most significant forms of issuance, accounting for 62.5% and 19.5% 
respectively. This changed between 2002 and 2007 when musyarakah and ijarah 
become the largest type of issue, accounting for 36.3% and 28.3% of the total 
market. In 2008 to 2009 the ranking reversed with ijarah and musyarakah 
accounting for 43.4% and 20.8% respectively as reflected in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3: Global Sukuk Issuance by Structure Type 
Year 
Type of 
Structures 
Value USD 
Billion 
Value 
in % 
Phase I Murabahah 1.6 62.5 
(1996-2001) Al Salaam 0.16 6.3 
  Istisna 0.5 19.5 
  Ijarah 0.25 9.8 
  Mudarabah 0.05 2.0 
  Musyarakah - - 
  Al Istithmar - - 
  Hybrid - - 
  Other - - 
  Total 2.56 100.0 
Phase II Murabahah 4.9 6.8 
(2002-2007) Al Salaam 1.9 2.6 
  Istisnaa 4.1 5.7 
  Ijarah 20.5 28.3 
  Mudarabah 8 11.0 
  Musyarakah 26.3 36.3 
  Al Istithmar 2.9 4.0 
  Hybrid 2.8 3.9 
  Other 1 1.4 
  Total 72.4 100.0 
Phase III Murabahah 4 12.8 
(2008-2009) Al Salaam 0.05 0.2 
  Istisnaa 0.08 0.3 
  Ijarah 13.6 43.4 
  Mudarabah 2.5 8.0 
  Musyarakah 6.5 20.8 
  Al Istithmar 3.5 11.2 
  Hybrid 0.075 0.2 
  Al Wakalah 1 3.2 
 
Total 31.305 100.0 
Source: Zawya Sukuk Monitor, 2009 
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The three principles of sukuk– debt based, assets based and equity based –are 
reflected in the instruments listed in Figure 3.17 in Chapter three. Murabahah is 
deferred payment sale or instalment credit sale. Istisna is sale with deferred 
delivery where payment can be a lump sum in advance or progressive instalments 
in accordance with progress made. Musyarakah is a partnership contract in which 
all parties provide working capital, assets, technical or management expertise. 
Ijarah is a bilateral contract allowing the sale of usufruct (beneficial outcome) for 
a specified rent and a specified period, which is in essence a lease. 
 
Murabahah and istisna were more prominent in the early history of sukuk issues 
and are debt based. They may be considered as the first mode of financing used by 
this market. Later, equity based financing (partnership financing) and asset based 
financing have become more favourably received as the preferred form of sukuk. 
The shift of sukuk structures suggests that the market evolved with partnership 
and asset based financing finding more favour. 
 
The increase in the issue size from year to year indicates that this market was 
gradually developing. It became lucrative markets for both the sukuk issuer and 
the sukuk holder, receiving increased support in the form of market surveillance 
and regulation, and from market participants. 
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1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
1.2.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The study investigates the impact of Islamic debt compared to non-Islamic debt 
on company value and company performance. Consideration is also given to the 
short term announcement effects and the longer term impact on company value 
and financial performance of the debt instrument choice. 
 
An unleveraged firm can be seen as an all equity firm, whereas a leveraged firm is 
made up of ownership equity and debt. A firm's debt to equity ratio provides a 
measure of the leverage or gearing. The influence of debt to equity on the value of 
a firm is the subject of multiple articles, including the seminal work of Modigliani 
and Miller. Capital structure is also associated with the cost of capital, which in 
turn will impact the value of the company. Accordingly, minimising the cost of 
capital should result in an increase in the value of the company. 
 
The relationship between company financial structure and value is important and 
continues to be debated in the literature. Modigliani and Miller (M&M) achieved 
notoriety with their proof that capital structure made no difference to company 
value. Subsequent relaxation of the M&M assumptions suggested that debt to 
equity choice does impact on company value. More recent research considering 
bankruptcy costs has contributed to empirical estimates of optimal leverage. The 
M&M argument is that in a perfect market, how a firm is financed is irrelevant to 
its value. However, even though it is widely accepted that the world is not made 
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up of perfect markets, the issue of optimal D/E ratio remains contentious and 
unresolved. 
 
The extent to which the prior research is applicable to Islamic debt, especially in 
an emerging market, requires analysis. Islamic debt known as sukuk, refers to 
business transactions using underlying tangible assets and having no interest 
payments. This form of financial instrument is becoming increasingly popular in 
Islamic countries, which are predominantly emerging markets. It is seen as a 
means of fulfilling the Muslim obligations for adherence to Islamic law while still 
obtaining personal gratification as a reward. 
 
Islamic debt includes no periodic interest payments, and provides a different cash 
flow profile when compared with non-Islamic debt instruments for borrowing 
companies and lenders. There is a socio-religious dimension relating to major 
principles that underlie all business transactions under Islamic law. All business 
transactions must be in line with the teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, 
which have four major prohibitions. The first is the prohibition of riba, known as 
adding any interest payments to a loan or other financing contract. Second is the 
prohibition from gharar and maisir, known as uncertainty and gambling; so 
transactions embodying these attributes will be considered invalid. Third is the 
prohibition of non halal business transactions, such as alcohol and any other 
prohibited and non halal items. The fourth prohibition concerns the general ban of 
contracts that fail to meet the highest Shariah standards (Ayub, 2007). 
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Even though Islamic financial instruments are designed for Muslim needs, 
especially in Muslim countries, the possibility of using these instruments to raise 
funds in non-Muslim countries is open in Germany and the United Kingdom. The 
extent to which strict compliance with Islamic law is achieved by instruments may 
vary to promote market attractiveness. In addition, there is a range of non-Islamic 
debt instruments that involve no explicit interest payments such as discount 
securities and instruments with capitalised interest components. This current 
research explores how the market prices these securities in terms of the yield 
curve and how risk pricing is embedded in the value and performance of 
companies. An initial position assumes that the market efficiently estimates and 
integrates the risk of Islamic and non-Islamic debt into the risk pricing calculus 
and that no bias exists. Consistent with Modigliani and Miller (1958), the 
proposition that the choice of Islamic or non-Islamic debt makes no difference is 
the starting point for the study. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of Islamic debt on company 
value and company performance. The following specific objectives are presented: 
1. To determine whether there is a difference in company value/and financial 
performance attributable to the proportion of Islamic debt and non-Islamic 
debt? 
2. To examine whether the market reacts favourably to a firm announcing an 
issue of Islamic debt in terms of its securities’ price reaction? 
3. To examine whether the Islamic debt characteristics, Islamic debt issuance 
frequency and Islamic debt type, firm performance affect the wealth of 
shareholders? 
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To examine three of the purposes outlined above, this study proposes: 
1. Panel data analysis is employed to examine the first purpose. Furthermore, to 
determine the appropriate panel model for regression analysis, a specification 
testing is conducted. 
2. Event study analysis and unit root tests are employed to examine the second 
purpose. 
3. Multivariate regression analysis for event study is employed to examine the 
third purpose. To determine the appropriate multivariate regression model, a 
specification testing is conducted. 
 
1.2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of Islamic debt on company 
value and company performance. To address this issue series of research 
questions are posed. There are three chapters of analysis for this study; chapter 
five, chapter six and chapter seven. Each chapter has research questions according 
to its objective provided previously. 
Research questions for chapter five are as follows: 
1. Is there a difference in company value/and financial performance attributable 
to the proportion of debt which is Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt?  
2. Does the frequency of Islamic debt issues (first, second and more than twice) 
make a difference in company value and/or firm value/and financial 
performance? 
3. Does the proportion of Islamic debt issues (below the average, average and 
above the average) make a difference in company value and/or firm value/and 
financial performance? 
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4. Does the form of sukuk (debt based, asset based and equity based) make a 
difference in company value and/or financial performance? 
 
Research question for chapter six is as follows: 
1. Does the market react favourably to a firm announcing an issue of Islamic 
debt in terms of its securities’ price reaction? 
2. Are the price movements predictable? 
 
Research questions for chapter seven are as follows: 
1. Does the market react positively to the Islamic debt characteristics? 
2. Does the market react positively to the first issuance of Islamic debt and/or to 
a firm issuing Islamic debt more than once, and does the market react 
positively to Islamic debt’s types? 
3. Does the firm value or firm financial performance affect shareholders’ wealth? 
 
1.3 LIMITATIONS 
Nowithstanding the findings, the current study does have limitations, which point 
potentially fruitful research opportunities. This thesis focuses on the impact of 
Islamic debt on firm value and/or firm financial performance. Extrapolating the 
findings of this thesis and applying them to other countries with different market 
characteristics need to be done with caution. Further studies could consider the 
impact of Islamic debt on corporate governance, agency costs and any other 
impacts. This study used only Malaysia and Indonesia as the sample, and in the 
future further studies could consider the Middle East or any other countries 
issuing Islamic debt. 
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1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is comprised of eight chapters. The current chapter (one) presents an 
introduction and outlines the objectives and the significance of the thesis. Chapter 
two reviews the capital structure literature relevant to this study to establish the 
theoretical context. This review is primarily based on previous studies that 
focused on capital structure and firm financial performance. Due to the lack of 
empirical investigation of Islamic debt in the context of finance theory, this study 
applied existing theories and existing empirical investigations to support the 
results of this study. 
 
Chapter three provides a description of the Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic debt 
market. It includes a brief description on the definition of Islamic debt, the 
structure of Islamic debt and its evolutions, the approved shariah concept and 
principles, the issuance of Islamic debt, and the recent development of Islamic 
debt. 
 
Chapter four describes the research framework, the hypothesis proposed, the data 
used in this study, the measurement of variables and the model specification 
employed for the empirical analysis. Chapter five provides a discussion on 
empirical results of Islamic debt choice on firm value/firm financial performance. 
Chapter six presents the result of event study analysis. Chapter seven provides a 
discussion on empirical results of the multivariate regression for event study. 
Finally, chapter eight summarises the contributions and implications of this thesis 
and it looks at future research directions to which this thesis points. 
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1.5 CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the impact of Islamic debt on firm value and firm financial 
performance, in particular it examines (i) the impact of Islamic debt on firm value 
and firm financial performance, (ii) the Islamic debt announcement effect on stock 
return, (iii) the relationship between Islamic debt characteristics and stock return. 
 
The first and the third objectives of this study are new to Islamic debt research. 
The impact of Islamic debt on firm value and impact of Islamic debt 
characteristics on stock return has not previously been analysed. P rior studies of 
capital structure have focused primarily on conventional debt. The majority of 
studies solely investigated Islamic debt in the context of legal aspects. Therefore, 
there is a gap in prior research in security pricing relating to shariah financing 
products. Although this study conducts a literature review on corporate finance, 
this is used to justify the findings of this thesis as opposed to affecting the results 
of this study. 
 
The second objective of this study is to which investigate the announcement effect 
of Islamic debt on stock return. A few studies have investigated the impact of 
Islamic debt announcement in the context of event study and their results 
areinconclusive. The inconclusive results may be due to several factors, including 
the different timeframes deployed, the different methods utilised, resulting in a 
number of different observations. This study provides new evidence of the Islamic 
debt announcement effect on stock return using a larger data set than prior studies 
and more robust econometric analysis. 
16 
 
In conclusion, this research is considered as being anew due to the lack of studies 
conducted in this type of instrument, therefore, it is expected that the empirical 
results from this study will be a starting point for future research in similar 
instrument. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study covers two scopes of finance theory; first, corporate finance, which in 
particular relates to capital structure, and second, financial market which relates to 
information, market efficiency, and event studies. This chapter, beginning with an 
overview, provides a review of the capital structure literature and the literature of 
the debt (Islamic debt) announcement impact on shareholders’ wealth that is 
relevant to the focus of this study. The theories are fundamental to establishing the 
importance of investigating the impact of Islamic debt on firm value and/or firm 
financial performance and the impact of Islamic debt announcement on 
shareholders’ wealth. A review of capital structure literature emphasising different 
theories and different countries is provided. Furthermore, the literature review 
focuses on the impact of debt in particular Islamic debt announcement on 
shareholders’ wealth. In particular, the focus turns to capital structure in the 
Malaysian and Indonesian context, followed by a chapter conclusion. 
 
The literature relating to Islamic debts has predominantly focused on the legal 
aspects of Islamic law, concept, basic requirements and the validity of how the 
debts are conducted in Islamic financing as general Islamic debt. There is little or 
no prior research relating to risk, impact upon financial performance or corporate 
value. Haneef (2009) discusses the history of sukuk, explaining how it has 
evolved from an asset backed structure, where sukuk holders have ownership 
rights over the underlying asset, to an asset based structure, where sukuk holders 
rank pari passu with unsecured creditors. Other scholars (Abd. Sukor, 2008; Al-
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Amine, 2001; Juan, 2008; Kamali, 2007; Mohd Yatim, 2009; Mokhtar, 2009; Al-
Amine, n.d.; Al Amine, 2008; Usmani, 1999, n.d.; Vishwanath, 2009; Wilson, 
2008, n.d.; Yean, n.d.) also discuss the structure and the regulation of the sukuk 
market in relation to shariah perspective and shariah compliancy. 
 
Most studies were only explanation studies (the presentation of information with 
the orientation on means) about how the concept of Islamic debt (sukuk), 
especially the types of the sukuk structure, namely, musyarakah, murabahah, 
ijarah, mudarabah, istisna, and wakalah were conducted to finance business under 
Islamic law (shariah). No previous research supports or contradicts these studies, 
or, in other words, most of the studies only establish a research territory by 
showing that this research area is important, central and interesting, problematic 
or relevant in some way and only focus on the organisation of data in relation to 
possible outcomes, conclusions or choices (discussion) rather than presenting data 
that is essentially sequential or chronological (recount). The majority of earlier 
studies employ a descriptive and qualitative method of research. 
 
The lack of prior research into the financial aspect of Islamic debt does not reflect 
a lack of concern for such matters, but rather, is a reflection of the newness of the 
topic. There are several studies that discuss Islamic debts, mostly aspects of 
shariah using both qualitative and sequential or chronological (Cakir, 2007; 
Mirakhor, 1996; Mohd Ashhari, 2009; Somolo, 2009; Tariq, 2007; Wilson, 2008). 
So far I have been unable to find research that looks at the effects of Islamic debts 
on the value of the company in international contexts. Thus this study is useful to 
supplement existing studies in this field and serves as a reference for studies in the 
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future. This study will consider how Islamic debt or non-Islamic debt in the 
capital structure impact financial performance and company valuation. 
 
The Islamic financial and economic system has existed since the time of the 
prophet Muhammad SAW. During that time, buying and selling, and savings and 
loans activities were not as extensive as they are now. However, the principle 
remains the same: no interest charged and no non halal products and activities 
permitted. The interest system is not used at all because it is forbidden by Allah 
SWT.  The banning was declared in the Qur'an and the Hadith. 
 
According to Ayub (2007), the prohibition of interest has been mentioned in 
several verses in the Qur'an, such as Verse Al Rum ayat 39, Verse An Nisa ayat 
161, Verse Al Imran ayat 130, Verse Al Baqarah ayat 275, 276, 278, 279, 280 and 
281. In order to perform better as human beings by committing the commands of 
Allah completely, every social and economic must adhere to the shariah. By doing 
so, it is believed that Muslims will be rewarded with personal gratification and 
humankind will benefit at large. 
 
Furthermore, Ayub (2007) describes how business is conducted in Islamic law. 
He mentions that the principle of partnership and other contracts based on genuine 
and valid trading, and leasing activities should be encouraged to replace interest 
based business activities. Profit and loss is shared proportionately based on 
trading, leasing or the Shirkah (partnership) principles. 
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Hossain (2009) discusses three reasons behind the banning of interest in Islam:  
economic harm, social harm and moral harm. First, if people earn money without 
any effort, it will lead to reluctance to work and the decline of motivation. 
Eventually people reduce their interest in productive work which influences and 
hampers the total welfare of society. There is also the probability that the 
exploitation of a loan by some people who borrow money in the name of doing 
business, when it is not used for business at all, will damage the entire economy. 
 
Secondly, the consequences of the poor and needy borrowing from the rich will 
increase class distinction and cause conflict as the rich become richer and the poor 
become poorer. Thirdly, when the interest system exists, greed is encouraged, and 
individuals become motivated to indulge in immoral acts such as theft or extortion 
in order to repay debts or secure their recovery. As a consequence, the kindness, 
fellow feeling, sense of brotherhood and the mentality of helping others gradually 
disappears from society. Muslims believe that if interest is charged, then a man’s 
good deeds will not be accepted and rewarded and that he will be deprived from 
barakah and the blessing of Allah. 
 
2.1 CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY 
2.1.1 MODIGLIANI MILLER THEORY 
Capital structure is widely discussed in the finance literature. The mixture of debt 
to equity in the financial structure of companies and whether it will impact upon 
financial performance risk and valuation is the subject of theoretical and empirical 
studies. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that capital structure is irrelevant, 
thus the total cash flows a company makes for all investors (debt holders and 
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shareholders) are the same regardless of capital structure. On the other hand 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) states that the amount of leverage in a firm’s capital 
structure is associated with its performance. Furthermore, several researchers have 
conducted numerous studies which aim to examine the relationship between 
capital structure and firm performance. However, until now the evidence 
regarding this study is contradictory and mixed. Some researchers (Ebaid, 2009; 
Ni & Yu, 2008; Phillips & Sipahiouglub, 2004) find consistent results with the 
Modigliani and Miller (M&M) theorem. On the other hand, others (Abor, 2007; 
Bhabra et al., 2008) find inconsistent results with the M&M theorem. The focus 
on country effect, for example, in developed and emerging markets has been done 
in some of the studies (Bhabra et al., 2008; Ebaid, 2009). Other studies document 
a focus on firm size, such as large, medium or small companies (Abor, 2007). 
 
The Modigliani and Miller theory (1958) assumes that a capital market is perfect 
(no transaction or bankruptcy costs, perfect information), individuals and 
corporations can borrow at the same rate, and no taxes. It does not matter if the 
firm's capital is raised by issuing stock or debt, or what the firm's dividend policy 
is. Therefore, the M&M theory concludes that capital structure is irrelevant. 
 
Modigliani and Miller made two propositions under these conditions. Their first 
proposition was that the value of a leveraged firm is the same as the value of an 
unleveraged firm. Their second proposition was that the expected return on equity 
is positively related to leverage because the risk to equity holders increases with 
leverage. These two propositions stand on the assumption that taxes are ignored, 
and bankruptcy cost and other agency costs are not considered either. 
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When taxes were taken into account, they had two propositions as well. First, they 
state that the value of the firm is positively related to leverage. It means that 
corporate leverage lowers tax payments because corporations can deduct interest 
payments but not dividend payments. Secondly, they state that the cost of equity 
rises with leverage because the risk to equity rises with leverage. These 
propositions assume that firms have a capital structure almost entirely composed 
of debt. But in the real world, firms cannot stand only with debt or a hundred 
percent leverage because an increase in debt will increase bankruptcy cost and 
agency cost. Consequently, it means that no optimal capital structure exists. 
 
Furthermore, the number of MM-theory studies has increased significantly since 
its inception both in developed and developing countries. While some studies 
have generated findings that support the MM-theory (Dhankar & Boora, 1996; 
Phillips & Sipahioglub, 2004; Carpentier, 2006; Ebaid, 2009), others do not  
(Majumdar & Chhibber, 1999), while others still derive inconclusive results. 
 
The existing literature focuses on the impact of capital structure choices, 
considering country effects such as developed market versus emerging market, 
and firm size effect, such as large companies versus medium or small companies. 
Little attention is drawn to the impact attributable to the proportion of debt that is 
Islamic debt. This study investigates the impact of Islamic debt as a part of capital 
structure upon financial performance and corporate value. 
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2.1.2 TRADE-OFF THEORY 
After the seminal work of M&M, little research has been done to explore capital 
structure in which some assumptions were proposed: trade-off theory and pecking 
order theory.  The trade-off theory derived from the models based on taxes and 
agency cost. Modigliani and Miller (1963), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest the firm has an optimal capital structure by 
offsetting the advantages of debt and the cost of debt. Therefore, trade-off theory 
refers to the idea that a company chooses how much debt finance and how much 
equity finance to use by balancing the costs and benefits. It states that there is an 
advantage to financing with debt, the tax benefits of debt, and tax benefits to be 
had, but there is also a cost to financing with debt, the costs of financial distress 
including bankruptcy costs, and agency costs. This theory suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between debt level and firm performance. Moreover, the 
implication of this trade-off theory is that firms have target leverage and they 
adjust their leverage toward the target over time. In addition, Harris and Raviv 
(1990) imply that higher leverage can be expected to be associated with larger 
firm value, higher debt level relative to expected income, and lower probability of 
reorganization following default. 
 
The empirical relevance of the trade-off theory has often been questioned. Some 
research has been conducted to investigate this theory and the results from various 
contexts are mixed and inconclusive. The evidence does indicate there are likely 
to be differences attributable to firm size, country and the maturity of the 
respective capital market. 
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Furthermore, the number of trade-off theory studies has increased significantly 
since its inceptions both in developed and developing countries. Some may find 
some support (Graham & Harvey, 2001; Dang, 2005; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2007; 
Krishnan & Moyer, 1997; Mayer & Sussman, 2004; Abor, 2007; Coleman, 2007; 
Buferna, Bangassa & Hodgkinson, 2008; Achy 2009), and some may find no 
support to the trade-off theory tested (Fama & French, 2002; Mayer & Sussman, 
2004; Rao, Al Yahyaee & Syed, 2007), and some may find inconclusive results. 
 
STUDIES FOCUSING ON DEVELOPED MARKETS 
Trade-off theory has been tested by researchers in developed markets; most of 
them focus on how the determinant factors affect capital structure choice (Graham 
& Harvey, 2001; Brounen et al., 2006; Vilasuso & Minkler, 2001; Fama & French, 
2002; Dang, 2005; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2007). In developed countries, signalling, 
transactions costs, underinvestment costs, asset substitution, bargaining with 
employees, free cash flow considerations, product market concerns (Graham & 
Harvey, 2001), and institutional differences (Brounen, De Jong &Koedijk, 2006) 
play a significant role in affecting capital structure choice and capital structure 
policies in each country. 
 
 Agency costs and asset specificity are significant determinants of the firm’s 
capital structure, and the cost of external funds depends on the characteristics of 
the assets involved in the project, including asset specificity, the changing 
incentive structure faced by debt, and shareholders’ agency costs (Vilasuso & 
Minkler, 2001). Moreover, to minimise the risk of agency cost and asset 
specificity considerations, equity finance might be best to be used along with the 
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debt as equity finance reduces transaction costs when assets are highly specific. 
Equity finance also offers bondholders greater protection from excessive risk 
taking, which reduces the agency costs of debt (Vilasuso & Minkler, 2001). In 
addition, though, higher leverage is associated with improved efficiency 
(Margaritis & Psillaki, 2007), however, leverage increases agency costs which 
arise from conflicts between debt holders and equity holders or from different 
principal agent objectives. Therefore, firms with more investments have less 
leverage (Fama & French, 2002). 
 
The majority of studies have been conducted in mature markets, including the 
United States, European and Asia Pacific regions, and these exhibit conflicting 
results, however, there are strong resemblances among the four European 
countries and also with the United States when comparing capital structure 
policies (Brounen et al., 2006). These conflicting results may be due to the 
country effect, firm size effect, and time horizon effects. Generalisation of results 
is not currently possible and this emphasises the importance of further empirical 
research. In addition, there is no evidence concerning how Islamic debt impacts 
upon financial performance and corporate value in markets and this last point is 
explored in this study. 
 
STUDIES FOCUSING ON DEVELOPING MARKETS 
There are several studies examining trade-off theory in developing markets. One 
of the empirical findings indicates that profitability performance and capital 
structure are influenced by the country of origin (Krishnan & Moyer, 1997). In 
developing countries, small firms tend to increase their debt instead of opening 
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their capital to outside investors while larger firms seem to rely much more on 
their retained earnings for their long term financial needs (Achy, 2009).  
 
Capital structure influences financial performance (Abor, 2007), therefore highly 
leveraged firms perform better by reaching out to more clientele and by reducing 
default rates. Furthermore, highly leveraged firms enjoy scale economies and 
therefore are better able to deal with moral hazard and adverse selection, and also 
to accommodate risk (Coleman, 2007).  
 
However, the high cost of borrowing and the underdeveloped nature of the debt 
market in developing countries affect the firm performance. Moreover, the tax 
savings a firm receives by using debt do not seem to be sufficient to outweigh the 
costs of using debt, including the high interest cost (Rao et al, 2007). In addition, 
the lack of a secondary market may have an impact on agency costs, as 
shareholders who are unable to offload their shares might exert pressure on 
management to act in their best interests (Buferna et al., 2008). 
 
The majority of prior studies were conducted in mature markets with some based 
in developing markets, including North America, Asia, North Africa, South Africa 
and the Middle East. Previous studies also consider firm size when investigating 
whether large corporations and small and medium size corporations behave 
differently. The results are mixed and inconclusive and emphasise the importance 
of further empirical research. This study addresses the particular gap where there 
is no evidence about how Islamic debt impacts upon financial performance and 
corporate value in markets. 
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2.1.3 PECKING ORDER THEORY 
Pecking order theory was developed by Myers and Majluf (1984). Myers and 
Majluf (1984) assert that firms must issue common stock to raise cash to 
undertake a valuable investment opportunity. Management is assumed to know 
more about the firm’s value than potential investors. Investors interpret the firm’s 
actions rationally. An equilibrium mode1 of the issue-investment decision is 
developed under these assumptions. The model shows that firms may refuse to 
issue stock, and therefore may pass up valuable investment opportunities. The 
model suggests explanations for several aspects of corporate financing behaviour, 
including the tendency to rely on internal sources of funds, and to prefer debt to 
equity if external financing is required. 
 
In addition, Frank and Goyal (2003) state that capital structure is acquired in 
accordance with the priority of the firm in which internal funding is preferable 
and external funding is less preferable. If it is needed, firms could use external 
funding from the lowest risk debt. Therefore, pecking order theory refers to the 
idea that companies prefer to use their sources of financing from internal 
financing to equity. If external financing is required, firms issue the safest security 
first. That is, they start with secure debt, then perhaps equity as a last choice. In 
addition, issue costs are least for internal funds, low for debt and highest for 
equity. There is also the negative signalling to the stock market associated with 
issuing equity, positive signalling associated with debt, and asymmetric 
information between managers and investors. This theory suggests that there is a 
negative relationship between debt level and firm performance. Therefore, the 
implication of this pecking order theory is that firms depend on internal sources of 
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funds and prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. Thus, a firm’s 
leverage is not driven by the trade-off theory, but rather by results of the firm’s 
attempts to mitigate signalling effect and information asymmetry. 
 
Furthermore, the number of pecking order theory studies has increased 
significantly since its inceptions both in developed and developing countries. 
While some find a support to the pecking order theory tested (Titman & Wessels, 
1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Boyle & Eckhold, 1997; Arvin & Francis, 1999; 
Frank & Goyal, 2003; Deesomsak, Paudyal & Pescetto, 2004; Mira & Gracia, 
2008; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-kunt & Maksimovic, 
2001; Prasad, Green & Murinde, 2001; Tong & Green, 2005; Eriotis, Frangouli & 
Neokosmides, 2002; Zeitun & Tian, 2007; Kim & Berger, 2008; Mitton, 2008; Ni 
& Yu, 2008; Sen & Oruc, 2008; Abor & Biekpe, 2009; Ali Ahmed & Hisham, 
2009; Mihalca & Antal, 2009), others do not (Seifert & Gonenc, 2008), while 
others still find inconclusive results (Karadeniz, Kandir, Balcilar & Onay, 2009). 
 
STUDIES FOCUSING ON DEVELOPED MARKETS 
The pecking order theory for developed markets originated with Myers and 
Majluf (1984). There are many subsequent studies that re-examine it. Sunder and 
Myers (1994) re-examine some aspects of the empirical literature on capital 
structure. Others, such as Titman and Wessels (1988), have also attempted to test 
various models by including all hypotheses jointly in the empirical tests. They 
view the theories as contending hypotheses and examine their relative explanatory 
power.  
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Capital structure decisions are not only the product of a firm’s own characteristics 
but also the result of the corporate governance, legal framework and institutional 
environment of the countries in which the firm operates. Moreover, the capital 
structure decision of firms is influenced by the environment in which they operate, 
as well as firm specific factors identified in the extant literature (Deesomsak et al., 
2004). Firm specific determinants of leverage differ across countries, while prior 
studies implicitly assume equal impact of these determinants (De Jong, Kabir & 
Nguyen, 2008). 
 
At an aggregate level, firm leverage is more similar across the G-7 countries, and 
the differences that exist are not easily explained by institutional differences 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Negative influence of profitability on leverage should 
become stronger as firm size increases (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). 
 
Furthermore, in some developed countries, relative transactions costs for debt and 
equity may be an important influence on the financing decisions of firms (Seifert 
& Gonenc, 2008), as transaction costs may be one of the important determinants 
of capital structure choice (Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
 
In addition, firms had converged their capital structure ratios toward the industry’s 
mean (industry’ capital structure ratios), thus confirming the optimal capital 
structure anew (Arvin & Francis, 1999). Firms prefer to use internal sources of 
funding when profits are high (Deesomsak, Paudyal & Pescetto, 2004), therefore, 
the current portion of long term debt is not treated as part of the financing deficit 
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(Frank & Goyal, 2003), and long term debt choices can be attributed to 
differences in firm earning power (Boyle & Eckhold, 1997). 
 
In developed countries, ownership is dispersed and managers and insiders have 
superior information compared to outside shareholders, and hence these 
asymmetric information issues are due more to the quality of information 
provided to investors and the legal rights afforded to these outside investors 
(Seifert & Gonenc, 2008). Asymmetric information theory suggests that firm first 
use retained earnings for new investments and then move to debt and equity if 
necessary. 
 
The majority of studies were conducted in mature markets including the United 
States, Europe, Japan and Asia Pacific regions and they have conflicting results. 
These conflicting results concerning the pecking order theory may be due to the 
country effect, firm size effect and time horizon effect which lead the results to 
behave differently. In addition, previous studies examine that direct effect of 
country factors on corporate leverage and the indirect effect of firm specific 
factors (De Jong et al., 2008); different legal, financial and institutional 
environments (Deesomsak et al., 2004); different corporate governance policy and 
mechanisms; and different macroeconomic environments may contribute to the 
inconclusive results. This emphasises the importance of further empirical research. 
There is no evidence about how Islamic debt impacts upon financial performance 
and corporate value in markets, and this issue will be explored in this study. 
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STUDIES FOCUSING ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Several papers report testing the pecking order theory in developing markets. 
Apparently, variables that are relevant for explaining capital structures in the 
United States and European countries are also relevant in developing countries, 
despite the profound differences in institutional factors across these developing 
countries (Booth et al., 2001). Similar factors, which affect the usage of debt in 
developed countries, may also be used in developing explanations for developing 
countries. Furthermore, the effects of macroeconomic and regional factors have a 
positive impact on firm performance (Zeitun & Tian, 2007). 
 
In developing countries, there are some factors that might affect the usage of debt. 
Internal fund deficiency is one of the most important determinants to explain the 
issuance of new debt (Ali Ahmed & Hisham, 2009). Furthermore, firm specific 
factors and other factors that are related to governance mechanisms of firms in 
developing countries have influence on debt policy choices (Wiwattanakantang, 
1999). The increase in debt ratios can largely be attributed to changes in the 
characteristics of emerging market firms (Mitton, 2008). Firms that prefer to 
finance their investment activities through self-finance are more profitable than 
those that finance their activities through borrowed capital; firms prefer 
competing with each other than cooperating; firms use their investment in fixed 
assets as a strategic variable to affect profitability (Eriotis et al., 2002). Moreover, 
companies with high profitability and good performance have less debt because 
these firms first use internally generated funds and only use debt as a last resort 
(Mihalca & Antal, 2009; Salehi & Biglar, 2009). However, smaller firms would 
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have a preference for inside financing over outside debt financing, as the cost of 
outside financing is greater for the firm (Abor & Biekpe, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, pecking order hypothesis is well explained in Malaysian capital 
market. The static trade-off model is not fit to explain the issuance of new debt 
issue in Malaysian capital market (Ali Ahmed & Hisham, 2009). Malaysian firms 
do not much care about tax shield benefits derived from employing both debt and 
non-debt tax shields (Ali Ahmed & Hisham, 2009). 
 
Firms with different types of controlling shareholders seem to have different 
capital structures. Single family-owned firms where shareholders are involved in 
managing the firm have higher debt levels. Owner managers of this type of firm 
use debt to protect their voting power in the firm, or as a commitment to limit 
agency costs (Wiwattanakantang, 1999). 
 
The majority of studies on pecking order theory have been conducted in mature 
markets with some based on developing markets including Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East. Previous studies also consider firm size, investigating whether large 
corporations and small and medium sized corporations behave differently. The 
results are mixed and inconclusive. In addition, previous studies examined 
different institutional structures (Booth et al., 2001); different governance 
mechanisms (Wiwattanakantang, 1999); different market power and firms 
investment (Eriotis et al., 2002); different regional risk (Zeitun and Tian, 2007); 
different firm characteristics, ownership structure and industry membership 
(Bhabra et al., 2008). In comparison with the abundance of studies on the 
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relationship between capital structure and firm performance and the determinant 
factors of capital structure in conventional debt, only a few studies focus on 
Islamic debt. This study provides evidence about how Islamic debt impacts upon 
financial performance and corporate value in markets. 
 
In conclusion, a major contribution to the related literature will be to measure the 
impact of Islamic debt on company value and financial performance using a 
model that is appropriate and based on the characteristics of the data. Moreover, 
dividing the sample into sub-groups based on the extent of specific country or 
region enables further investigation of the determinant factors on the capital 
structure decision. 
 
2.2 MARKET REACTION ON ISLAMIC DEBT 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
2.2.1 ISLAMIC DEBT ANNOUNCEMENT IMPACT ON STOCK RETURN 
Asian debt markets are considered as less developed due to regulations which are 
effectively impediments to cross-border investment in Asian debt markets (Rhee, 
Lejot, & Arner, 2006). In addition, factors such as a lack of liquid benchmark 
yield curves, irregular frequency of issuance of benchmark government securities, 
inadequate regulatory frameworks and market micro-structure affect the 
activeness of the debt market; in the end, this might affect the issuance process 
including the debt announcement effect. 
 
The impact of debt announcement on stock return has been extensively studied in 
recent years with mixed empirical evidence; however, few studies have attempted 
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to investigate the impact of Islamic debt announcement on stock return. This 
study contributes to existing studies related to the impact of Islamic debt 
announcement on stock return. 
 
Smith (1986), and Magennis, Watts, and Wright (1998) suggest that the 
announcement of debt and equity securities have different impacts on stock return. 
The impact of debt issues announcement can be classified into three groups; first, 
the zero impact hypotheses, second, the positive impact hypotheses, and third the 
negative impact hypotheses. The zero impact hypotheses were proposed among 
others by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller (1977), who assert that the 
leverage has no effect on the firm’s market value. This notion may imply that the 
debt and/or equity issues announcement generates no abnormal returns. 
 
The positive impact hypotheses were proposed among others by Modigliani and 
Miller (1963), Kraus Litzenberger (1973), Brennan and Schwartz (1978), 
DeAngelo and Masuli (1980), Leland and Pyle (1977). They affirm that debt has a 
positive impact on the firm’s market value. According to the asymmetric 
information model, the debt issues announcement increases shareholders’ wealth 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Debt, in particular the conversion ratio of convertible 
debt, may serve as a signal of a firm’s future earnings, thus a large conversion 
ratio implies lower expected earnings because it signals the desire of insiders to 
share risk (Kim, 1990) 
 
The negative impact hypotheses were proposed among others by Myers and 
Majluf (1984), and Miller and Rock (1985). Free cash flow theory suggests that 
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prices decline on the issuance of debt (Jensen, 1986). Increase in debt is seen as a 
diversion of the future cash flows to the bondholders and therefore, shareholders 
might perceive it negatively (Gosh, Varma, & Woolridge, 1990). Furthermore, 
eventual reduction in the ownership concentration may contribute a negative price 
reaction to debt issues (Gosh et al., 1990). The announcement of pure equity 
issuance has been associated with a significantly negative impact, whereas the 
announcement of debt issuance has not been associated with significant price 
reaction (De Roon & Veld, 1998). 
 
Apart from zero impact hypotheses, there are other factors that may affect the 
value of a firm, including the reputations of promoters, the management of the 
company, economic and political conditions, the role of bulls and bears, 
government policies, etc. (Dhankar & Boora, 1996). However, the different types 
of debt also affect the firm’s credit rating, which in turn, has an impact on stock 
returns (Shyam-Sunder, 1991; 1985, Eckbo, 1986; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986). 
 
The stock market reaction to the debt issues announcement has been investigated 
by many researchers. However, there are only a few attempts to examine the stock 
market reaction to the Islamic debt issues announcement, and most of the results 
are inconclusive (Ashhari et al., 2009; Ibrahim & Minai, 2009; Godlewski, Turk-
Ariss & Weill, 2010; Modirzadehbami & Mansourfar, 2011; Modirzadehbami & 
Mansourfar, 2012). Ashhari et al. (2009), and Ibrahim and Minai (2009), however, 
find a positive wealth effect by the announcement of Islamic debt. In contrast to 
Ashhari et al. and Ibrahim and Minai, Godlewski et al. (2010) find a significant 
negative stock market reaction to the announcement of Islamic debt. Like 
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Godlweski, Modirzadehbami and Mansourfar (2011 and 2012) also find a 
negative stock market reaction to the announcement of Islamic debt, but this is not 
to a significant degree. The inconclusive results might be caused by the different 
methods used, the different number of samples used and the different lengths of 
observation periods. This study fills the gap by employing a robust method, a 
larger sample, and a longer period of observation. 
 
2.2.2 MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Fama (1970) was the first scholar to define three types of efficient markets. The 
first of these, weak form efficiency, asserts that stock prices already reflect 
information contained in the past. The second, semi-strong efficiency asserts that 
stock prices already reflect all publicly available information. The third, strong 
form efficiency, asserts that stock prices reflect all relevant information, including 
inside information. This study focuses on the weak form market efficiency 
hypothesis by examining whether the price movements surrounding the Islamic 
debt announcement is predictable or not. This study also seeks to confirm whether 
the generation of abnormal returns are solely driven by the announcement or 
driven by the price trends. 
 
According to Fama (1970), there are a few assumptions embedded in the idea of 
efficient markets: there are no transaction costs, all relevant information is 
available to all market participants without cost, and all agree on the implications 
of current information for the current price and the distributions of future prices. 
In fact, as Fama argues, transaction costs and information are not freely available 
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to all investors. Measuring these effects on the process of price formation is the 
major goal of empirical studies on market efficiency (Fama, 1970). 
 
Many previous studies on weak form efficiency focus only on the level of price 
movement. As Roberts (1959) once noted, financial theories maintain that only 
the patterns of past stock prices need to be studied although successive levels of 
stock prices can reveal an appearance of pattern or trend. Few studies try to relate 
runs of price changes (Roberts, 1959) and the magnitude of the adjustment (Keane, 
1983) into empirical hypotheses settings. Hence, Roberts (1959) invited scholars 
to analyse price changes as well as price levels. 
 
To date, many recent studies have only focused on the conventional securities 
issues, and there is no study that investigates Islamic debt issues in relation to its 
market efficiency. As such, this study addresses this gap by examining the Islamic 
debt issues, and how price movements relate to Islamic debt issues by testing the 
weak form efficiency of the market. Since previous research in this field has been 
limited to the impact of announcements, therefore there is no discussion of the 
previous literature review on Islamic debt.  
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2.3 THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIC DEBT CHARACTERISTICS, 
ISLAMIC DEBT ISSUANCE FREQUENCY, AND ISLAMIC 
DEBT TYPES, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE ON 
SHAREHOLDERS’ WEALTH 
The relationship between debt issues and shareholders’ wealth has been 
investigated by many researchers, but there are few studies which examine this 
issue in relation to Islamic financial instruments, as the focus has been solely on 
the legal aspect of Islamic debt.  However, there are some studies that might be of 
interest to issuers and investors as these studies examine risk, and also propose a 
model to construct Islamic financial benchmarks. Cakir and Raei (2007) assess the 
impact of sukuk issuance based on the cost and risk structure using Value at-Risk 
(VaR) compared to Eurobond. The application of Cakir and Raei’s comparative 
study is limited to international issues of sukuk and conventional debts by the 
governments of Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, and Bahrain. Cakir and Raei suggested 
that the correlations of sukuk returns with conventional debts returns are smaller 
than the correlation of conventional debts returns only. 
 
Furthermore, Mirakhor (1996) proposes a benchmarking of Islamic instruments to 
measure the cost of capital of Islamic investments and to evaluate the efficiency of 
Islamic investments. The uniqueness of his model is his omission of the fixed and 
predetermined interest rate. That is, he bases his model on Tobin’s q formula, but 
omits the debt instrument. Mirakhor did not mention previous research discussing 
this subject matter except that of Khan and Mirakhor (1989) who examine the rate 
of return of Islamic investments’ benchmarking based on the economics’ real 
sector for investment decisions. However, Mirakhor mentions that a fixed and 
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predetermined rate of interest should be omitted in order to measure the cost of 
capital. In addition, Somolo (2009) proposes a method to determine the cost of 
capital of Islamic investments without using the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) as a benchmark based on Capital Asset Pricing Model Theory. 
 
These studies notwithstanding, research focusing on the relationship between 
Islamic debt and shareholders’ wealth is still few (Ashhari et al., 2009; Ibrahim & 
Minai, 2009). The study of Islamic debt has become an important aspect of 
Islamic finance as there has been growing interest in Islamic finance.  
 
Ashhari et al. (2009) investigate the impact of Islamic debt characteristics on 
shareholders’ wealth. They use four explanatory variables such as Islamic debt 
offering size, Islamic debt maturity, debt ratio and firm size. The result reveals 
that only Islamic debt offering size is significant but negative. Furthermore, 
Ibrahim and Minai (2009) also investigate the impact of Islamic debt 
characteristic on shareholders’ wealth; however, they add more explanatory 
variables in their regression model. They used seven explanatory variables such as 
firm size, free cash flows, Islamic debt offering size, Tobin’s Q, leverage, the 
compliancy to Islamic law, and securities commission approval. The result reveals 
that only Islamic debt offering size, Tobin’s Q and securities commission 
approval yield a significant negative on shareholders’ wealth. This result is 
somewhat similar to the study by Ashhari et al. (2009), in which the Islamic debt 
offering size is significant negative on shareholders’ wealth. 
 
40 
 
This study attempts to provide new evidence on how Islamic debt issues impact 
on shareholders’ wealth by extending the explanatory variables, the number of 
samples used, and the period of observations. Furthermore, previous studies have 
failed to consider econometric models which are robust, an omission that this 
study attempts to address. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter, in examining the following areas, adds to the existing literature. 
Figure 2.1 provides a schematic of the contribution. The impact of capital 
structure choice on firm value and/or firm financial performance, in particular, the 
impact of Islamic debt on firm value; market reaction on the Islamic debt issuance 
announcement and its market efficiency; the impact of Islamic debt characteristics, 
Islamic debt issuance frequency and Islamic debt types, firm performance on 
shareholders’ wealth are unified in the context of empirical linkage/ 
 
These contributions extend the domain of Islamic debt studies beyond the primary 
focuses on the legal aspect of Islamic law. Very few studies investigate Islamic 
debt in the context of corporate finance and none in this comprehensive manner. 
The next chapter provides an overview of Islamic debt, including Islamic debt 
definition, Islamic debt structure, Islamic debt evolution and further development. 
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Figure 2.1: The Literature reviews’ gap 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ISLAMIC DEBT 
 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the definition of Islamic debt, and outlines its structures 
and evolutions. While Malaysia represents a mature stage of the Islamic finance 
industry, Indonesia still has a long way to go as it is still in its initial stage. Thus, 
the development and regulation of Islamic debt in Malaysia and Indonesia are 
quite different. Islamic debt is also referred as sukuk, and hereafter this term will 
be frequently used. 
 
3.1 THE MALAYSIAN ISLAMIC DEBT 
Malaysian Islamic debt has developed since the first Islamic debt issue in 1990. 
Malaysia achieved a further significant milestone when a Malaysian corporation 
issued the first global corporate Islamic debt (sukuk), namely The Guthrie Sukuk 
in 2001. A year later Malaysian Global Sukuk Inc. issued the first global 
sovereign sukuk, raising USD600 million (Maimunah, 2010). With this issuance, 
Malaysian Islamic debt became an international benchmark for the issuance of 
global sukuk. 
 
The Malaysian sukuk market attracted a wide range of investors and also became 
more developed in terms of listing. Sukuk were listed on the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange, Labuan International Financial Stock Exchange and Bahrain Stock 
Exchange. The rising demand of Islamic debt, the growing number of issuers, and 
the broadening types of investors led to the development of the sukuk market. 
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Malaysia now has one of the largest Islamic securities of the sukuk market in the 
world, with USD31.5 billion or 43 % of all outstanding sukuk worldwide 
originating from Malaysia at the end of 2009 (RAM Ratings, 2010) 
 
There are two major components to the Islamic corporate securities market: the 
Islamic debt securities market and the Islamic equity market. Islamic debt 
securities (IDS) have become increasingly accepted, along with various types of 
Islamic debt instruments. These Islamic debt securities comprise the medium-term 
Islamic bonds and short-term Islamic commercial papers. The market share of 
Islamic debt securities (IDS) from 2006 to 2009 accounted for 15.1%, 18.7%, 14% 
and 6.5% respectively, as shown in Table 3.0.2. 
 
Table 3.1 presents the government and corporate debt issue in Malaysian currency. 
As can be seen below, the Islamic debt issue fluctuated from 2006 to 2009, similar 
to the corporate debt issue. 
 
Table 3.1: Government and corporate debt issue (in Malaysian currency) 
Government and Corporate Debt Issue (RM) 
Year 
Islamic 
Debt Issue 
Corporate 
Debt Issue 
Total Private 
Debt Issue 
Government 
Debt Issue 
Total Debt 
Issue 
2006         4,780.6           26,956.30           31,736.90         45,280.00       77,016.9  
2007       12,127.0           52,810.20           64,937.20         55,461.80      120,399.0  
2008         7,467.5           45,692.40           53,159.90         63,142.60      116,302.5  
2009         3,785.0           54,790.00           58,575.00         96,795.00      155,370.0  
Source: RAM Ratings, 2010 
 
Figure 3.1 depicts a comparison growth between the Islamic debt issue and the 
corporate debt issue as a percentage. Islamic debt fluctuated slightly in a similar 
pattern to the corporate debt issue but there is a converse relationship in this 
fluctuation. As the Islamic debt rose, the corporate debt declined, that is, from 
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2006 to 2007 Islamic debt rose from 15.1% to 18.7%, and corporate debt declined 
from 84.9% to 81.3%, and did so during 2008 and 2009. Overall, Islamic debt 
accounted for less than 20% of the total private debt issue from 2006 to 2009. 
 
Figure 3.1: Islamic and Corporate Debt Issue 
 
Source: RAM Ratings, 2010 
 
Figure 3.2 depicts the growth of Malaysian sukuk issuance in USD. There was a 
gradual rise in sukuk issue from 1990 to 2005, a steep rise from 2005 to 2007 
before a sharp fall in 2008 and 2009. 
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Figure 3.2: Total Islamic Debt Issue in USDm 
 
Source: IFIS Database, 2010 
 
Possible causes of this large drop in Malaysian sukuk in 2008 are the subprime 
crisis and the effects of the global financial crisis which slowed down the 
economy. Moreover, at the end of 2007 the AAOIFI announced some changes in 
the rules and regulations of the sukuk structure as a requirement for shariah-
compliance, in which this announcement slowed down the growth of the 
instrument (Lahsasna & Idris, 2008). In addition, the report from the AAOIFI that 
85% of Islamic bonds were not shariah-compliant as they included repurchases 
undertakings sent shockwaves through the market in 2007. This report was seen 
as a major reason for the big drop in sukuk issuance in 2008 (Islamic Finance 
News, 2009). 
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Table 3.2 presents the growth of the types of sukuk issue in USD. There was a 
gradual rise in sale-based sukuk and lease-based sukuk from 1990 to 2009, while 
equity-based sukuk fluctuated. 
Table 3.2: Type of sukuk issue (in US$m) 
Year 
Type of Sukuk 
Sale 
Based 
Lease 
Based 
Equity-
based 
Unidentifiable 
1990 $30 $0 $0 $0 
2000 $336 $0 $0 $0 
2001 $530 $250 $33 $0 
2002 $50 $750 $186 $0 
2003 $4,157 $1,050 $587 $23 
2004 $4,689 $2,495 $34 $0 
2005 $6,391 $1,793 $2,400 $213 
2006 $8,195 $4,991 $13,946 $47 
2007 $5,134 $5,091 $35,225 $1,343 
2008 $3,055 $6,440 $7,346 $3,700 
2009 $5,172 $3,340 $4,093 $0 
Source: IFIS Database, 2010 
 
As an adjacent to Table 3.2, Figure 3.3 depicts the growth of the sukuk issue types 
in a line chart. As can be seen, sale based sukuk and lease based sukuk moved in 
the same direction, with both types gradually rising, while equity-based sukuk 
moved upward dramatically between 2005 to 2007. In 2007, equity-based sukuk 
was the most popular type of sukuk issued as it was similar to the growth of 
global sukuk issuance in which musyarakah and ijarah became the largest type of 
issue, accounting for 36.3% and 28.3% of the total market (refer to Table 1.3 in 
chapter one) . Equity-based sukuk represents 75% of sukuk issuance in 2007, but 
in 2008 there was a huge drop in equity-based sukuk for reasons previously 
mentioned. 
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Figure 3.3: Type of sukuk issue (in US$m) 
 
 
As noted above, Malaysian Islamic debt has developed since the first Islamic debt 
issue in 1990, and the development of sukuk involves the issuance numbers, the 
type of structure, and the market. Sukuk listing was introduced in December 2008 
and Bursa Suq Al Sila’ was launched in August 2009. In 24 June 2010, the 
Malaysian Stock Exchange facilitated the issuance of the Malaysian 
Government’s Sukuk 1 Malaysia through Bursa Suq Al-Sila’, the world’s first 
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from 1990 to 2005 and then dramatically rose from 2005 to 2007 before sharply 
falling in both 2008 and 2009. The huge drop in Malaysian sukuk issues might 
have been the result of the subprime crisis and the effects of the global financial 
crisis. Moreover, by the end of 2007 the AAOIFI had announced some changes in 
the rules and regulations of the sukuk structure. The new sukuk structure had to 
observe some points as requirements for the shariah-compliance of sukuk. Indeed, 
the announcement slowed down the growth of the instrument (Lahsasna & Idris, 
2008). 
 
3.2 THE INDONESIAN ISLAMIC DEBT 
Indonesia as one of the biggest Muslim countries in the world holds an enormous 
market for the development of sharia finance industry. The shariah capital market, 
which is part of the shariah finance industry, has an important role in increasing 
the market share of shariah finance industry. Although its development is 
considered new compared to shariah banking, Indonesia’s shariah capital market 
is expected to experience rapid growth along with the significant growth in 
Indonesian capital market. The instruments traded in the shariah capital market 
are shariah securities, for example shariah stocks, shariah mutual funds and 
shariah bonds. 
 
Apart from legal foundations, shariah securities require Islamic law (fatwa) 
foundations that can be used as a reference to the enactment of shariah securities. 
Islamic law is necessary as a basis to establish shariah principles that could be 
applied in the capital market. The milestone of the development of shariah capital 
market in Indonesia was started on July 3
rd
, 2000 by the issuance of the Islamic 
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stock index (Jakarta Islamic Index). However, the shariah capital market is not a 
separate system from the capital market as a whole, and in general, the shariah 
capital market activity is no different with the conventional capital market. 
 
In 2002, the milestone for Islamic debt was started by the issuance of the Fatwa 
No.32/DSN-MUI/IX/2002 concerning shariah bonds. Along with that, the first 
corporate Islamic debt was offered in the Indonesian capital market, and 
fortunately this was over-subscribed with a value double than the offered value. 
Since the first offering, the number of Islamic debt public offerings has increased 
steadily. Until the end of 2010, 47 Islamic debts have been offered to the public 
(Indonesian Stock Exchange, 2011). After 2002, consecutive Islamic laws were 
issued to regulate the Islamic securities instruments in the capital market. Islamic 
debt has become a topic of discussion among Indonesian economists in recent 
years since Islamic debt has attracted considerable attention from both corporate 
issuers and investors. 
 
Figure 3.4 depicts the growth of Indonesian sukuk issuance in USDm. In its initial 
stage in 2003, Islamic debt slightly increased but then declined for two 
consecutive years, however there was a gradual rise in sukuk issuance from 2007 
to 2010, and a decline from 2010 to 2011. 
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Figure 3.4: Total Islamic Debt Issue in USDm 
 
 
Table 3.3 presents the growth of the types of sukuk issue in USDm. There was a 
gradual rise in asset-based sukuk from 2007 to 2010, while debt-based sukuk had 
slight fluctuations from 2003 to 2008. Because Islamic debt was considered a new 
instrument in the Indonesian capital market, investors favoured asset-based type 
compared to debt-based. This initial stage behaviour is similar to the Malaysian 
Islamic debt development when they were also in their initial stages. This may 
indicate that investors preferred to have tangible assets as securitisation. 
 
Whilst the global sukuk issuance experienced a downturn in 2008, Indonesia 
sukuk issuance experienced a gradual rise until 2010. 
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Table 3.3: Type of sukuk issue (in USDm) 
Year 
Type of Sukuk 
Total 
Debt-based Asset-based Equity-based 
2003  $             41.95   $             22.97   $                  -     $           64.92  
2004  $             26.08   $             66.74   $                  -     $           92.82  
2005  $                  -     $             38.28   $                  -     $           38.28  
2007  $             13.71   $             21.70   $                  -     $           35.41  
2008  $             55.90   $             48.70   $                  -     $         104.60  
2009  $                  -     $           151.64   $                  -     $         151.64  
2010  $                  -     $           189.00   $                  -     $         189.00  
2011  $                  -     $           100.00   $                  -     $         100.00  
Source: IFIS database, 2011 
    
As an adjacent to Table 3.3, Figure 3.5 depicts the growth of the Islamic debt 
type’s issuance in a line chart. As can be seen, debt-based sukuk and asset-based 
sukuk moved in the same direction from 2004 to 2008, with both types gradually 
rising. However, after 2008, there was no issuance of the debt-based type, while 
asset-based sukuk gradually rose until 2010. 
 
Figure 3.5: Type of sukuk issue (in USDm) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 exhibits the type of investors in Islamic debt. The figure shows that 37% 
are shariah investors while 63% are non-shariah investors. There might be reasons 
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why Islamic debt could attract more non-shariah investors than shariah investors. 
It also indicates that Islamic debt is not only seen as an Islamic product, but also a 
profitable product. 
Figure 3.6: The profile of corporate sukuk investors 
 
Source: Bapepam-LK Statistics Department, 2011 
 
 
3.3 UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAMIC DEBT 
3.3.1ISLAMIC DEBT DEFINITION 
According to the Securities Commission Malaysia, Islamic debt is defined as 
“certificates of equal value which evidence undivided ownership or investment in 
the assets using Shariah principles and concepts approved by the Shariah 
Advisory Council (SAC)” (Sukuk Guidelines 2011, Securities Commission 
Malaysia, 2011).  Similarly, the Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) has also defined Islamic debt as: 
Certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in the 
ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the 
ownership of) assets of the particular projects or any specified 
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investment activity. Investment of sukuk should be distinguished 
from common shares and bonds. While shares represent the 
ownership of a company as a whole and are for an indefinite 
period, sukuk represent specified assets and are for a given period 
of time. Sukuk, unlike bonds, carry returns based on cash flow 
originating from the assets on the basis of which they are issued 
(Ayub, 2007; p.392). 
 
Similarly, Indonesian Capital Market Regulatory, BAPEPAM-LK Rule No. 
IX.A.13, defined Islamic debt as “sharia securities in a form of certificate or 
proof of ownership which have the same value and represent participation unit 
which is not separated from or consists of”. 
 
In its simplest form, the owner of sukuk certificates is involved in the real 
business/real asset/real projects from which profit is generated based on equal 
value of the money they have invested in the business/assets/project. Through the 
sukuk structure, investors/sukuk holders enjoy the benefit of being backed by 
assets, which afford investors with a level of protection which may not be 
available from conventional debt securities. Additionally, unlike conventional 
debt securities that mirror debts or loans on which interest is paid, the sukuk can 
be structured based on innovative applications of Islamic principles and concepts. 
However, the sukuk does share some similarities with conventional debt securities, 
in that it is structured based on assets that generate revenue. The underlying 
revenue from these assets represents the source of income for the payment of 
profit on the sukuk (Ibrahim & Wong, 2006; Jalil, 2005; Mohd Zin, Sakat, Ahmad, 
Mohd. Nor, Bhari, Ishak & Jamain, 2011). Furthermore, Usmani (2009) and 
Mohd Zin et al (2011) explain that the sukuk is an exchange of assets that enable 
investors to receive profits from the assets purchased. If the sukuk issuer defaults 
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or some other default eventually occurs, then investors can claim some of their 
investment assets which have been secured as collateral in the sukuk contract. 
 
Table 3.4: The differences between Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt 
Islamic Debt Conventional Debt 
Islamic debt represents ownership of 
the real assets. 
Conventional debt represents debt 
obligations on the money borrowed. 
Islamic debt issued only to finance 
assets/projects which adhere to the 
Islamic law. 
Conventional debt may be issued to 
finance any purpose. 
The relationship between sukuk issuer 
and sukuk holder is cooperative. 
The relationship between debt issuer 
and debt holder is lender/borrower. 
Islamic debt offers a profit generated 
from assets/projects’ revenue. 
Conventional debt offers fixed or 
variable interest on the money 
borrowed. 
The sale of Islamic debt represents a 
sale of a share on an asset. 
Conventional debt is basically the sale 
of debt. 
Islamic debt price depends on the 
supply and demand (market driven) to 
value the underlying asset in trading. 
Conventional debt price depends solely 
on the creditworthiness of the debt 
issuer. 
Source: Vishwanath and Azmi, 2009 
 
Table 3.4 above shows the differences between Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt. 
Islamic debt represents ownership, pays a profit payment to the debt holders 
instead of an interest payment, and does not guarantee the return of principal 
when redeemed at maturity if the enterprise suffers losses. It can be concluded 
that an Islamic debt is secure compared to non-Islamic debt due to the underlying 
assets involved in an Islamic debt transaction. In addition to the differences stated 
above between Islamic debt and conventional debt, some further parameters can 
be used to thoroughly differentiate the instruments. Five parameters are shown in 
Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Parameters to distinguish the differences between Islamic debt and 
non-Islamic debt 
Parameter Islamic Debt Conventional Debt 
Issuer Sukuk issuers engage in the 
business activity that is 
permitted under Islamic law. 
An issuer of conventional 
debt is not limited in its 
business activities. 
Investor Enjoys a wider investor from 
both Islamic and conventional 
investors. 
Conventional debt can only 
tap the conventional 
investors. 
Ownership Investors take direct 
ownership of the 
business/asset/project. 
A conventional debt is purely 
the financial debt of the 
issuers. 
Administrative 
cost 
Additional fees in terms of 
legal and shariah advisory fee. 
No additional administrative 
costs. 
Financing cost A larger pool of sukuk 
investors creates more 
demand, hence may be able to 
achieve slightly more 
competitive pricing. 
A comparatively smaller 
pool of conventional debt 
investors suggests that there 
is less demand for the debt. 
Source: KFH, 2010 
 
As noted in the earlier definition, Islamic debt is involved in real business/real 
asset/real projects. For the real asset, two types of structure are mostly used in 
transactions: asset-based structure and asset-backed structure. While the asset-
backed structure is accepted widely and enjoys significant development, in a few 
countries, the asset-based structure has been debated regarding its compliance 
with Islamic law. The critical issues of shariah in the asset-based structure have 
been reviewed among Islamic scholars (Haneef, 2009; Dusuki 2010). 
 
Haneef (2009) discusses the development of the asset-based structure and asset-
backed structure, and outlines how Islamic debt has shifted from an asset-backed 
structure toward an asset-based structure, and the shariah issues arising in the 
asset-based structure. Furthermore, Dusuki (2010) has conducted a critical 
examination of the shariah issues in the asset-based structure. Dusuki states that 
there are many contentious shariah issues arising in the asset-based structure. 
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These issues include: the ownership issue, that is, sukuk holders have no interest 
on the underlying assets even though they are supposed to own the assets; that 
sukuk holders have no right to dispose of the asset; and the sukuk gives no 
additional security for the sukuk holders in the case of dissolution (financial 
insolvency) and therefore the underlying asset that will be sold back to the sukuk 
issuer at par is not sufficient to pay back the sukuk holders. The distinction 
between asset-based and asset-backed structure is provided below. 
 
The difference between asset-based structure and asset-backed structure 
The asset-based structure is referred to as a sale and purchase agreement involved 
in a financial activity. The sukuk holders’ interest in the asset-based structure is 
only a security interest; therefore, the credit worthiness of the originator (obligor) 
is important to the sukuk holders as it affects the sukuk’s credit quality and rating. 
In contrast, the asset-backed sukuk is referred to as a true sale transaction. The 
sukuk holders’ interest in the asset-backed structure is an ownership interest, and 
the asset purchased by investors is the source of profit and capital payment from 
the originator. 
 
Table 3.6 summarises the differences between asset-based structure and asset-
backed structure: 
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Table 3.6: The differences between asset-based structure and asset-backed 
structure 
Asset-based structure Asset-backed structure 
The transaction is closely similar to the 
mirror debt therefore the interest is 
limited to the security interest. 
The transaction is a true transaction of 
an asset therefore the interest is 
ownership interest. 
Credit quality of the originator/obligor 
is very important since it reflects the 
asset’ credit quality. 
The credit quality of the originator is 
not an issue because the investors buy 
and own the asset sold from the 
originator. 
The source of payment usually comes 
from issuer/obligor’s cash flow. 
Main source of profit and capital 
payment is the revenue from the 
underlying assets. 
Sukuk holders do not bear any losses 
due to the impairment of the asset. 
Sukuk holders bear any losses due to 
the impairment of the asset. 
Normally structured as on balance 
sheet. 
Can either be on or off balance sheet. 
 
While debate exists regarding the acceptance of asset-based structure, the asset-
based structure enjoys considerable growth and the number of issuances in the 
debt market indicates that it is one of the most popular choices of debt. Why and 
how the asset-based structure has become more popular than the asset-backed 
structure has been attracting considerable attention among Islamic scholars and 
market players. 
 
3.3.2 THE STRUCTURE OF ISLAMIC DEBT 
Section 1 to section 4 provides the transaction process of the asset-based structure 
that is classified into lease-based (Ijarah) and sale-based (Murabahah, Salam and 
Istisna’) respectively while section 5 to section 7 provides the transaction process 
of the asset-backed structure that is classified into partnership-based (Mudarabah 
and Musyarakah) and agency-based (Wakalah). Section 8 is the hybrid structure 
that can be comprised from a lease-based and sale-based structure or partnership-
based and an agency-based structure. 
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1. Ijarah sukuk 
Ijarah sukuk is divided into purchase agreements, lease agreements, servicing 
agreements and purchase undertakings. It is based on letting property rights to any 
other beneficiary based on the agreed price. Ijarah sukuk is issued on a sale and 
leaseback arrangement (Ijarah) of assets. The process can be represented 
schematically as shown in Figure 3.7. 
Figure 3.7: Ijarah Sukuk Structure 
 
Steps involved in the Ijarah sukuk structure: 
1. The originator sells certain assets to the SPV at an agreed pre-determined 
purchase price. 
2. The SPV raises financing by issuing sukuk certificates in an amount equal to 
the purchase price of the asset, and the fund received from an investor is 
passed on to the originator. 
3. A lease agreement is signed between the SPV and the originator for a fixed 
period of time where the originator leases back the asset as lessee. 
4. The SPV receives periodic rental payment from the originator and this 
payment is distributed among the investors (sukuk holders). 
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5. At maturity/or on a dissolution event, the SPV sells the assets back to the 
seller at a predetermined value. That value should be equal to any amounts 
still owed under the terms of ijarah sukuk. 
 
2. Murabahah sukuk 
The issuer of murabahah sukuk certificate is the seller of the murabahah 
commodity and the subscribers are the buyers of that commodity, and they are 
entitled to its final sale price upon the re-sale of the commodity. Murabahah sukuk 
cannot be legally traded on the secondary market, as the certificate represents a 
debt owing from the subsequent buyer of the commodity to the sukuk holders, and 
such trading of debt on a deferred basis is not permitted under Islamic law. Figure 
3.8 illustrates the structure and numbered steps of the Murabahah sukuk structure. 
Figure 3.8: Murabahah Sukuk Structure 
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Steps involved in the Murabahah sukuk structure: 
1. An agreement is signed between the borrower and the SPV. 
2. The SPV issues sukuk to raise funds and receives cash from the investors. 
3. The SPV buys the commodity from the commodity supplier on an on-the-spot-
basis and the commodity supplier receives payment. 
4. The SPV sells the commodity to the borrower on the spot price plus a profit 
margin based on the agreement, and the borrower sells the commodity to the 
commodity buyer on the spot price. 
5. The borrower receives payment from the commodity buyer and pays the SPV. 
The Investor receives the final sale price and profit margin from the SPV. 
 
3. Salam sukuk 
Salam sukuk is the sale of a specific commodity well defined in its quality and 
quantity which will be delivered on a fixed date in the future, and full payment in 
advance based on the spot price. Additionally, salam sukuk is a certificate of 
equal value  issued for  the purpose of mobilizing salam capital,  therefore  the  
goods  to  be  delivered  on  the  basis  of  salam  come  into  the  ownership  of  
the certificate holders. 
 
Furthermore, the issuer of the certificates is a seller of the goods of salam and the 
subscribers  are  the buyers of  the  goods, while  the  funds  received  from  the 
subscription are  the purchase price  (salam  capital)  of  the  goods.  The  holders  
of  salam  certificates  are  the  owners  of  the  salam  goods and are entitled  to  
the  sale price of  the certificate or  the  sale price of  the salam goods sold. Figure 
3.9 illustrates the structure and numbered steps of the salam sukuk structure. 
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Figure 3.9: Salam Sukuk Structure 
 
 
 
Steps involved in the Salam sukuk structure: 
1. The SPV signs a contract with obligator 1 to provide both commodities and 
buyers. The contract of obligator 1 contract is to buy on behalf of the sukuk 
holders (investors) and to sell the commodity for the profit of the sukuk holders. 
2. The SPV issues sukuk to raise funds and receives funds from the investors. The 
fund received is used to pay obligator 2 who sells the commodity on a forward 
basis. 
3. The SPV receives the commodity from obligator 2 and hands over the 
commodity to obligator 1. 
4. Obligator 1 sells the commodity for a profit and transfers the profit to the SPV. 
The SPV distributes proceeds of the commodity sale to the investors. 
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4. Istisna’sukuk 
Istisna’sukuk is a sale and purchase agreement that serves to finance a project. 
The Istisna’sukuk certificate carries equal value and is issued to mobilize funds 
required for production of goods products that will be owned by the certificate 
holders. Moreover, the issuer of these certificates is the manufacturer and the 
subscribers are the buyers of the intended product, while the funds received from 
the subscription are the cost of the product. In addition, Islamic law prohibits 
these certificates to be traded in the secondary market. Figure 3.10 illustrates the 
structure and numbered steps of the Istisna’sukuk structure. 
Figure 3.10: Istisna’ Sukuk Structure 
 
 
 
Steps involved in the Istisna’sukuk structure: 
1. The SPV issues sukuk to raise funds and receives cash from the investor. 
2. The SPV pays the contractor and the contractor delivers the 
goods/commodities to the SPV. 
3. The SPV sells the goods/commodities to the buyer and receives periodic 
payments from the buyer. 
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4. The investor receives periodic payments from the SPV. 
 
5. Mudharabah sukuk 
Mudharabah sukuk is divided into mudharabah agreement and purchase 
undertaking. It is a cooperation agreement between two parties, that is, investors 
and managers of the capital. Mudharabah sukuk is investment sukuk that 
represents common ownership of units of equal value in the mudharabah equity. 
Moreover, the holders of Mudharabah sukuk are the suppliers of capital, the 
owner’s shares in the mudharabah equity, and receive returns according to the 
percentage of ownership share. Additionally, mudharabah sukuk holders have the 
right to transfer the ownership by assets on the securities market. Figure 3.11 
illustrates the structure and numbered steps of the Mudharabah sukuk structure. 
Figure 3.11: Mudharabah Sukuk Structure 
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Steps involved in the Mudharabah sukuk structure: 
1. The SPV makes an agreement with the project owner for a new project/existing 
project. 
2. The SPV issues sukuk to raise funds and issues sukuk certificates to the 
investors. 
3. (3a) The SPV receives the funds raised and (3b) transfers the funds to the 
project owner. 
4. The SPV receives the regular profit payments and distributes the profit among 
investors (at the end of the project, the investor will receive principal capital 
and final profit). 
5. Upon completion, the SPV hands over the finished project to the project owner. 
 
6. Musyarakah sukuk 
Musyarakah sukuk is divided into musyarakah agreements, management 
agreements, and purchase undertakings. It involves cooperation of two parties to 
incorporate a capital for a specific purpose. Moreover, the issuer of musyarakah 
sukuk contributes the subscription proceeds to create a joint venture with the 
originator who contributes either his/her own capital/asset or makes a contribution 
in kind. The issuer and the originator share the profits according to an agreed ratio; 
any losses must be shared according to the ratio of capital contributed as it is 
required under Islamic law. Figure 3.12 illustrates the structure and numbered 
steps of the Musyarakah sukuk structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Figure 3.12: Musyarakah Sukuk Structure 
 
 
 
Steps involved in the Musyarakah sukuk structure: 
1. The corporate contributes land or other physical assets to the musyarakah. 
2. The SPV receives cash from the investors and transfers it to the musyarakah. 
3. The SPV issues sukuk certificates to the investors as the investors are the 
owner of the project/assets as per their respective shares. 
4. The musyarakah appoints the corporate as an agent to develop the project with 
the cash injected into the musyarakah. The musyarakah sells/leases the 
developed assets on behalf of the musyarakah, and the corporate will receive a 
fixed agency fee plus a variable incentive fee payable. 
5. The SPV receives a profit and distributes the profit to the investors (profit 
sharing ratio). 
6. The corporate irrevocably undertakes to buy at a pre-agreed price the 
musyarakah shares of the SPV (i.e. semi-annual basis), and at the end of the 
fixed period the SPV would no longer have any shares in the musyarakah. 
66 
 
7. Wakalah sukuk 
Wakalah sukuk is defined as a contract whereby a party authorises another party 
to act on its behalf based on agreed terms and conditions. Figure 3.13 illustrates 
the structure and numbered steps of the Wakalah sukuk structure. 
Figure 3.13: Wakalah Sukuk Structure 
 
 
 
Steps involved in the Wakalah sukuk structure: 
1. The SPV and the investors come into a contract agreement in that the SPV acts 
on behalf of the investors (The SPV will receive a management fee as their 
compensation). 
2. The SPV issues sukuk certificates to the investors as the sukuk holders and the 
SPV receives funds from the investors to be invested in the shariah compliant 
activities or projects. 
3. To generate profit, the SPV invests the funds to other parties (Mudharabah, 
Ijarah, and other shariah compliant contracts). 
4. The SPV receives profit from the investment. 
5. The SPV transfers the profit to the investors. 
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8. Hybrid sukuk 
Hybrid sukuk is an innovative form of sukuk which is structured around the 
various demands of investors.  Hybrid sukuk is a more diversified form of sukuk 
emerging in the market. The assets can comprise of istisna’, murabahah as well as 
ijarah sukuk. For instance, the Islamic Development Bank issued the first Hybrid 
Sukuk for US$400 million. The assets comprised 66% Ijarah sukuk, 31% 
Murabahah and 3% Istisna’sukuk. The hybrid sukuk structure represents the 
potential of new structures and benefits to the investors. Figure 3.14 illustrates the 
structure and numbered steps of the Hybrid sukuk structure. 
Figure 3.14: Hybrid Sukuk Structure 
 
 
 
Step involved in the Hybrid sukuk structure: 
1. The originator transfers the tangible assets plus murabahah deals to the SPV. 
2. The SPV issues sukuk to raise funds and receive funds from the investors. 
3. The originator purchases the assets from the SPV and pays fixed payment to 
the SPV. 
4. The investors receive fixed payment of return on the asset. 
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The various types of sukuk structures explained above have their own particular 
roles, positions and characteristics within the sphere of Islamic financial 
transactions. Therefore, the evolutionary process that has led to their creation  is 
an important subject of discussion and has been taken up by the likes of Tariq and 
Dar(2007), Haneef (2009) and Dusuki (2010). 
 
3.3.3THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC DEBT 
The Islamic financial and economic system has existed since the time of the 
prophet Muhammad SAW. During that time, buying and selling, and savings and 
loans activities were not as extensive as they are now. However, the principle 
remains the same; no interest charged and no non halal products and activities 
permitted. The interest system is not used at all because it is forbidden by Allah 
SWT.  The banning was declared in the Qur'an and the Hadith. 
 
According to Ayub (2007), the prohibition of interest has been mentioned in 
several verses in the Qur'an, such as Verse Al Rum ayat 39, Verse An Nisa ayat 
161, Verse Al Imran ayat 130, Verse Al Baqarah ayat 275, 276, 278, 279, 280 and 
281. In order to perform better as human beings by committing the commands of 
Allah completely, all the shariah must be applied to every social and economic 
aspect. By doing so, Muslims will be rewarded with personal gratification and 
human kind will benefit overall. 
 
Furthermore, Ayub (2007) describes how business is conducted in Islamic law. 
He mentions that the principle of partnership and other contracts based on genuine 
and valid trading, and leasing activities should be encouraged to replace interest 
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based business activities. Profit and loss is shared proportionately based on 
trading, leasing or the Shirkah (partnership) principles. 
 
Hossain (2009) discusses three reasons behind the banning of interest in Islam; 
economic harm, social harm and moral harm. First, if people earn money without 
any effort, it will generate a reluctance to work and the decline of motivation. 
Eventually people will reduce their interest in productive work which influences 
and hampers the total welfare of society. There is also the probability that the 
exploitation of a loan by some people, who borrow money in the name of doing 
business, when it is not used for business at all, will damage the entire economy. 
 
Secondly, the consequences of the poor and needy borrowing from the rich will 
increase class distinction and cause conflict as the rich become richer and the poor 
become poorer. Thirdly, when the interest system exists in society, greed is 
encouraged, and individuals become motivated to indulge in immoral acts such as 
theft or extortion in order to repay debts or secure their recovery. As a 
consequence, the kindness, fellow feeling, sense of brotherhood and the mentality 
of helping others gradually disappears from society. Muslims believe that if 
interest is charged, then a man’s good deeds will not be accepted and rewarded 
and that he will be deprived from barakah and the blessing of Allah. 
 
According to AAOIFI standards for investment sukuk, there are seven types of 
sukuk as investment certificates (Ayub, 2007; p.396): 
1. Sukuk ownership in leased assets: further divided into sukuk of ownership of 
usufruct of existing assets, sukuk of ownership of described future assets, 
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sukuk of ownership of services of a specified party and sukuk of ownership 
of described future services 
2. Salam Sukuk 
3. Istisna’Sukuk 
4. Murabaha Sukuk 
5. Musharakah Sukuk: further divided into participation certificates, Mudarabah 
Sukuk and investment agency sukuk. Muzara’ah (share-cropping) Sukuk. 
6. Musaqah (projects involving irrigation of fruit-bearing trees) Sukuk. 
7. Mugharasah (projects involving plantation of gardens) Sukuk 
 
Meanwhile, Ayub (2007; pp.398-406) also discusses various categories of sukuk, 
such as: 
1. Muqaradah or Mudarabah Sukuk, which refers to certificates that represent 
projects or activities managed on the mudarabah principle by appointing any 
of the partners or any other person as mudarib for management of the 
business. 
2. Musharakah Sukuk, which refers to a mode of sukuk that can serve as a basis 
for securitisation easily, especially in the case of big projects where huge 
amounts of capital are required. 
3. Ijarah Sukuk, which refers to certificates that are issued on stand-alone assets 
as identified on the balance sheet. The assets can be parcels of land to be 
leased or leased equipment, such as aircrafts and ships. The rental rates of 
returns on these sukuk can be fixed or floating depending on the particular 
originator. 
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4. Salam Sukuk, which refers to a contract in which advance payment is made 
for goods to be delivered later on. 
5. Istisna’Sukuk, which refers to a contractual agreement for manufacturing 
goods, allowing cash payment in advance and future delivery of a future 
payment and future delivery of the goods manufactured, as per the contract. 
6. Securitisation on the basis of murabahah and Murabahah Sukuk 
7. Mixed Portfolio Sukuk, which refers to a combination or pool of musharakah, 
ijarah and some murabaha, salam, istisna’ and ju’alah (a contract for 
performing a given task against a prescribed fee in a given period) contracts. 
 
Figure 3.15 depicts sukuk categorisation from both AAOIFI and Ayub (2007) 
taxonomies. 
Figure 3.15: Categorisation of sukuk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The AAOIFI 
Muqharasah sukuk 
Istisna’a sukuk 
Musharakah sukuk 
Musaqah sukuk 
Murabaha sukuk 
Muzara’ah sukuk 
Leased assets sukuk 
Salam sukuk 
Ayub, 2007 
Muqadarah or mudarabah sukuk 
Mushaakah sukuk 
Ijarah sukuk 
Salam sukuk 
Istisna’a sukuk 
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Jalil (2005) categorises Islamic debt into five categories, that is, loan-based bonds, 
sale-based bonds, and lease-based bonds, equity-based bonds, and hybrid-based 
bonds. Likewise, Mohd Zin et al (2011) also explain various categories of Islamic 
debt, that is, ijarah sukuk, mudharabah sukuk, musyarakah sukuk, istisna’sukuk, 
murabahah sukuk and hybrid sukuk. 
 
In addition, Securities Commission’s Shariah Advisory Council Malaysia (SAC 
Malaysia) and Securities Exchange Commission of Indonesia (SEC Indonesia) 
also define the sukuk structure concepts for the purpose of structuring, 
documenting and trading of Islamic securities (Securities Commission Malaysia, 
2009). Table 3.16 shows the sukuk structure defined by SAC Malaysia and SEC 
Indonesia. 
Table 3.7: Sukuk structure concepts defined by SAC Malaysia and SEC Indonesia 
Profit and Loss-sharing 
(Musyarakah) 
 
A partnership arrangement between two parties or more to finance a business 
venture, where all parties contribute capital either in the form of cash or in 
kind for the purpose of financing the business venture. Any profit derived from 
the venture will be distributed based on a pre-agreed profit-sharing ratio, but a 
loss will be shared on the basis of equity participation. 
Profit-sharing 
(Mudharabah) 
 
A contract between 2 parties to finance a business venture. The parties are a 
rabb al-mal or investor, who solely provides the capital; and a mudharib or 
entrepreneur, who solely manages the project. If the venture is profitable, the 
profit will be distributed based on a pre-agreed ratio. In the event of a business 
loss, it shall be borne solely by the provider of the capital. 
Leasing (Ijarah) A benefit (usufruct) type of contract, where a lessor (owner) leases out an asset 
or equipment to its client at an agreed rental fee and pre-determined lease 
period upon the ‘aqad (contract). The ownership of the leased equipment 
remains in the hands of the lessor. 
Deferred-payment Sale 
(Bai’ Bithaman Ajil or 
BBA) 
A contract that refers to the sale and purchase transaction for the financing of 
an asset on a deferred and instalment basis, with a pre-agreed payment period.  
The sale price will include a profit margin. 
Sale with Immediate 
Repurchase (Bai’ ‘Inah) 
A contract that involves the sale and buy-back of an asset by a seller. A seller 
will dispose of the asset to a buyer on a cash basis. The seller will immediately 
buy back the same asset on a deferred-payment basis, at a price that is higher 
than the cash price. It can also be applied when a seller sells the asset to a 
buyer on a deferred basis. The seller will later buy back the same asset on a 
cash basis, at lower than the deferred price. 
Supply Sale (Bai’ 
Istijrar) 
A contract between a client and a supplier, where the supplier agrees to supply 
a particular product on an on going basis, e.g. monthly, at an agreed price and 
on the basis of an agreed mode of payment. 
Advance Purchase (Bai’ 
Salam) 
 
A sale and purchase contract, where the payment is made in cash at the point 
of contract, but the delivery of the asset purchased will be deferred to a 
predetermined date. 
Sale and Repurchase 
(Bai’ Wafa’) 
A contract with the condition that when the seller pays back the price of goods 
sold, the buyer returns the goods to the seller. 
Lease to Purchase 
(Ijarah Thumma Bai‘) 
A contract that begins with an Ijarah contract, for the purpose of renting out a 
lessor’s asset to a lessee. At the end of the lease period, the lessee will 
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purchase the asset at an agreed price from the lessor, by executing a purchase 
(Bai‘) contract. 
Purchase Order 
(Istisna’) 
A purchase contract for an asset, where a buyer will place an order to purchase 
the asset that will be delivered in the future. In other words, the buyer will 
require a seller or a contractor to deliver or construct the asset that will be 
completed in the future, according to the specifications in the sale and 
purchase contract. Both parties in the contract will decide on the sale and 
purchase prices as they wish, and settlement can be delayed or arranged based 
on the schedule of work completed. 
Cost-plus Sale 
(Murabahah) 
A contract that refers to the sale and purchase transaction for the financing of 
an asset, where the cost and profit margin (mark-up) are made known and 
agreed to by all parties involved. The settlement of the purchase price can be 
either on a deferred lump-sum basis or an instalment basis, which will be 
specified in the agreement. 
Benevolent Loan 
(Qardh Hasan) 
A contract of loan between two parties on the basis of social welfare or to 
fulfil a short-term financial need of the borrower. The sum of repayment must 
be equivalent to the amount borrowed. It is however legitimate for a borrower 
to pay more than the amount borrowed, as long as it is not stated or agreed at 
the point of contract. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia and Securities Commission Malaysia, 2009 
 
Tariq and Dar (2007), and Haneef (2009) divide sukuk based on the evolution of 
sukuk structures into three phases, namely, the asset-backed sukuk, asset-based 
sukuk, and hybrid sukuk. Many factors influence the evolution of sukuk structure. 
At the beginning of the emergence of sukuk, debt-based sukuk is Murabahah 
sukuk. The debt-based sukuk’s mechanism is that the sukuk holders (investors) 
purchase assets or goods from a third party based on the request of the sukuk 
issuers, then the sukuk holders resell it to the sukuk issuers at a higher price on 
deferred payment terms. The figure of the evolution of sukuk structure is depicted 
in Figure 3.16 below. 
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Figure 3.16: The Evolution of Sukuk Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are some notable features of the Murabahah structure. First, the certificate 
holders own the murabahah commodity and are entitled to its final sale price upon 
the re-sale of the commodity. Secondly, it only exists in the primary market. 
Thirdly, trading of this sukuk in the secondary market is not permitted by shariah. 
The certificates represent a debt owing from the subsequent buyer of the 
commodity to the certificate-holders and such trading amounts to trading in debt 
on a deferred basis, which will result in riba (Ayub, 2007; Haneef, 2009; 
Muhammad Al Amine, 2008; Tariq & Dar, 2007; Usmani, n.d.; Wilson, 2008, 
n.d.). The debt-based structure is slowly shifted into other structures due to the 
fact that this structure can only be traded in the primary market. 
 
The second stage of the evolution is asset-based sukuk. One of the forms of this 
structure is Ijarah Sukuk. Ijarah sukuk refers to the contract of hiring and renting 
any assets or commodity to benefit its yield. The features are embedded and 
clearly stipulated in the contract. It is the responsibility of the owners to cover any 
expenses which are occurred on the assets as basic characteristics, it is negotiable 
The evolution of sukuk 
1. Debt based sukuk 
4. Hybrid/mixed sukuk 
3. Equity based sukuk 
2. Asset based sukuk 
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and can be traded on the secondary market, and it can be issued by financial 
intermediaries or directly by users of the leased assets. 
 
There is some constraint that prevents this kind of sukuk being used, such as the 
lack of suitable assets for the underlying ijarah transaction. Most governments or 
sovereigns are apprehensive about the possibility of negative sentiments coming 
from an investor. But this problem was solved by the issues of The Bahrain in 
2001. It was a milestone in sukuk issuance in that it was positively perceived by 
the public. Then, in 2002, Malaysia issued the first Islamic global sukuk in 
compliance with the US regulations. It was the first Malaysian sukuk to be listed 
on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange and is rated by Standard & Poor’s and 
Moody’s, and incorporated with the conventional debt practices as well  (Haneef, 
2009). 
 
The last stage of the evolution is equity-based sukuk or partnership based sukuk. 
The forms of this structure are musyarakah and istisna’. Established by the end of 
2009, they are the third phase of the development of sukuk. Musyarakah sukuk is 
similar to mudarabah, the main difference being that in musyarakah, all the 
partners provide some capital and profits are shared in the pre-agreed ratio while 
losses are shared in proportion to the capital contributions. This sukuk may be 
used to finance of a new project or an existing one and the certificate holders are 
the owners of the project. They can also be traded in the secondary market. Lastly, 
Istisna Sukuk is a sale at an agreed price in which the buyer takes an order to 
manufacture, assemble or construct anything to be delivered in the future. The key 
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feature of this sukuk is that certificate holders own the product and are entitled to 
the sale price of the certificates or the sale price of the product. 
 
Meanwhile, there is a continuing evolution in sukuk structure; the legality of the 
sukuk structure and its profit distribution is becoming a topic of interest among 
Islamic scholars as the interest system is strictly prohibited. Therefore, the 
principle of partnership and other contracts based on genuine and valid trading, 
and leasing activities should be encouraged to replace interest based business 
activities.  
 
The legality of Islamic debt is strictly regulated by Islamic law under which there 
are rights embedded in sukuk, such as rights to an underlying asset and its cash 
flow. In cases where the sukuk represents ownership of assets (the underlying 
asset), the claim embodied in the sukuk is not just a claim on the underlying asset 
used in the sukuk transaction, but also the right to the cash flow and proceeds 
from the sale of the asset. 
 
According to Wilson (2005), the various transaction contracts that form the 
provenance for a sukuk issue have different legal implications for investors. 
Sukuk investors should, therefore, be fully apprised of and knowledgeable on 
their rights and obligations under the various Islamic concepts and principles. 
Additionally, not only has the right of an underlying asset on the sukuk become a 
focus of discussion among Islamic scholars, but documentation in the sukuk 
contract is also very important as stipulated in the Holy Qur’an 2:282. 
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Shariah Resolutions in Islamic Finance allows the distribution of profit calculated 
based on gross profit in Islamic debt. The distribution of profit is made at the 
gross profit level, which is the profit for the whole operation after deducting all 
direct expenses for all investment funds and the deposits received. Moreover, the 
profit distribution method based on gross profit is aimed at safeguarding the 
customers’ interest as investors or depositors (Usmani, 1999). 
 
In addition, as the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia (SAC), in 
its 16
th
 meeting dated 11 November 2000, resolved that the profit distribution 
method based on gross profit is permissible, Bank Negara Malaysia and Securities 
Commission Malaysia (2009) also resolved that profits are distributed according 
to a pre-agreed proportion while losses are pro-rated according to their equity 
share. Similarly, the Indonesian National Sharia Board also resolved that the 
income from bond investments has to be distributed based on a pre-agreed 
proportion. 
 
There are some rules and guidelines for issuing and investing in the Islamic debt 
in Malaysia and Indonesia which are regulated by the Securities Commission 
Malaysia and the Securities Exchange Commission Indonesia. The regulation is 
aimed at providing secureness to the market players on the securities market. 
 
ISSUING AND INVESTING ISLAMIC DEBT IN MALAYSIA AND 
INDONESIA 
The purpose of these rules and guidelines is to expedite and create a facilitative as 
well as transparent approval scheme for corporate issuances. Furthermore, 
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corporate debt and Islamic debt issuance impose greater disclosure requirements 
and enhance legal protection for investors. Moreover, the guidelines govern all 
issues/offers/invitations involved in corporate debt. In addition to the issuance 
requirements stated in the corporate debt guidelines, the guidelines on the offering 
of Islamic securities stipulate the additional Shariah criteria that must be met with 
regard to all issues, offers, or invitations under the Capital Markets and Services 
Act 2007 (CMSA 2007). Additionally, the approval of the Shariah Advisory 
Committee (SAC) must be obtained prior to the submission of any declaration and 
information to the Securities Commission (Bank Negara Malaysia and Securities 
Commission Malaysia, 2009). 
 
Similar to Malaysia, Indonesian Capital Market Regulatory (ICMR) also set some 
rules and regulations regarding Islamic instruments, which in 2002, saw the 
regulation of Islamic bond conduct No.32/DSN-MUI/IX/2002 being issued. In 
addition, the Islamic instruments issuance in Indonesian Capital Market is also 
monitored by the Indonesian Shariah Board (Majelis Ulama Indonesia). 
 
There are various parties involved in sukuk issue, each one playing an important 
role. All parties should ensure that the issue is appropriately structured and 
investors’ interests are fully protected. All parties involved in sukuk issue are 
listed below: 
Table 3. 8: Parties involving in Islamic debt transaction in Malaysia and Indonesia 
Lead Arranger/ 
Principal Advisor 
The role of the Lead Arranger or Principal Advisor is to structure the 
debt securities or sukuk proposal, together with any other arrangers, 
and submit the application to the SC for approval. 
Advisor The role of the Advisor is to structure the debt or sukuk proposal 
together with the Lead Arranger. 
Underwriter Investment banks and commercial banks are the main underwriters of 
debt securities and sukuk. 
Facility Agent The Facility Agent is responsible for all administrative matters 
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pertaining to the issue. 
Paying Agent The Paying Agent is responsible for the cash flow involved in the 
transaction, in terms of receiving the proceeds from the issuance on 
behalf of the issuer and remitting the proceeds to the issuer, as well as 
the payment of interest to investors. The Lead Arranger is often also 
the Paying Agent. 
Legal Counsel Before the finalisation of a debt securities or sukuk issue, a legal due 
diligence exercise is always conducted on the issuer, related projects 
and project information pertaining to the securities issue or sukuk. This 
is done by a team of lawyers appointed by the issuer. 
Shariah Advisor A Shariah Advisor must be appointed for a Sukuk issue to advise the 
issuer on the appropriate and acceptable concept(s) and principle(s) to 
be used in the issuance. The Shariah concepts and principles to be used 
must be approved by the Shariah Advisory Council. 
Trustee Trustees for a bond or sukuk issue have the responsibility of 
safeguarding the interests of the bond holders.  
Credit Rating Agency There are two credit rating agencies (CRAs) in Malaysia that provide 
independent opinions on the credit risks and potential default risks of 
specific issuers. The first rating agency, Rating Agency Malaysia 
Berhad; the second, Malaysian Rating CorporationBerhad.  The credit 
rating agency in Indonesia is Pemeringkat Efek Indonesia (PEFINDO). 
Financial Guarantee 
Institution 
Financial Guarantee Institutions (FGIs) help raise the credit rating of 
bond issues, which otherwise would normally be below investment 
grade, to a level deemed investment grade by investors who lend their 
own sterling ratings to these bond issues. Issuers will need to pay a 
premium, commensurate with the perceived risk of the issuer,   to these 
FGIs who will undertake to pay the interest and capital repayment in 
the event that the issuer fails to do so. 
Compiled from sources 
 
Sukuk is experiencing a growing number of issuance in the debt market because 
of its popularity as a debt instrument in a few countries, particularly Malaysia. 
Why and how the sukuk structure has gained popularity, since its initial launch, 
has been attracting considerable attention among Islamic scholars and market 
players. One can say that the sukuk’s massive trend in corporate debt innovation 
is only to meet market demand, or that there is some attractiveness in investing in 
Islamic debt. Some reasonable answers for why and how the sukuk structure has 
gained popularity are provided as follows: 
1. Investors are provided with a steady stream of income through the regular 
payments that the issuer has contracted to pay. 
2. Islamic debt has relatively attractive yields and profits that are usually higher 
than the interest received from savings and deposits in banks. 
80 
 
3. Islamic debt offers high liquidity, a welcome feature to investors who face the 
problem of not being able to fully recover their money on demand. 
4. Islamic debt is a safer asset than shares, which offers low risk assets, and as 
long as the issuer does not default, the investor receives profit payments. 
 
According to Ibrahim and Wong (2006), there are two key developments in the 
Malaysian bond market; first, the regulatory framework and market infrastructure, 
second, the regional corporation. In addition, Jalil (2005) reviews the Malaysian 
experience in managing the issuance and the development of the Islamic bonds 
market and states that at the beginning of Islamic debt issuance, the acceptance of 
the Islamic debt issued by Malaysia was barely accepted by global investors, 
especially Middle East investors. Therefore, to encourage the development of 
Islamic debt, some incentives have been provided to both investors and issuers 
based on the Finance Act 2007-Amendment to the Income Tax Act 1967 
(Securities Commissions Malaysia, 2011).  
 
Apart from its massive growth in a few countries, the growth of Islamic financial 
products in Indonesia is not as rapid as other countries though Indonesia is a 
potential and huge market for Islamic finance institutions and banks to develop 
their products and services with about 80% of the Indonesian population being 
Muslim (240 million people). There are three potential reasons for the slow 
growth of Islamic debt in Indonesia. First, Islamic financial institutions are still 
focused on standard and simple Islamic products due to the lack of knowledge and 
human resources in Islamic financial institutions. Second, the regulation in 
Islamic instruments is vague and not fully supported by the government, for 
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example, the double taxation issue that requires investors/issuers to pay double 
taxes in Islamic instruments transaction. Third, though the vast majority of the 
Indonesian population is Muslim, the share of Islamic instruments market is 
considerably small, representing only 5% of the market share of the whole 
financial market. 
 
Until this year, there is no Islamic debt default in Indonesia. Unfortunately, in 
Malaysia there have been a few Islamic debt defaults, such as Johor Corporation, 
Ingress Sukuk Berhad, Tracoma Holdings Berhad and Nam Fatt Corporation 
Berhad (Majid et al., 2011). Therefore, to prevent future Islamic debt defaults, 
Islamic countries should have good and strong economic fundamentals. In 
developing countries such as Indonesia, political and public issues have important 
influences over the conditions of Indonesian industries and companies. 
 
Although there have been a few Islamic debt defaults in Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates and Malaysia, the Islamic debt is still claimed to be more secure than 
conventional debts due to the requirement for physical assets. Islamic debt 
defaults in Malaysia have affected the credibility of Islamic debt as a feasible 
Islamic instrument and raise concern about the investors’ protection and the 
survival of the Malaysian capital market in the future, but the development of 
Islamic debt still flourishes with certainty. 
 
3.4. FURTHER EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC DEBT 
The market for sukuk, Islamic bonds, experienced phenomenal growth during its 
first years in existence. Despite this, in 2008, the number of sukuk issued globally 
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declined for the first time. Market commentators attribute this to a number of 
factors, including the global financial turbulence and resulting market conditions. 
The global financial turbulence has resulted in a number of high-profile defaults, 
and this has generated a timely debate by market participants as to the nature of 
investors' recourse to the underlying assets. In turn, this inevitably resulted in a 
better understanding by investors, bankers, originators and lawyers alike of what 
the consequences of a default are, leading to further innovation and development 
of existing sukuk structures and the further evolution of Islamic debt structures. 
However, the outlook for the sukuk market remains positive, with Standard & 
Poor's indicating that the total amount of sukuk issued or being talked about in the 
market is estimated to be $50 billion (Standard & Poor’s publication, 2010). 
 
As a consequence, a more diversified kind of sukuk, referred to as hybrid sukuk, 
which is based on the various demands of investors, emerged in the market. The 
assets can comprise of Istisna’, Murabahah as well as Ijarah. The hybrid sukuk 
structure represents the potential of new structures and benefits to the investors. 
Furthermore, a particular sukuk can also be converted into equity upon an IPO. 
The example of the convertible sukuk was issued by the Dubai based port 
operator ports, customs and free zone corporation (PCFC) which originally was 
issued in the form of Musharakah structure. The sukuk was targeted in particular 
at Islamic investors interested in the booming IPOs market in the Middle East. 
Therefore, the transaction demonstrates the continuing demand for sukuk products 
and the flexibility of sukuk, which can be adapted to meet the specific financing 
needs of the issuers. 
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3. 5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides brief explanations of Islamic debt such as concept, structure, 
commercial practices and regulators. Islamic debt, also referred as sukuk, is a 
certificate of equal value representing undivided shares in the ownership of 
tangible assets or services of the particular projects or any specified investment 
activity. Unlike conventional debt which is viewed as homogeneous product, 
Islamic debt is viewed as heterogeneous product. There has been an emerging 
range of Islamic debt products since its inception, such as ijarah, murabahah, 
salam, istisna, mudarabah, musyarakah, wakalah and hybrid sukuk, each of which 
has different structure. The structure can be in the form of debt, asset and equity 
types, and the types of the structure depend on the asset/project/investment 
financed. The innovation of Islamic debt structures is provided in Figure 3.18. 
 
In terms of commercial practices, Islamic debt issuance and Islamic debt trading 
are regulated by formal bodies as part of capital market regulators. Furthermore, 
since its establishment, the focus of the Securities Commission in both Malaysia 
and Indonesia has been to supervise and monitor the activities of market 
institutions including the exchange and clearing houses, as well as all persons 
licensed under some regulations in order to protect the interest of all parties, 
especially investors’ interests. In additon, the Securities Commission in both 
Malaysia and Indonesia is responsible for promoting and developing the securities 
and futures markets. The Commission has established the Shariah Advisory 
Council (SAC) or Indonesia Sharia Board to advise on matters in relation to the 
Islamic capital market activities and products, and has constructed a 
comprehensive and facilitative framework for Islamic instruments. This action has 
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paved the way for the development of the Malaysian Islamic capital market and is 
contributing to the acceleration of the product innovation in the Islamic equity and 
debt (sukuk) sectors. 
 
Chapter four will outline the research method, hypotheses and empirical models 
used in this study. 
 
Figure 3.17: Timeline of Islamic debt 
 
 
Source: PricewaterCoopers Malaysia, 2008 
1990 
Debt Structure 
• First Bai Bithaman Ajil Islamic Debt by Shell 
MDS Sdn Bhd 
1994 
Equity 
Structure 
• First sukuk Mudarabah by Cagamas Bhd 
2001 
Asset Structure 
• First corporate sukuk ijarah by Kumpulan 
Guthrie Bhd 
2006 
Hybrid 
Structure 
• First exchangeable sukuk by Binariang GSM 
Sdn Bhd 
85 
 
CHAPTER 4: DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the research framework, develops hypotheses, presents 
empirical models and describes methods for examining the impact of Islamic debt 
on company value. 
 
4.1 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Capital structure has been extensively investigated in recent years. The mixture of 
debt to equity in the financial structure of companies, and whether it will impact 
upon financial performance risk and valuation is the subject of theoretical and 
empirical studies. The method to investigate the capital structure impact is also a 
focus of discussions. This study investigates the Islamic debt impact on company 
value; Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 illustrate the structure of this study. 
 
The linkage between debt structure and firm value/or a firm’s financial 
performance are presented schematically. This study investigates whether there is 
difference in company value and/or financial performance attributable to the 
proportion of debt which is Islamic debt. The debt instruments in this study are 
either Islamic or non-Islamic. In addition, this study also examines whether there 
is a difference in financial performance attributable to the proportion of Islamic 
debt, and whether the form of sukuk (debt-based, asset-based and equity-based 
type) make a difference in company value and/or financial performance. Firm size 
is used to control the effect of size differences. 
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Figure 4.1: Structure of the study for chapter five 
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Figure 4.2: Structure of the study for chapter six 
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Figure 4.3: Structure of the study for chapter seven 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 HYPOTHESIS 
The hypotheses presented in this study will be tested using two data from two 
countries, Malaysia and Indonesia. This section provides links between theoretical 
as well as empirical and research questions proposed in this study, from which 
research hypotheses are then constructed. According to the structure of the study 
(Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3), the hypotheses are divided into three 
sections as follows: 
Islamic debt issue announcement 
Islamic Debt Issuance 
announcement in term of 
frequency; First, second and more 
than second issuance 
Islamic Debt Issuance 
announcement in term of Islamic 
Debt Type: Debt-based, Asset-
based and Equity- based type 
The 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
(CAAR) 
Islamic debt issue characteristics: 
1. Islamic debt offerings size. 
2. Islamic debt maturity 
3. Debt ratio 
4. Firm size 
 
Firm Performance: 
1. Tobins’ Q 
2. Economic Value Added 
3. Return on Asset 
4. Return on Equity 
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4.2.1 HYPOTHESIS FOR FIGURE 4.1 
Hypothesis 1.1 
The relationship between company financial structure and value is important and 
continues to be debated in the literature. Modigliani and Miller (1958) achieved 
notoriety with their proof that capital structure made no difference to company 
value. Subsequent relaxation of Modigliani and Miller (M&M) assumptions 
suggested that debt to equity choice does impact on company value. More recent 
research considering bankruptcy costs has contributed to empirical estimates of 
optimal leverage. The M&M argument is that in a perfect market, how a firm is 
financed is irrelevant to its value. However, even though it is widely accepted that 
the world is not made up of perfect markets, the issue of optimal D/E ratio 
remains contentious and unresolved. 
 
Following the work of M&M, subsequent works had been conducted to challenge 
their theory in which capital structure has an impact on firm value. They were 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), and Jensen 
(1986). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that a particular capital structure can 
result from using a debt as a monitoring and controlling device for managers. 
Furthermore, Jensen (1986) considers the point of free cash flow, wherein an 
excess of cash results in the “implausible” action of managers. In the position of 
free cash flow, debt issues will reduce free cash, and debt covenant and 
bondholders will act as monitoring and controlling agents over the manager’s 
behaviour. Myers (1984) contends that capital structure has a positive impact on 
firm value and his findings provided the basis for the trade-off theory. Further to 
this, Myers and Majluf (1984) find that capital structure has a negative impact on 
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firm value and their findings were called the pecking-order theory. Two years 
later, Jensen (1986) explains that debt mitigates the agency costs of free cash flow 
by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the preference of managers. 
Moreover, the threat of being unable to pay the debt serves as direct force in 
making firms become more efficient. In sum, as leverage increases, the agency 
costs of debt increases, including bankruptcy costs. Called the agency theory, this 
theory does not imply that debt issue will always has a positive impact on firm 
value, because at some point, the marginal costs of debt cannot offset the marginal 
benefits. 
 
Frank & Goyal (2003) and Dang (2005) find that the trade-off theory holds well in 
developed countries. In addition, Abor (2007) and Coleman (2007) examine 
capital structure impact on financial performance of the small and medium 
enterprise (SME) in developing countries. Their results are contradictory since 
Abor finds that the SME tends to use short term debt whereas Coleman finds that 
the SME tends to use long term debt. The type of debt chosen by firms, then, may 
not necessarily be a definitive factor in affecting the financial performance of the 
SME. However, they find that, overall, capital structure influences the financial 
performance of the SME. Taking agency cost into the capital structure study, 
Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) find that higher leverage is associated with 
higher profit. 
 
However, it has been argued that different theories apply to firms under different 
circumstances. Islamic debt can cope with the Islamic law issues which allow 
Muslim investors to invest their funds in the debt instrument based on the Islamic 
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principles. Furthermore, Islamic debt is claimed to be more secure, and investors 
are provided with a steady stream of income through the regular payments that the 
issuer has contracted to pay. In the end, these reasons attract not only Muslim 
investors but also non-Muslim investors. This study adopts the trade-off theory 
and the agency theory, which assumes that Islamic debt has a positive impact on 
firm value. The testable hypothesis for Islamic debt and firm value/firm financial 
performance is: 
H1.1a : Islamic debt is positively associated with firm value/firm financial 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1.2 
The frequency of Islamic debt issues is assumed to have a positive impact on firm 
value and firm financial performance; therefore, the more frequent the Islamic 
debt issues, the greater the firm value and firm financial performance. The testable 
hypothesis for the frequency of Islamic debt and firm value/firm financial 
performance is: 
H1.2a : The frequency of Islamic debt is positively associated with firm value/firm 
financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1.3 
This study assumes that the proportion of Islamic debt has a positive impact on 
firm value and firm financial performance, given the previously mentioned 
reasons for positive impact. Harris and Raviv (1990) imply that higher leverage 
can be expected to be associated with larger firm value. In contrast, Krishnan and 
Moyer (1997), and Zeitun and Tian (2007) find a significant negative impact of 
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debt ratio on firm performance. In addition, Coleman (2007), consistent with other 
studies, finds that highly leveraged microfinance institutions perform better by 
reaching out to a wider clientele base and reducing default rates, further they 
enjoy scale of economies and are able to deal with moral hazards, adverse 
selection and risk. The testable hypothesis for the proportion of Islamic debt and 
firm value/firm financial performance is: 
H1.3a : The proportion of Islamic debt is positively associated with firm value/firm 
financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1.4 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) affirm that there is a different impact of certain 
types of debts on shareholders’ wealth; hence, this finding can also be applied to 
the Islamic debt. The type of Islamic debt issued is assumed to have a positive 
impact on firm value and firm financial performance. The testable hypothesis for 
the type of Islamic debt and firm value/firm financial performance is: 
H1.4a : The type of Islamic debt is positively associated with firm value/firm 
financial performance. 
 
4.2.2 HYPOTHESIS FOR FIGURE 4.2 
Hypothesis 2 
The impact of debt issuance announcements on stock prices has been widely 
documented both in the United States and other countries. Most of the attention 
has been focused around non-Islamic debt, for example straight debt and 
convertible debt, and to date few studies examining the impact of debt 
announcement on stock price (Ashhari et al., 2009; Ibrahim & Minai, 2009; 
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Godlewski, Turk-Ariss & Weill, 2010; Modirzadehbami & Mansourfar, 2011; 
Modirzadehbami & Mansourfar, 2012; Ahmad & Radzi, 2011). Further, there is 
no consensus amongst academics and practitioners as to how the market should 
react to such securities. As such, in order to investigate the impact of Islamic debt 
issue on stock price and to construct the hypothesis for this study, this study will 
first discuss existing studies that have investigated the impact of debt issue on 
stock price. Masulis (1978), Mikkelson (1981), Dann and Mikkelson (1984), 
Korwar (1982) and many others afterwards show a statistically significant 
decrease in the price of firms' common stock at the earliest public announcement 
of certain types of capital structure changes. Further, under the assumption of 
asymmetric information, Miller and Rock (1985), and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
proposed that stock price is negatively correlated to the issuance of new securities.  
 
In contrast, several other studies found no significant effect of debt issue on the 
stock price (Dann & Mikkelson, 84; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986; Eckbo, 1986; 
Shyam-Sunder, 1991). The stock price reaction can be potentially negative, 
positive or even null. In a recent study, a significant positive price reaction is 
recorded (Martel & Padron, 2006). As mentioned before, there has been little 
discussion about Islamic bond. Most of the studies, to date, have tended to focus 
on the legal aspects of Islamic debt, and few studies have examined the wealth 
impact of Islamic debt on stockholders. One of the few studies available on 
Islamic bond effects is the investigation by Ashhari et al. (2009), Ibrahim and 
Minai (2009), Goldlewski et al (2010), Modirzadehbami and Mansourfar (2011, 
2012). Ashhari et al. (2009) concentrate on the difference between conventional 
bond and Islamic bond announcements and they attempt to show that certain types 
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of debts lead to abnormal returns, in accordance with the claim by Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986) that certain types of debts lead to abnormal returns. Ashhari et al.  
find that there was a positive reaction on the Islamic bond issues announcement; 
however, no wealth effect was associated with the conventional bond 
announcement. Similar to Ashhari et al. (2009), Ibrahim and Minai (2009) find a 
significant positive market reaction of -3, 0 and -3, 3 surrounding the 
announcement of Islamic debt issuance. In contrast, Goldlewski et al. (2010), 
Modirzadehbami and Mansourfar (2011) find a negative significant abnormal 
return surrounding the event date. This may indicate that there was adverse 
selection behaviour from the market participants toward the Islamic debt during 
the research study. A new debt issue is likely to be more predictable than a new 
equity issue because principal repayments are fixed and more predictable than 
earnings (Smith, 1986). Further, debt is viewed as a substitute device in reducing 
agency or asymmetric information problems because debt payments not only 
reduce the amount of free cash flow under management control but debt payments 
also give managers an incentive to avoid unprofitable new projects. What is more, 
debt payments provide an indication of the firm’s future earnings and its  quality 
(Jensen, 1986; Ravid & Sarig, 1991; Johnson, 1995). Thus, this study assumes 
that the market reacts positively to the issuance of Islamic debt. The testable 
hypothesis for Islamic debt and stock price is: 
H2.1a : The market reacts positively to the issuance of Islamic debt 
H2.2a : The price movements surrounding the announcement of Islamic debt are 
random 
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4.2.3 HYPOTHESIS FOR FIGURE 4.3 
Hypothesis 3.1 
The impact of Islamic debt characteristics, namely bond offerings size, the Islamic 
debt maturity, the debt ratio and firm size, on the cumulative average abnormal 
return (CAAR) has been investigated by Ashhari et al. (2009). A testable 
hypothesis is derived as follows: 
H3.1a : Islamic debt characteristic is positively associated with the CAAR. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2 
The impact of Islamic debt issuance frequency and Islamic debt type on the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) has been investigated by Ashhari et 
al. (2009). Testable hypotheses are derived as follows: 
H3.2.1a : The market reacts positively to the more frequent issuance of Islamic debt 
H3.2.2a : The market reacts positively to the type of Islamic debt issued. 
 
Hypothesis 3.3 
The capital structure study has been a topic of interest. It has been argued that 
profitable firms are less likely to depend on debt in their capital structure than less 
profitable ones. The more profitable firms have less debt than less profitable ones 
(Nivorozhkin, 2002). In addition, firm value and firm financial performance may 
also affect the choice of capital structure. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) 
stipulate that more efficient firms are more likely to earn a higher return for a 
given capital structure, and that higher returns can act as a buffer against portfolio 
risk so that more efficient firms are in a better position to substitute equity for 
debt in their capital structure. Hence, under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, more 
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efficient firms choose to lower the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. In 
essence, the efficiency-risk hypothesis is a spin-off of the trade-off theory of 
capital structure whereby differences in efficiency, all else equal, enable firms to 
fine-tune their optimal capital structure. The testable hypothesis for Islamic debt 
and stock price is: 
H3.3a : Firm value of firms having Islamic debt is positively associated with 
abnormal returns. 
 
4.3 DATA 
This section describes the research methods used to test the research framework 
and research hypotheses. The sections that follow describe the methodology used 
for the data collection, the measurement of variables, and the model specification 
for data analysis. 
 
The data for this study were obtained from the Islamic Finance Information 
Service (IFIS) database. The sampling period is 2000 to 2009, which is ten years 
and, this study used quarterly data. This quarterly data is important since the 
issuance of Islamic debt for every firm is in different quarters. Initially, this study 
proposed to investigate the debt choice impact on a company value and firm’s 
financial performance using Malaysia and the Middle East countries as a sample. 
However, only Malaysia can be used as a sample for this study because of the 
insufficient information and the unbalanced format of the data that were available. 
Fortunately, Indonesia, the closest country to Malaysia, issued Islamic debt in the 
period of 2000 to 2009. Thus, this data can be used as a comparison to explain 
how Islamic debt behaves for neighbouring countries under different 
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circumstances. List the sukuk issuers from Malaysian listed firms and Indonesian 
listed firms are provided in appendix 1 and appendix 2. 
 
Further, this study notes that 227 companies from Malaysia issued Islamic debt 
from 2000 to 2009. From those 227 Malaysian companies, 106 companies are 
public companies, and 121 companies are limited companies. From the 106 public 
companies, 26 companies have been excluded from the data list because of the 
unavailability of their financial statement data. In addition, the sample of Islamic 
debt offering must have data availability on the size of the offering, the maturity 
length, the history of the issuance, and other accounting data information. There 
were 26 Indonesian firms which issued Islamic debt for the range of this study 
period, however only 14 firms have complete data. Therefore, a balanced panel of 
80 Malaysian and 14 Indonesian companies are employed in this study. 
 
Furthermore, an outlier in the data set may indicate that the data is not good, 
therefore, a statistical test, for example Grubbs’ test and Dixon test, can be used to 
detect outliers in a univariate data set which assumed a normally distributed 
population, either creating a new variable (equal to 1 if the observation is an 
outlier and 0 otherwise) or dropping outliers out of the data set. The Grubbs test is 
also known as the maximum normed residual test. The outliers are expunged from 
the data set and the test is iterated until no outliers remain. The null hypothesis for 
the outlier test is there are no outliers in the data set. The Grubb test result reveals 
that all the data set employed in this study has no more outliers. 
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For panel data analysis, the availability of ten years’ worth of data are required, 
particularly quarterly data. For event study and multivariate regression method 
analysis, the data of the daily closing stock prices for two years prior and one year 
after the announcement date is required in order to calculate the abnormal return 
using the abnormal return benchmark (mean adjusted return, market adjusted 
return and market model return). 
 
To mitigate the problem of missing values, this study uses multiple imputations. 
The common practice to deal with the missing values is to delete firms for which 
some of the necessary data items are missing, however, this practice can create 
missing-data-bias. According to Raghunathan (2004) which reviewed three 
approaches for analysing incomplete data: firstly, missing-data can be resolved by 
including the weighted value to compensate the missing value excluded in the 
model, secondly, by including two or more plausible values to replace the missing 
values, and thirdly, by constructing the likelihood based on the incomplete data. 
Further, Raghunathan states that these three approaches are valid under the 
missing at random (MAR) mechanism and missing data mechanism assumption 
implies that the missing values in any variable are independent of the underlying 
values in the model. 
 
In addition, Raghunathan and Siscovick (1996) demonstrate that using an 
auxiliary variable in the imputation process can considerably improve the 
efficiency and the non-response problem in the same way for all observations, so 
that analysis will be consistent across observations. However, because the 
plausible replacements of the imputed values for the missing values are not true 
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values themselves, this creates a degree of  uncertainty  that results in  smaller 
estimated standard errors, narrowed confidence intervals, and smaller p-values of 
the significance tests. However, the key idea about imputation is to use data on 
aspects of the firm that we can observe to make a reasonable replacement about 
the values that are missing; the replacement values will not be perfect, but they 
provide a better reflection than simply disposing them.  To cope with the missing 
data problem, this study employed multiple imputations by replacing the missing 
value with its mean and median where it was appropriate to do so. 
 
The investigation of 14 Indonesian companies, compared with the 80 Malaysian 
companies studies, may, perhaps be viewed as something of an unbalanced. 
However, econometrians often use co-integration analysis for several different 
countries, wherein the size sample for each country is not necessarily identical. It 
is on this basis that this study generates findings and inferences, despite the 
disproportionate sample size of Malaysian companies being examined vis-a-vis 
Indonesian companies. Though this study has two data sets which is Malaysia and 
Indonesia, this study did not combine these two data sets as cointegrated data set. 
Moreover, the cointegration test result, using the four error-corrections based 
panel co-integration tests developed by Westerlund in 2007 (Persyn & Westerlund, 
2008); strongly reject the hypothesis that the series are cointegrated. The reason is 
that these two data sets are in the different stage of development; hence the factors 
impacting each data set might be different, therefore cointegration might be 
seemed inappropriate. 
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Table 4.1 presents the composition of Islamic debt type in the Malaysian public 
firms. There was a slight upward change in the debt-based type for the first, 
second, third and fourth issuance. In contrast to the debt-based type, the asset-
based type experienced a downward change for the first, second, third and fourth 
issuance, meanwhile the equity-based type fluctuated slightly for the first, second, 
third and fourth issuance. 
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Table 4.1: The composition of Islamic debt type from listed Malaysian firms 
  
First Issuance Second Issuance Third Issuance Fourth Issuance 
  Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Debt Based                 
Bai Inah 2 1.89% 1 1.89% 1 2.78% 1 4.76% 
Bai' Bithaman Ajil (BBA) 15 14.15% 1 1.89% 1 2.78% 1 4.76% 
Murabahah 52 49.06% 35 66.04% 23 63.89% 15 71.43% 
    65.09%   69.81%   69.44%   80.95% 
Asset Based                 
Sukuk Al Ijarah 12 11.32% 4 7.55% 2 5.56% 1 4.76% 
                  
Equity Based                 
Sukuk al Musharakah 14 13.21% 8 15.09% 7 19.44% 3 14.29% 
Mudharabah 6 5.66% 4 7.55% 1 2.78% 0 0.00% 
Istisna 2 1.89% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Sukuk Al Wakalah 1 0.94% 0 0.00% 1 2.78% 0 0.00% 
    21.70%   22.64%   25.00%   14.29% 
                  
Not specified 2 1.89% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  106   53   36   21   
 
 
Table 4.2: The composition of Islamic debt type from limited Malaysian firms 
  First Issuance Second Issuance Third Issuance Fourth Issuance 
  Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Debt Based                 
Bai Inah 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Bai' Bithaman Ajil (BBA) 40 37.74% 3 5.66% 1 2.78% 0 0.00% 
Murabahah 37 34.91% 21 39.62% 16 44.44% 8 38.10% 
    72.64%   45.28%   47.22%   38.10% 
Asset Based                 
Sukuk Al Ijarah 16 15.09% 5 9.43% 3 8.33% 2 9.52% 
                  
Equity Based                 
Sukuk al Musharakah 15 14.15% 8 15.09% 3 8.33% 3 14.29% 
Mudharabah 3 2.83% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Istisna 9 8.49% 3 5.66% 1 2.78% 0 0.00% 
Sukuk Al Wakalah 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
    25.47%   20.75%   11.11%   14.29% 
                  
Not specified 1 0.94%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
  121   40   24   13   
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Table 4.2 presents the composition of Islamic debt type in the Malaysian limited 
firms. There was a significant drop in the debt-based type for the second issuance, 
and a slight fluctuation from the second issuance to the fourth issuance. Likewise, 
the asset-based type experienced a steep drop for the second issuance, and a slight 
fluctuation from the second issuance to the fourth issuance, meanwhile the equity-
based type experienced a downward trend from the first to the fourth issuance. 
 
In comparing public and limited Malaysian firms, an opposite trend can be seen 
for the debt-based types. The debt-based type for Malaysian public firms 
maintained an upward trend, and the debt-based type for Malaysian limited firms 
experienced a downward trend. The changes in the asset-based and the equity-
based type for both firms were similar. 
 
4.4 VARIABLES 
This section describes the dependent variables and independent variables used in 
this study. This section is divided into three parts: section 4.4.1 explains the 
variables for panel data analysis, section 4.4.2 explains the variables for an event 
study analysis and section 4.4.3 explains the variables for the multivariate 
regression method for event study. 
4.4.1 VARIABLES FOR PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
4.4.1.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Firm value and firm financial performance are dependent variables. Tobin’s Q is 
used as a firm value indicator and EVA, ROA, and ROE metrics are used as a 
firm financial performance indicator. Previous studies use a number of different 
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measures of the performance of firms. These measures include accounting based 
measures calculated from the financial statements of firms such as return on 
equity, return on assets, return on invested capital, gross margin, etc (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995; Boyle & Eckhold, 1997; Wiwattanankantang, 1999; Booth, et al., 
2001; Prasad, et al., 2001; Phillips & Sipahioglub, 2004; Mayer & Sussman, 2004; 
Deesomsak, et al., 2004; Dang, 2005; Rao, et al., 2007; Buferna, et al., 2008; De 
jong, et al., 2008; Mira & Gracia, 2008; Seifert & Gonenc, 2008; Bahbra & 
Tirtiroglu, 2008; Kim & Berger, 2008; Mitton, 2008; Ni & Yu, 2008; Sen & Oruc, 
2008; Abor a& Biekpe, 2009; Achy, 2009; Jasim, Hameeda Abo & Nadhem, 2009; 
Karadeniz, et al., 2009; Mihalca & Antal, 2009), market based measures such as 
stock returns and volatility (Dhankar & Boora, 1996), accounting and market 
measures: (Abor, 2007; Krishnan &Moyer, 2007; Zeitun & Tian, 2007; Salehi & 
Biglar, 2009), and other measures such as firm efficiency measures (Margaritis & 
Psillaki, 2007). This study proposes to use Tobin’s Q to evaluate the firms’ value, 
and EVA to measure financial firms’ performance. In addition, other metrics such 
as return on assets will be included to support the robustness of the analysis. 
 
Tobin’s Q mixes market value with accounting value and is used to measure the 
firm's value in many studies (McConnel & Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg, 1999; 
Zeitun & Tian, 2007). Tobin’s Q was developed by James Tobin (1969) as the 
ratio between the market value and replacement value of the same physical asset, 
or the ratio of the market value of a firm’s assets as measured by the market value 
of its outstanding stock and debt, to the replacement cost of the firm’s assets. Thus, 
when Tobin’s Q is less than one, it means that the market value of the company is 
less than the total asset value, indicating that it is undervalued. Likewise, when it 
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is more than one, it indicates that the market value is higher than the total asset 
value and that the company might be overvalued. 
 
Tobin’s Q is a ratio between the market value of a firm’s assets and the book 
value of the same assets. If Tobin’s Q is greater than one, then the market value is 
greater than the book value of the assets recorded or otherwise. A company 
having Tobin’s Q greater than one indicates that it has higher performance and a 
company having smaller than one indicates lower performance. However, for a 
particular industry such as the manufacturing industry, scoring less than one in 
Tobin’s Q does not indicate that the company has low performance. Further, 
diversified firms have a lower Tobin’s Q ratio compared to niche market firms, 
since the value of the firm’s assets is penalised by the market (Lang & Stulz, 
1993). In addition, Tobin’s Q takes less consideration of the intellectual assets of 
the firm, for example goodwill, knowledge, technology and other intangible assets, 
and the Tobin’s Q can be affected by the market hype and speculation. Therefore, 
Tobin’s Q only partially represents the firm value (Jonathan & Bichler, 2009). 
 
Tobin’s Q has been extensively used by most of the researchers as an indicator of 
firm value, for different purposes; for example, corporate governance issues, 
investment and diversification decisions, managerial performance, tender offers, 
and many other related issues (Hermalin &Weisbach, 1991; Chung & Pruitt, 1994; 
Perfect & Wiles, 1994; Yermack, 1996; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Kang & Stulz, 
1996; Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998; Bhagat & Black, 2000; Hossain et al, 2001; 
Loderer & Peyer, 2002; Keil & Nicholson, 2003; Panasian et al, 2003; Anderson 
& Reeb, 2004; Randoy & Jenssen, 2004; Chin et al, 2004; Choi et al, 2007; Chan 
105 
 
& Li, 2008; Reddy et al, 2008a; Vera & Ugedo, 2007). Using Tobin’s Q, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) study corporate governance in the context of the 
relationship between ownership equity and firm value. Blundell et.al (1992) study 
the importance of Tobin’s Q in the process of investment decision, and find that 
Tobin’s Q has a small effect but remains significant in investment decisions. 
 
Tobin’s Q also measures the managerial performance in the tender offer activities, 
and Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989) find that well-managed bidders benefit 
substantially from the tender offers of poorly managed targets. Further, Lang and 
Stulz (1994) examine the benefit of firm diversification on shareholders’ wealth, 
and conclude that more diversified firms have lower Tobin’s Q compared to 
specialised firms. 
 
This study uses Tobin’s Q because it has been widely considered as a firm value 
indicator as it reflects the real value of a firm assessed by the market. In this study, 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of equity, plus the book value of long 
term liabilities, plus the book value of current liabilities, less current assets 
divided by total assets. Market value equity is the product of a firm’s share price 
and the common stock outstanding. The formula of Tobin’s Q is shown as follows 
(Reddy et al., 2010): 
         
(                                                ) (                                  )
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While economic value added (EVA) has been adopted by many firms as one of 
the indicators of a firm’s performance, numerous studies have been conducted to 
test and compare the effectiveness of EVA, as the driver of shareholders wealth, 
to other firm performance metrics (Birchard, 1994; Dodd and Chen, 1996; Lehn 
and Makhija, 1996; Chen and Dodd, 1997-1998-2001; Kramer and Pushner, 
1997). Furthermore, the financial performance measure EVA is widely regarded 
as the most useful measure to test firm performance since it not only measures net 
income but also the cost required to generate that income (Gapenski, 1996; Jeffrey, 
John, Todd & Anjan, 1997; O'Hanlon & Peasnell, 1998). 
 
Studies of EVA provide two different propositions; the claim that EVA is the best 
measurement as opposed to the other accounting metrics has been challenged 
(O’Bryrne, 1996; Grant, 1996), Similarly, some studies find no evidence to 
support the contention that EVA is the best measure of shareholder value added 
(Birchard, 1994; Dodd and Chen, 1996; Lehn and Makhija, 1996; Chen and Dodd, 
1997; Chen and Dodd, 2001; Kramer and Pushner, 1997; Ismail, 2006). Even 
though EVA is not the best measurement compared to some others firm financial 
metrics, EVA still has information content in terms of value-relevance (Chen and 
Dodd, 1997; Chen and Dodd, 2001). 
 
EVA is a measure of shareholder wealth and a measure of financial performance 
developed by Stern Stewart & Co. It is closely related to shareholder value 
analysis (SVA). It is used to evaluate a company’s true profit, defined by Stern 
Stewart as the amount by which earnings exceed or fall short of the required 
minimum rate of return that shareholders and lenders could get by investing in 
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other investments. In other words, EVA is equivalent to after tax income that 
exceeds the required minimum return on capital. It is computed by deducting the 
cost of capital (both debt and equity) from the after tax profit, and it is tied to cash 
flow and not to earnings per share (EPS). 
 
This study uses EVA because it measures the managerial effectiveness of the firm 
in maximising shareholders’ wealth as it represents the residual income remaining 
after all costs have been paid, and it does not focus directly on the market values. 
In this study, EVA is calculated as the return on capital, less the weighted average 
cost of capital, multiply by the total capital (Birchard, 1994; Kramer and Pushner, 
1997; Stern, Stewart, and Chew, 1995). The formula of EVA is given as follows: 
                      (                    )  
                                 
                  (     )    
  
    (    )
    (  )
  
            
                 
             
  
where cost of debt is similar to the company’s interest expenses after adjusting for 
the tax deductibility of interest. 
 
Other performance indicators are accounting performance, such as Return on 
Assets (ROA), and Return on Equity (ROE). The variation of the accounting 
performance used is aimed at providing a different valuation result according to 
their purpose. These metrics are included to support the robustness of the analysis 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Boyle & Eckhold, 1997; Wiwattanankantang, 1999; 
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Booth, et al., 2001; Prasad, et al., 2001; Phillips & Sipahioglub, 2004; Mayer & 
Sussman, 2004; Deesomsak, et al., 2004; Dang, 2005; Rao, et al., 2007; Buferna, 
et al., 2008; De jong, et al., 2008; Mira & Gracia, 2008; Seifert& Gonenc, 2008; 
Bahbra & Tirtiroglu, 2008; Kim & Berger, 2008; Mitton, 2008; Ni & Yu, 2008; 
Sen & Oruc, 2008; Abor & Biekpe, 2009; Achy, 2009; Jasim, et al., 2009; 
Karadeniz, et al., 2009; Mihalca & Antal, 2009). 
 
ROA is an indicator of how profitable a firm is relative to its total assets, and it 
measures the operating efficiency of the total business. ROA provides investors an 
idea of how effectively the firm management is at using its assets to generate 
earnings. However, ROA may vary substantially for public firms and is highly 
dependent on the industry. Higher ROA indicates an effective firm management 
in managing their assets to generate profits. In contrast, lower ROA indicates an 
inefficient firm management in achieving their profits’ target.  
 
ROE is an indicator of how profitable a firm is relative to its total equity, and it 
measures the operating efficiency in contributing to the owners’ wealth.  ROA 
and ROE are widely used in evaluating firm performance, however, this 
accounting based measure is criticised as being a historical firm performance. In 
this study, ROA is calculated as net income divided by total book value of assets. 
ROE is calculated as net income divided by total book value of equity (Demsetz 
& Villalonga, 2001; Finch & Shivadasani, 2006; Thomsen et al, 2006). The 
formula for ROA and ROE is given as follows: 
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Each of the performance indicators measures a different aspect of performance.  
Tobin’s Q measures the value of a firm, and it is considered as a market reflection 
of the firm’s activities and performances. EVA measures the financial success of 
the corporation in relation to shareholders’ wealth. Likewise, ROE also measures 
the performance from the perspective of the equity holders; meanwhile ROA 
measures the asset productivity and operating profit margin. It is important to note 
that none of these measures truly reflect the complete picture by themselves but 
have to be seen in conjunction with other metrics.  
 
4.4.1.2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
The study of leverage impact on firm value has become an important aspect of 
capital structure theory. Myers (1984) claims that the firm value depends on the 
debt ratio, similarly, many studies have focused on the impact of the debt level 
and the debt type on a firm’s financial performance (Ebaid, 2009; Ghosh & Cai, 
1999; Hatfield, Cheng & Davidson, 1994; Coleman, 2007; Talberg, Winge, 
Frydenberg & Westgaard, 2008). However, few recent studies investigate the 
impact of the Islamic debt type on a firm’s value and financial performance. This 
study attempts to investigate the impact of Islamic debt on company value and a 
firm’s financial performance. The proportion of the Islamic debt to non-Islamic 
debt, the proportion of Islamic debt, the frequency of Islamic debt issuance and 
the type of Islamic debt issued are used as independent variables.  
 
The proportion of Islamic debt is calculated as the total Islamic debt divided by 
the total assets. The proportion of non-Islamic debt is calculated as the total of 
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non-Islamic debt divided by the total assets. The formula for the Islamic debt and 
non-Islamic debt proportion is provided as follow: 
             
           
            
  
              
               
            
  
  
For the proportion of Islamic debt, the frequency of Islamic debt issued and the 
type of Islamic debt, dummy variables are employed. To avoid too many 
parameters and to find the unique least square estimates for the model, this study 
uses only n-1 dummy; therefore, the baseline is chosen for every set of the 
specifications. In addition, n-1 dummy may mitigate the problem of 
multicollinearity among the regressors (Baltagi, 2005). The choice of a baseline 
category is essentially arbitrary, for this study fits precisely with all regression 
models regardless of which category is selected for this role. The value and 
meaning of the individual dummy-variable coefficients    ,    ,    ,    ,    and     
depend, however, on which category is chosen as the baseline. 
 
The first group dummy is aimed at examining the effect of the Islamic debt 
proportion on each company, and three categories are set: first, a company having 
an Islamic debt proportion below the average of the Islamic debt proportion; 
second, a company having an average Islamic debt proportion; and third, a 
company having an Islamic debt proportion higher than the average of the Islamic 
debt proportion. The first category will be set as “1” if companies have a below 
average Islamic debt proportion; otherwise it is set equal to “0”. The second 
category will be set as “0” if companies have an average Islamic debt proportion. 
The third category will be set as “1” if companies have a higher than average 
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Islamic debt proportion; otherwise it is set equal to “0”. The baseline category is 
used for this dummy if the company has an average proportion Islamic debt. The 
average of the Islamic debt proportion is 8.06%, which is calculated by the total of 
the Islamic debt proportion over the total number of companies. 
 
The second group dummy is aimed at examining the effect of the Islamic debt 
issuance frequency on each company, and three categories are set: first, a 
company issuing an Islamic debt only once; second, a company issuing an Islamic 
debt for the second time; and third, a company issuing an Islamic debt more than 
twice. The first category will be set as “0” if companies issue an Islamic debt only 
once. The second category will be set as “1” if companies issue an Islamic debt 
for the second time; otherwise it is set equal to “0”. The third category will be set 
as “1” if companies issue an Islamic debt more than twice; otherwise it is set 
equal to “0”. The baseline category is used for this dummy if the company issued 
Islamic debt for the first time. 
 
The third group dummy is aimed at examining the effect of the Islamic debt type 
on each company, and three categories are set: first, a company issuing a debt-
based type of Islamic debt; second, a company issuing an asset-based type of 
Islamic debt; and third, a company issuing an equity-based type of Islamic debt. 
The first category will be set as “0” if companies issue a debt-based type. The 
second category will be set as “1” if companies issue an asset-based type; 
otherwise it is set equal to “0”.  The third category will be set as “0” if companies 
issue an equity-based type; otherwise it is set equal to “0”. The baseline category 
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is used for this dummy if the company issues an debt-based type of the Islamic 
debt. 
 
Prior research suggests that the performance of each firm may differ according to 
their size, because larger firms have greater economies of scale in the transaction 
costs associated with long term debt, which may influence the results and 
inferences (Ramaswamy, 2001; Frank & Goyal, 2003; Coleman, 2007; Jermias, 
2008; Ebaid, 2009). In addition, larger firms have less potential of bankruptcy 
cost; therefore, firm size should be positively related to the borrowing capacity 
(Krishnan & Moyer, 1997). This study uses a natural logarithm of the total assets 
as a proxy for firm size as the control variable (Naceur & Goaied, 2002; Akhtar, 
2005; Zeitun & Tian, 2007; Talberg et al., 2008). The natural logarithm is applied 
for the firm size variable owing to the skewness and kurtosis problem. Further, 
natural logarithm ensures that the actual regressor has less statistical noise in the 
regression model, and moderates the effects of the large size of the firm. Table 4.3 
provides a brief explanation for all research variables. 
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Table 4.3 Description of the research variables for panel data analysis 
Variable Acronym Description 
Dependent Variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q 
( ) 
Value of the firm’s assets as measured by the 
market value of equity, plus the book value of 
long term liabilities, plus the book value of 
current liabilities, less current assets divided 
by total assets. Market value equity is the 
product of a firm’s share price and the 
common stock outstanding. 
Economic Value Added EVA ( ) Economic value of the firm as it measures 
managerial effectiveness of the firm in 
maximising shareholders wealth. It represents 
the residual income remained after all cost 
have been paid, and does not focus directly on 
the market values. EVA is calculated as the 
return on capital, less the weighted average 
cost of capital, multiply by the total capital. 
Return on Assets ROA ( ) An indicator of how profitable a firm is 
relative to its total assets, and it measures the 
operating efficiency of the total business. 
Measured by the net profit/total assets. 
Return on Equity ROE ( ) An indicator of how profitable a firm is 
relative to its total equity, and it measures the 
operating efficiency in contributing the 
owners’ wealth. Measured by the net 
profit/total equity. 
Explanatory variables: 
The proportion of the 
Islamic debt to non-Islamic 
debt.  
PROP ID-
NID ( ) 
The proportion of Islamic debt is calculated 
as the total Islamic debt divided by the total 
assets/or total Islamic debt divided by the 
total Islamic debt plus total equity. 
The proportion of Islamic 
debt. 
PROP ID 
( ) 
Three categories are set: the first category 
will be set as “1” if companies have a below 
average Islamic debt proportion; otherwise it 
is set equal to “0”. The second category will 
be set as “0” if companies have an average 
Islamic debt proportion. The third category 
will be set as “1” if companies have a higher 
than average Islamic debt proportion; 
otherwise it is set equal to “0”. 
The frequency of Islamic 
debt issuance. 
FREQ ID 
( ) 
Three categories are set: the first category 
will be set as “0” if companies issue an 
Islamic debt for only once. The second 
category will be set as “1” if companies issue 
an Islamic debt for the second times; 
otherwise it is set equal to “0”. The third 
category will be set as “0” if companies issue 
an Islamic debt more than twice; otherwise it 
is set equalt to “0”. 
The type of Islamic debt 
issued. 
TYPE ID 
( ) 
Three categories are set: the first category 
will be set as “0” if companies issue a debt-
based type. The second category will be set as 
“1” if companies issue an asset-based type; 
otherwise it is set equal to “0”.  The third 
category will be set as “0” if companies issue 
an equity-based type; otherwise it is set equal 
to “0”. 
114 
 
4.4.2 VARIABLES FOR EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS 
There are two variables used for event study analysis, which are average abnormal 
return (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). AAR is the 
average abnormal return across the firms while CAAR is the cumulative average 
abnormal return across the firms. Abnormal return is defined as the difference 
between the expected return and the actual return on investment. Abnormal return 
may be either positive or negative. Abnormal return is calculated using three 
abnormal return benchmarks, which are mean adjusted return, market adjusted 
return, and market model return. 
 
4.4.3 VARIABLES FOR MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION METHOD 
(MVRM) FOR EVENT STUDY 
4.4.3.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The cumulative average abnormal return is dependent variable. This variable is 
calculated using two abnormal return benchmarks; namely, mean adjusted return 
and market model return. 
 
4.4.3.2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
There are three equations of MVRM used in this study. Islamic debt frequency 
and Islamic debt type are used as dependent variables for the first equation. 
Islamic debt offerings size, Islamic debt maturity, debt to equity ratio and firm 
size are used as independent variables for the second equation. Firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q, EVA, ROA and ROE) is used as the independent variable for the third 
equation. Table 4.4 provides a description of the research variables. 
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Table 4.4 Description of the research variables for multivariate regression for 
event study 
Variable Acronym Description 
Dependent Variable: 
Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Return 
CAAR ( ) The daily abnormal return across firms. 
Explanatory variables: 
Islamic debt frequency  
IDFREQ 
( ) 
The frequency of the Islamic debt 
issuance. 
Islamic debt type IDTYPE 
( ) 
The type of Islamic debt issued. 
Islamic debt offerings size  IDOS ( ) The ratio of Islamic debt size offering 
divided by total asset for the period 
prior to the announcement. 
Islamic debt maturity IDMAT 
( ) 
The Islamic debt maturity length. 
Debt ratio D/E (X) The ratio of total debt to total asset for 
the period prior to the announcement 
date 
Firm size SIZE (X) The logarithm of the total asset. 
Firm performance FP (X) Firm performance (Tobin’s Q, EVA, ROA, 
ROE). 
 
4.5 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
This section includes the models used to test the relationship between Islamic debt 
and firm value/firm performance. There are three sections of analysis: first, panel 
data analysis, second, event study analysis, and third, multivariate regression 
method analysis. The econometric tests discussed in this chapter included the 
dynamic panel GMM regression and the panel corrected standard error (PCSE) 
for panel data analysis. The panel data analysis is primarily directed toward 
investigating explanatory variables related to the performance of various 
dependent variables. Regression models for panel data are employed according to 
the diagnostic testing of the data. This will include normality test, 
heteroskedasticity test, and some other tests relating to the specification of the 
regression model. 
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An event study method is used to investigate whether the market reacts favourably 
to a firm issuing Islamic debt. Two situations will be considered: first, a company 
which issues an Islamic debt for the first time and, second, a company which 
issues Islamic debt more than once. This will provide evidence concerning 
whether the market reacts positively or negatively to the first issuance, and 
whether the market reacts favourably or unfavourably to on-going issues of sukuk. 
Last, the multivariate regression method is employed to examine whether the 
Islamic debt issuance has an impact on the abnormal return. This method is aimed 
at investigating some variables which determine the abnormal return. Figure 4.5, 
Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 provide schematic outlines of the data processing. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the process in determining the regression method employed for 
chapter five, which is panel data analysis. Figure 4.6 provides the process for 
event study analysis, which is chapter six. Figure 4.7 exhibits the process in 
determining the regression method employed for chapter seven, which is 
multivariate regression analysis for event study. 
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Figure 4.4: General process in specifiying the final method 
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Figure 4.5:  process in determining the regression method for panel data analysis  
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Figure 4.6: The process for event study analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: The process in determining the regression method for multivariate 
regression analysis for event study 
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4.5.1. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
This study uses the panel data method which allows the unobservable 
heterogeneity for each observation in the sample to be eliminated and 
multicollinearity among variables to be alleviated. Unobservable heterogeneity 
might result in spurious correlations with the dependent variables, which would 
bias the coefficient obtained (Baltagi, 2005). However, test for poolability is 
necessary because the parameters of the prediction equation may vary across firms 
and observation years. To support the panel method of this study, there are some 
tests of the poolability, for example the Chow test, the ANCOVA test and the 
Roy-Zellner test. This study employed the Roy-Zellner test to confirm poolability 
in order to avoid type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it’s true).  
 
The Roy-Zellner poolability test result across firms and across time are 10.86 with 
p-value 0.9001 and 144.71 with p-value 0.000 respectively. Though the result 
across time can reject the null hypothesis, the result across firms cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of poolability, suggesting that the panel method is appropriate for 
this study.  
 
Before proceeding to the model specification, diagnostic testing of normality, 
heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation, was conducted to 
determine the appropriate method used in this study. This step is necessary 
because the estimators in the regression model have to comply with the basic 
assumptions that estimators should be linear, unbiased and have minimum 
variance, and these basic assumptions are commonly referred to as the best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE) coefficients. Further, model misspecification can arise 
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when omitted variables, improper specification of a lag structure and 
misspecification of functional form exist; therefore, specification testing is 
important prior to model building. 
 
Maddala and Lahiri (2009) specify problems that might be present in the 
regression model. First, normality is present when the regression model contains a 
non-normal distribution of error terms. Second, heteroskedasticity is present when 
the regression model exhibits unequal variance of each disturbance term (the 
individual dependent values are not spread around their mean values with the 
same variance). Third, multicollinearity is present when the regression model 
shows a high correlation among independent variables (their dependency resulting 
in high coefficient standard errors). Fourth, autocorrelation is present when the 
regression model contains a high correlation between the errors terms. Those 
problems lead to inefficiency of the least square estimators and biased estimates, 
which will invalidate the tests of significance (Maddala & Lahiri, 2009). 
 
If heteroskedasticity is present on the dependent variable, the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) is no longer an efficient and unbiased estimator; therefore, the 
model that is robust to heteroskedasticity should be applied. White or a Breusch-
Pagan test can be used to detect the heteroskedasticity. If the sample size is 
considerably large and errors exhibit autocorrelation, then feasible generalised 
least square (FGLS) is appropriate. Furthermore, Greenberg (2003) affirmed that 
the OLS with panel corrected errors provided more efficient estimation than the 
FGLS. Moreover, if the model exhibits autocorrelation, first differences 
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(Wooldrige, 2002) or GLS corrected for autoregressive moving average (Sayrs, 
1989) can be used. 
 
If there is autocorrelation in the model, it is necessary to deal with it. The Durbin-
Watson test is one of several tests which can be used to test residual 
autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson test for first-order autocorrelation in the 
residuals was modified by Bhargava et al. to handle balanced panel data. Baltagi 
and Wu (1999) modified it further to handle unbalanced panel data. 
 
Autocorrelation is inherent within the panel from one period to another. Some 
problems with dynamic panels that contain autocorrelation in the residuals are 
handled with a Prais-Winston transformation and/or a Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation that amounts to a first partial differencing to remove the bias from 
the autocorrelation and/or a weight-adjusted combination of the White and 
Newey-West estimator to handle both the heteroskedasticity and the 
autocorrelation in the model. Furthermore, Arellano, Bond and Bover developed 
one and two step general methods of moments (GMM) estimators for panel data 
analysis. GMM is usually robust to deviations of the underlying data generation 
process to violations of heteroskedasticity and normality; GMM are 
asymptotically normal but they are not always the most efficient estimators. 
 
If no autocorrelation is assumed, then problems from the correlation of the lagged 
endogenous and the disturbance term may yield biased results particularly when 
the sample is finite or small. If one uses general methods of moments (GMM), 
with instrumental variables, the use of the proxy variables or instruments may 
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circumvent problems with correlations or errors. If the autocorrelation is prevalent 
in the random errors, an autoregressive error structure of the first order using two-
stage generalised least square (2-stage GLS) procedure is appropriate. 
 
When heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are prevalent, GMM with a 
combination of White and Newey-West estimators is appropriate as it obtains 
robust panel standard errors. Moreover, GMM model tends to be robust with 
respect to non-normality. 
 
The diagnostic testing reveals that the data present a heteroskedasticity problem; 
therefore, Generalised Least Square (GLS) method is appropriate to be used; 
however, to finalise the appropriate method employed in this study, the linearity 
and the endogeneity tests were conducted.  
 
In practice, a linear functional form for dynamic panel data models is often 
assumed for convenience. However, the danger of inappropriate model 
specification is prevalent when inappropriate specification testing is not 
conducted properly, hence, it is important to first determine whether a panel 
model is linear before proceeding to a non-linear specification. Moreover, when 
the time dimension in the panel data is short, the linearity test result is likely to 
yield non-linearity, although the true relationship is linear. To test for linearity, 
Baltagi and Griffins (1997) applies the double-length artificial regression to test 
whether the panel model is linear or log-linear. 
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Linearity means that the amount of change or rate of change between scores on 
two variables are constant for the entire range of scores for the variables. If the 
relationship is nonlinear, the statistics which assume it is linear will underestimate 
the strength of the relationship, or fail to detect the existence of a relationship. The 
regression equation for each firm under an unrestricted model is: 
                                  (1) 
where   is different for every firm equation, and the hypothesis           for all 
I, hence the restricted model given in (1) as: 
        (2) 
 
The linearity testing of the data is important as the characteristics of the data may 
affect the results and this study still has to confirm the linearity of the data 
characteristics because the dynamic debt effect should be consider as an important 
matter when affecting firm value. The linearity test result for group 1 is 2.905506 
with p-value 0.0000, which rejects the null hypothesis of nonlinearity. Similar to 
the result for group 1, the linearity test result for group 2 is -4.659 with p-value 
0.000, which supports the linear model. 
 
Even though panel data method gives an important advantage – it can reveal 
whether a static or dynamic model is in fact appropriate – some of the unobserved 
determinants of capital structure and firm value are likely to change significantly 
over time. Therefore, specifying exogenous and endogenous variables in the 
explanatory variables are important as they will affect the estimations. 
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The endogeneity causes inconsistency of the OLS estimates and requires 
instrumental variable methods to obtain consistent parameter estimates. If the 
possible endogeneity of the variables exists, a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
analysis using Instrumental Variables (IV) or Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) is more appropriate (Vera & Ugedo, 2007). 
 
The endogeneity is primarily controlled for an analysis of omitted variables, 
measurement error, and an inverse causality, and, in case of doubt, checked with 
the Hausman test. The Hausman test is used to detect the endogeneity in the 
explanatory variables, and this test allows for verification of the presence of 
correlations between the unobservable heterogeneity and the explanatory variables 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). 
 
Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) address the endogeneity issue of debt and firm 
performance when they examined the mechanisms to control agency problems. 
They use a simultaneous equations system with equations for Tobin’s Q and debt 
in which debt is allowed to depend on each other. Likewise, Dessi & Robertson 
(2003) and Maghyereh (2005) treat leverage as an endogenous variable in 
examining variables that are relevant for explaining capital structure. Further, 
profitability, firm size, and non-debt tax shield are some capital structure 
determinants; the high possibility that capital structure might have an inverse 
causality with profitability might be present, which would lead to the endogeneity 
problem. 
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In accord with numerous studies of capital structure determinants (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Dessi & Robertson, 2003; Maghyereh, 2005; Coricelli, Driffield, 
Pal & Roland, 2011), this study assumes that the debt choice has an inverse 
causality with the firm’s value and/or firm’s financial performance, and the choice 
of debt might be affected by other factors. To confirm the endogeneity further, 
this study has employed endogeneity testing using the Durbin-Wu Hausman 
(DWH) testing. 
Let            Then a test can be based on 
    {         [ ]}      
 
The Hausman test usually compares the coefficients of the endogenous variables, 
and if there is considerable difference between Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and 
IV estimation (IV, 2SLS, and GMM), then the model has to be instrumented using 
an appropriate technique. Such a technique is only valid under the condition that 
errors are independent and homoskedastic. However, in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, the test of        can be implemented using robust variance 
estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  
 
The endogeneity tests result reveals that the regressors in the model present 
endogeneity. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose the instrumental variable (IV) 
technique to overcome the endogeneity by using the lagged instruments. Further, 
Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal, (2002) employ the lagged independent variable to 
address the endogeneity problem in their model. 
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This technique results in consistent estimations, therefore, the endogeneity model 
in this study uses lagged leverage (lagged independent variable) because capital 
structure is only one of the factors affecting the firm value, and it is assumed that 
firms change their capital structure over time and the changes might contribute to 
the firm value.  
 
Supported by numerous previous studies, by the assumptions above, by the 
endogeneity tests and by the linearity tests, the Generalised Method of Moments 
is appropriate for group 1 as it corrects for heteroskedasticity, the endogeneity 
problems and reduces multicollinearity, hence improving the efficiency of the 
estimates. Meanwhile the appropriate regression model for group 2 is the panel 
corrected standard error (PCSE), because group 2 is imposed with only 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
Before constructing the dynamic panel GMM model for group 1 and the PCSE for 
group 2, the equation below is a starting point for this study to establish if the debt 
choice has an impact on a firm’s value and firm’s financial performance. A model 
for the regression of Islamic debt, non-Islamic debt, the proportion of Islamic debt, 
the frequency of Islamic debt issuance, and the type of the Islamic debt issued is 
then: 
                                                        
    (3) 
              (4) 
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where    is firm’s value and/or firm’s financial performance.      is Islamic debt, 
    is non-Islamic debt and ,     is firm size. K is the dummy proportion for 
Islamic debt, N is the dummy frequency for Islamic debt and Z is the dummy 
Islamic debt type.    denotes the unobservable individual effect,    denotes the 
unobservable time effect, and     is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. 
This model describes three parallel regression planes, which can differ in their 
intercepts. Hereafter, the         will be referred as     (set of regressors): 
        
                                        (5) 
where     is a K x 1 vector of regressors,   is a K x 1 vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and    represents time-invariant individual nuisance parameters. Under 
the null hypothesis,     is assumed to be independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.) over periods and across cross-sectional units. 
 
When using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate  , one assumes that    
  
is orthogonal with      of equation (1), but this may not be true, and thus the 
estimated   may be biased with endogeneity. Therefore, the instrumental variable 
(IV), denoted as  , approach may be used to solve the endogeneity; while the 
changes in the new IV are associated with changes in  but they do not lead to 
changes in   (except indirectly via   ). Therefore, the equation which includes 
endogeneity is specified as follows (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010); 
       
       
         
                          (6) 
 
The intercepts for Islamic debt, Islamic debt proportion (low and medium 
proportion), Islamic debt issuance frequency (one and two issues), and Islamic 
debt type issued (debt-based and asset based type) are provided as follows: 
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   (    )  (    )  (    )  (    )  (    )  (    )  
                        (7) 
 
or,    represents the constant vertical distance between the regression for low 
Islamic debt proportion and high Islamic debt proportion (fixing the values of 
Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt);    represents the constant vertical difference 
between the parallel regression for average Islamic debt proportion and high 
Islamic debt proportion (fixing the values of Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt); 
   represents the constant vertical difference between the parallel regression for 
one Islamic debt issue and more than two Islamic debt issues (fixing the values of 
Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt);    represents the constant vertical difference 
between the parallel regression for two Islamic debt issues and more than two 
Islamic debt issues (fixing the values of Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt);    
represents the constant vertical difference between the parallel regression for the 
debt-based Islamic debt type and equity-based Islamic debt type (fixing the values 
of Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt);    represents the constant vertical 
difference between the parallel regression for the asset-based Islamic debt type 
and equity-based Islamic debt type (fixing the values of Islamic debt and non-
Islamic debt). 
   (    )                          (7.1) 
   (    )                          (7.2) 
   (    )                        (7.3) 
   (    )                          (7.4) 
   (    )                          (7.5) 
   (    )                          (7.6) 
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The coefficient  , therefore gives the intercept for non-Islamic debt, Islamic debt 
proportion (high proportion), Islamic debt issuance frequency (more than two 
issues), and Islamic debt type issued (equity-based type): 
                             (8) 
 
Because non-Islamic debt, Islamic debt proportion (average proportion), Islamic 
debt issuance frequency (first issuance), and Islamic debt type issued (debt-based 
type) are coded 0 for all dummy regressors, therefore non-Islamic debt, Islamic 
debt proportion (average proportion), Islamic debt issuance frequency (first 
issuance), and Islamic debt type issued (debt-based type) serve as the baseline 
category to which the other regressors are compared.  
 
The GMM was first introduced by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and further developed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991), who claimed that GMM deploys additional 
instruments obtained by utilising the orthogonality conditions that exists between 
the disturbances and the lagged values of the dependent variable. Furthermore, 
Hansen (1982) explains that one can find a GMM estimator of the true parameter 
by finding the element of the parameter space which sets linear combination of 
the sample cross products as close to zero as possible. Thus, the advantage of 
GMM stems from the fact that it optimally exploits all the linear moment 
restrictions specified by the model. Further, the dynamic panel data model is 
examined in extensively by Kiviet (1995), Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002), and 
Alvarez and Arellano (2003) in their study. 
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The GMM equation model (Blundell & Bond, 1998) is specified as follows 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010): 
          (   )       
            
Where     is the Tobin’s Q at time t for firm i,     is a set of regressors,    is an 
unobserved firm-specific effect and     is a stochastic error. Moving to the right 
     , it is to obtain; 
            
            
 
Taking first difference, one can elide the unobserved firm-specific effect; 
           (           )   
 (         )  (         ) 
where  includes lag performance for explanatory variables,       as well as 
dependent variables. The first-differencing eliminates potential bias that arises 
from unobservable heterogeneity. After first-differencing, GMM estimation uses 
lagged values as instruments for          : 
 
Supposing that the regressors are predetermined, it is possible to obtain consistent 
estimates of coefficients performing a GMM estimator that exploits the following 
orthogonality conditions; 
 [     (         )]                        
 [     (         )]                        
 
Then, the instrumental variable estimation in the first difference model is: 
                             
                            
where   is the first difference operator. The first difference in equations and levels 
using their past levels/first differences are used for the instrumented variables.  
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There are some drawbacks of GMM:  first-differencing may increase the signal to 
noise ratio and reduce the power of the test (Beck et al., 2000); weak instruments 
of the variables in levels for first-differenced equations (Arrelano & Bover, 1995); 
higher chance to be imposed of measurement errors in the dependent variable due 
to first-differencing (Griliches & Hausman, 1986). 
 
Further, a test of overidentifiying restrictions is necessary to test the validity of 
overidentifying instruments in an overidentified model to identify that the 
parameters of the model are estimated using optimal GMM. This test is called 
Hansen’s test, and the null hypothesis is that all instruments are valid. At last, 
weak instruments testing is done to identify whether the instrument is weak, and 
the overidentified model is used because the model has only one endogenous 
regressor that is overidentified (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; p. 191-199). 
 
It is typically assumed that disturbances in panel data models are cross-sectionally 
independent, particularly for panels with large cross-section dimension (N). 
However, testing for cross-sectional dependence is important in fitting panel-data 
models particularly for a short dynamic panel-data model, where the number of 
observation is considerably high or infinite with fixed length of time or finite (De 
Hoyos & Saradivis, 2006). 
 
This study uses fixed N and sufficiently large T, and the cross correlations of the 
errors can be tested statistically either using the Lagrange multiplier (Breusch & 
Pagan, 1980) or the seemingly unrelated regression equation (Zellner, 1962). 
Further, Jensen and Schmidt (2011) compare the cross-section dependence test of 
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the Pesaran test (2004), the Schott test (2005) and the Liu-Lin-Shao test (2008). 
They find that the Schott test is superior when controlling for panel-specific and 
time-specific fixed effects (with few time periods and relatively many cross-
sectional units). 
 
Under the alternative,     may be correlated across cross sections, but the 
assumption of no serial correlation remains. 
              (      )                      
                                     
Where     is the product-moment correlation coefficient of the disturbances and is 
given by: 
        
∑       
 
   
(∑    
  
   )
   (∑    
  
   )
   
 
The number of possible pairings        rises with N. 
 
Finally, the same specification testing is also employed for group 2 to determine 
the appropriate regression method such as poolability test, normality test, 
heteroskedasticity test, multicollinearity test, autocorrelation test, linearity test and 
endogeneity test. The Roy-Zellner poolability test across firms and across time for 
group 2 reject the null hypothesis. However, a rejection of the null hypothesis 
does not imply that the data from different factors cannot be pooled for estimation. 
This is supported by Liu, Tung and Pong (2006), as they affirmed that the 
hypothesis of equality for intercepts and slopes is not the correct hypothesis for 
poolability across design factors. 
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The heteroskedasticity result for group 2 is 12.5800 with p-value 0.9605, 
suggesting no heteroskedaticity problem. The skewness and kurtosis are 8.1500 
with p-value 0.2270 and 1.9300 with p-value 0.1652, suggesting that group 2 
exhibits normal distribution. The multicollinearity result is 2.34 with p-value 
0.000, suggesting no multicollinearity problem. The endogeneity tests result 
reveals that the regressors in the model present no endogeneity. The linearity test 
result for group 2 is -4.659 with p-value 0.000, which supports the linear model. 
 
As a result of the specification tests results obtained for group 2, panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) is employed. PCSE allows heteroskedasticity and allows 
the error     in the model to be correlated over i.  
 
4.5.2. EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS AND UNIT ROOT TEST 
Event study analysis relates to the information uncertainty in the market. When 
the market absorbs particular information, it will reflect in the firm value which is 
indicated by the stock price movement. Earning announcement, stock splits 
announcement, and mergers and acquisitions announcements are examples of that 
particular information affecting the stock price. 
 
Event study analysis was first introduced by James Doley (1933), and it examined 
the impact of stock split on the stock price. In his study, Doley finds a significant 
difference in the stock price movement in which the price increased in 57 of the 
cases and declined in only 26 of the cases. Further, a series of research in the 
event study field has been continuously conducted since its initial momentum 
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until 1960, and John H. Myers (1948), C. Austin Barker (1956) and John Ashlery 
(1962) are examples of researchers using event study (MacKinlay, 1997). 
 
However, event study has been popular since the seminal work of Ball & Brown 
(1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969), in which they introduced the 
methodology of the event study that has been employed by most researchers until 
now. Ball and Brown (1968) examine the impact of earning announcements, and 
Fama et al. (1969) examine the impact of stock split on the stock price, using 29 
months before the split was announced to 30 months after as the event period, and 
the abnormal return was calculated using the market model. The result reveals that 
the stock price quickly adjusted to the split announcement, and no investors 
should gain abnormal return from the split announcement.  
 
This study uses event study methodology to examine whether the market reacts 
favourably to a firm announcing an issue of Islamic debt. Even though Brown and 
Warner (1985) reveal a series of problems with daily returns– non-normality of 
the returns, non-synchronous trading affects the reliability of the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) estimates, autocorrelation in daily excess returns, and variance 
increases on the days around an event – a daily stock return is used in this study 
because it can capture the effect of the announcement date surrounding the event 
date. Further, daily returns are more powerful than those using monthly returns 
(Peterson, 1989). 
 
Typically, the estimation window is about 250 days for daily data, however, there 
is discretion to determine the estimation window, and it may depend on the 
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characteristics and circumstances (Thomson, 1995). Therefore, this study uses 120 
days estimation window, 31 days event window, and 120 days post-estimation 
window. The aim of 120 days estimation window is to capture the signalling 
effect of the Islamic debt issuance before the event window. The reason for using 
15 days before the event date as the event window is because the securities 
commission will grant its approval for Islamic debt (sukuk) proposal issuance 
within 14 working days as mentioned in the Malaysian Securities Commission 
Guidelines, 2009. Figure 4.8 presents the estimation window. 
Figure 4.8: Estimation Window 
 
 Estimation Window Event Window Post-Event Window 
 
 T0 T1 0 T2 T3 
 τ 
τ = 0 as the event date 
τ = T1 + 1 to T2 as the event window 
τ = T0 + 1 to T1 as the estimation window 
τ = T2 + 1 to T3 as the post-estimation window 
 
The estimation period is the period of time over which no event has occurred, and 
is used to establish how the return should behave normally in the absence of the 
event. There is no set standard for the number of periods to include in the 
estimation period; one can set a longer estimation window to capture the 
relationship between the stock and the market, but it should be noted that longer 
estimation window may cause a spurious correlation between the stock and the 
market. 
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The event window is the number of trading days preceding and following the 
event date that are considered necessary to capture both the leakage and the time 
needed for the information to be absorbed by the market. The length of the event 
window is a matter of judgement for the researcher, and it is preferable to have the 
least number of days possible for the event window because multiple events 
within an event window may occur and affect the significance of the result. 
 
Brown and Warner (1985) use 244 days as the estimation window and 11 days as 
the event window; 5 days before and 5 days after the event date. Eckbo and Weir 
(1989) use 200 days as the estimation window, and 31 days as the event window; 
20 days before and 10 days after the event date. Furthermore, Johnson (1995) uses 
150 days estimation window, 21 days event window, and 170 days post-event 
window to examine the effect of straight debt announcement issues. Johnson uses 
a post-event window to capture the change of the market model parameters due to 
the effect of the leverage changes caused by a debt issue.  
 
Moreover, Castillo (2004) uses 180 days as the estimation window, and 21 days 
as the event window; 10 days before and 10 days after the event date, to examine 
the announcement effect of bond and equity issues. In addition, Asshari et al. 
(2009) use 120 days as the estimation window and 61 days as the event window; 
30 days before and 30 days after the event date, and divide the estimation window 
into two groups; period 1 (3 months before the event window or 4 months before 
the event date), and period 2 (2 months before the event window or 3 months 
before the event date). Such researchers investigate the announcement effect of 
debt and equity issues. However, in the value effects study of regulatory regime, 
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the event window is shorter, ranging from 1 to 3 days (Forbes, 1994; Oxera, 2006; 
Arnold & Parker, 2007). Therefore, the length of the event window depends on 
the event investigated. 
 
According to Brown and Warner (1980), different abnormal return benchmarks 
used in the event studies give less benefit and may worsen the result. Moreover, 
there is no difference among the alternative estimators with regard to their ability 
to detect abnormal performance in the absence of event-time clustering (Peterson, 
1989). In addition, Binder (1998) discusses Chandra, Moriarty and Willinger’s 
work (1990) in which they re-examine Brown and Warner results (1980). Chandra 
et al. imply that the mean adjusted returns and market adjusted returns have an 
equal power as the market and risk adjusted returns in estimating parameters, 
however, Binder affirms that the mean adjusted returns is less powerful than the 
market adjusted returns and the market and risk adjusted returns in estimating 
parameters. 
 
According to Castillo (2004), who examined the impact of bond and equity 
announcement, the market corrected model and the market model minimise the 
variance of the abnormal return by removing the portion of the returns related to 
the market movements, hence, this widens the possibility to detect the event effect. 
Therefore, the abnormal return benchmarks that are the mean adjusted return and 
the market model are employed in this study. 
 
The mean adjusted return model is one of the simplest models of abnormal returns 
that yields similar results compared to other sophisticated models in the short term 
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interval and general market movement is not allowed (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
The mean adjusted return is formulated as (Peterson, 1989; MacKinlay, 1997; 
Binder 1998): 
           ̅  
 
This method is the simplest method because only one parameter is estimated, and 
return market is not required. The risk of the mean adjusted returns on the market 
portfolio is uncontrollable during the event period, and its estimators have 
considerably greater variance than the market model disturbances (Binder, 1998). 
 
The market adjusted returns is the difference between return on stock and return 
on market. This method may be appropriate especially when the stocks have betas 
close to one. This method allows for general market movement but assumes each 
firm has the same average return and risk characteristics as a whole. The market 
adjusted return is formulated as (Brown & Warner, 1985; Peterson, 1989; Binder, 
1998); 
              
Where Rit and Rmt are the period t returns on security i and the market portfolio, 
this method only requires the return market. 
 
The market model represents a potential improvement over the constant mean 
return model by removing the portion of the return that is related to the return on 
the market portfolio. Hence, the return generated by the security is dependent on 
that generated by the market portfolio and the degree to which the security 
responds as evaluated by beta. Typically, security returns are linearly related to 
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market returns through stock betas. Stock betas are estimated over firm estimation 
periods. This method considers market trends and the firm’s risk characteristics, 
and risk-adjusted returns may vary across securities and over time. The market 
model is potentially superior as it removes the portion of the return that is related 
to movement in the market, hence the variance of any abnormal returns detected 
should be reduced. The market model is formulated as follows (Peterson, 1989; 
Shyam-Sunder, 1991; MacKinlay, 1997; Binder, 1998; Martel & Padron, 2006; 
Ibrahim & Minai, 2009; Ashhari, Chun & Nassir, 2009; Modirzadehbami and 
Mansourfar, 2011); 
                    
 (     )                      (   )      
  
where Rit and Rmt are the period t returns on security i and the market portfolio,     
is the zero mean disturbance term.   ,   ,    
  are the parameters of the market 
model. This method controls for the risk (beta) of the stock and the movement of 
the return market during the period estimated. The benefit of using the market 
model will depend on the R
2
 regression; the higher R
2
, the greater is the reduction 
in the variance of abnormal returns, which increases the power to detect the 
abnormal performance. This method simply pertains to the running of an Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regression on a time series to formulate daily expected 
returns, and from these, abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. 
However, in the presence of thin trading in a particular share, the market model 
will produce outputs that bias expected returns downwards and therefore bias the 
resulting abnormal returns upwards, generating in exaggerated results.  
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According to Blume (1975), the estimated beta deriving from the historical data is 
biased, and it may affect the empirical results. Therefore, the estimated beta has to 
be adjusted to avoid biasness, and the adjustment of beta is important since it will 
be used to forecast the future beta for a security in which it will be used to 
estimate its market risk. Furthermore, the beta changes overtime as the uncertainty 
arises in the value of the expected return which can result in biasness, therefore 
several time periods are used to measure the beta. If the true beta follows a linear 
trend, it can be easily shown that the estimated beta is unbiased so that the results 
are more accurate. In addition, Blume’s method is generally appropriate for any 
conditions arising in the market. 
 
A linear regression is a common method used in the beta estimation, Harvey, Lins 
and Roper (2004) estimate the beta using returns from 120 trading days prior to 
the announcement date and excluding the 21 days of the event window, and the 
adjusted beta is calculated using Blume’s method to acquire unbiased beta for the 
forecast period, therefore the results are more accurate. The linear regression for 
beta is: 
                (9) 
 
Where     is the beta of security i in time period 1,     is the beta of security i in 
time period 2 and     is the error term. The formula 1 is used to calculate the beta 
in time period 2. The beta in time period 2 (first 60 days prior to announcement, 
excluding the 31 days event window), are regressed on the corresponding beta in 
the time period 1 (second part of 60 days). The regression coefficient   and   is 
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utilised in the following equation to obtain the ex-ante betas in time period 3,     
(event window), by using the ex-post betas (   ) in time period 2 as: 
                (10) 
The     obtained is used to forecast the corresponding “true” betas in time period 
3 (three). 
 
Non-synchronous trading is a problem in a daily return, as mentioned by Brown 
and Warner (1985). If non-synchronous trading is an issue, then the market model 
parameter can be calculated using the estimators derived by Scholes and Williams 
(1977) (Binder, 1998). 
 
Table 4.5 presents the list of the return benchmark used by researchers from 1983 
to 2010. The market model, the calendar time approach (Three-Factor Model), the 
size/industry control firm, the size/book to market portfolio, and the event time 
approach (Buy and hold abnormal return) are the common benchmarks used to 
measure the abnormal return, although of these, the market model is the most 
frequent benchmark used to measure the abnormal return.  This study uses market 
adjusted returns to calculate abnormal returns. Mean adjusted return is used to 
support the robustness of the analysis. 
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Table 4.5: Return benchmark 
Year Author(s) Return Benchmark 
1983 Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen Market Model 
  
Event time portfolio method 
1984 Dann and Mikkelson Market Model 
1986 Eckbo Market Model 
1986 Mikkelson and Partch Market Model 
1989 Bernard and Thomas Market Model 
1991 Ritter Market Index 
  
Size/Industry control firm 
  
Size Portfolio 
1991 Shyam and Sunder Market Model 
1992 Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker Size Portfolio 
1995 Ikkenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen Market Index 
  
Size Portfolio 
  
Size and Book to market portfolio 
1995 Loughran and Ritter Market Index 
  
Size control firm 
  
Calender time approach (Three-Factor Model)\ 
1995 Spiess and Affleck Market Index 
  
Size Portfolio 
  
Size/Industry control firm 
  
Size/Book to market control firm 
1995 Michaely, Thaler and Womack Market Index 
  
Size Portfolio 
  
Size/industry portfolio 
1996 Desai and Jain Size Portfolio 
  
Book to market portfolio 
1996 Huffman and Ward Market Model 
1996 Womack Size Portfolio 
  
Calender time approach (Three-Factor Model)\ 
1997 Best Market Model 
1998 Howton, Howton and Perfect Market Model 
1998 Roon and Veld Market Model 
1999 Abhyankar and Dunning Market Model 
2000 Megginson, Nash, Netter and Schwartz Event time approach (BHAR) 
2004 Castillo Market portfolio (market corrected model) 
  
Market Model 
2004 Zhang Calender time approach (Three-Factor Model)\ 
2009 Asshari, Chun and Nassir Market Model 
2009 Dutta and Jog Event time approach (BHAR) 
  
Calender time approach (Three-Factor Model)\ 
2010 Ameer and Othman Market Model 
2010 Duca, Dutordoir, Veld and Verwijmeren Market Model 
Source: Compiled from sources 
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The abnormal returns in the sample firms are aggregated to draw overall 
inferences for a specific event, and the aggregation is calculated through time and 
across securities. The aggregation of the cross-sectional distribution of returns at 
the time of an event is intended to examine whether the distribution is abnormal or 
whether the mean abnormal return at the time t is equal to zero (equation 1). The 
independence assumption for the abnormal returns in the cross-section may fail to 
be met due to the event-time clustering (Collins & Dent, 1984; Bernard, 1987; 
Petersen, 2005). This would bias the standard deviation estimated, and to address 
the bias, the significance of the event-period average abnormal return is often 
gauged using the variability of the time series of event portfolio returns in the 
period preceding or after the event date (event portfolio return). 
 
The standard deviation of the portfolio returns can be used to assess the 
significance of the event-window average abnormal return. The cross-sectional 
dependence is accounted for because the variability of the portfolio returns 
through time incorporates whatever cross-dependence exists among the returns on 
individual event securities. Due to the uncertainty factor, the use of historical or 
post-event time-series variability might understate the true variability of the event-
period abnormal performance because the event might have been triggered by 
uncertainty-increasing factors and/or the event itself causes uncertainty in the 
economic environment for the firm, thus the variance is estimated using the 
variability of returns during the event and non-event periods (Collins & Dent, 
1984; Brown & Warner, 1985). Further, abnormal returns may vary cross-
sectionally because the economic effect of the event differs by firm. Events are 
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endogenous, reflecting a firm’s self-selection to choose the event, which in turn 
reflects insiders’ information.  
 
The aggregation of the time series distribution of returns at the time length of an 
event is intended to examine whether mean abnormal returns for periods around 
the event are equal to zero (equation 2 or 3). In estimating the performance 
measure over any multi-period interval (e.g., time 0 through +10), there are a 
number of methods for time-series aggregation over the period of interest. The 
cumulative average residual method (CAR) uses as the abnormal performance 
measure the sum of each month’s average abnormal performance. The cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) is to accommodate a multiple period event window. 
    
 
 
∑    
 
    (1) 
                       (2) 
    (     )   ∑     
  
    
 (3) 
 
Under the null hypothesis, H0, that the event has no impact on the behaviour of 
returns (mean or variance) in observation length of the event window (MacKinlay, 
1997): 
      (    
 (    )) (4) 
 
The variance of CARi is: 
  
 (     )  (         )   
  (5) 
The distribution of the CAR under H0 is no abnormal return, then: 
    (     )  (    
 (     )) (6) 
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The aggregation is calculated through time and across securities 
                       (7) 
      
 
 
∑    
 
    (8) 
      ∑     
  
     (9) 
The variance of CAARi is: 
  
 (     )  (         )   
  (10) 
 
The distribution of the CAAR under H0 is no abnormal return, then: 
     (     )  (    
 (     )) (11) 
 
A test statistic is typically computed and compared to its assumed distribution 
under the null hypothesis that mean abnormal performance equals zero. The null 
hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic exceeds a critical value, typically 
corresponding to the 5% or 1% tail region (i.e., the test level or size of the test is 
0.05 or 0.01). The test statistic is a random variable because abnormal returns are 
measured with error. Two factors contribute to this error. First, predictions about 
securities’ unconditional expected returns are imprecise. Second, individual firms’ 
realised returns at the time of an event are affected for reasons unrelated to the 
event, and this component of the abnormal return does not average to literally zero 
in the cross-section. For the CAR shown in equation (2 or 3), a standard test 
statistic is the CAR divided by an estimate of its standard deviation.5 Many 
alternative ways to estimate this standard deviation have been examined in the 
literature (MacKinlay, 1997). The test statistic is given by: 
   (    )
[  (    )]   
 (12) 
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Where,   (    )    
 (   ) (13) 
 
The test statistic in equation 12 provides the variance of one-period mean 
abnormal return and equation 13 assumes time-series independence of one-period 
mean abnormal return.   (   ) is the variance of the one-period mean abnormal 
return.  
 
After testing the power of AAR and CAAR, this study tested for randomness to 
examine whether the price movements are predictable or not. There are a few 
methods that can be used to test randomness, such as run test, variance ratio test, 
autocorrelation test, unit root test, and autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test. This study employed the unit root test. The early 
and pioneering work on testing for a unit root test in time series was done by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979). The basic objective of the test is to test whether the 
series is random. This test is employed to support the event study analysis, 
therefore a broader insight can be provided. 
 
4.5.3. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL FOR EVENT STUDY 
A Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM) methodology was first introduced by 
Gibbons, (1980) and is used to measure the effect of new information on asset 
prices. Binder (1985, 1998) uses MVRM applying Fama et al (1969)’s method to 
measure abnormal return, and outlines the advantage of the MVRM method over 
other event study methodologies. According to Modigliani & Miller (1963) and 
Masulis (1983), an increase in financial leverage has a positive effect on stock 
prices. 
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The MVRM methodology begins by parameterising the abnormal returns     in 
the individual return equations (Binder, 1985, 1998): 
 ̃           ̃   ∑         ̃  
 
    (1) 
 
Using dummy variables     if there are A announcements about the event, each 
    equals one during the period of   th announcement and otherwise. When the 
explanatory variables in the return generating process are the same for each of the 
N stocks the system of return equations: 
 ̃           ̃   ∑         ̃  
 
   
 
 ̃           ̃   ∑         ̃  
 
   
 
 
 ̃           ̃   ∑         ̃  
 
    (2) 
After testing the MVRM for each firm, this study applies joint hypothesis testing 
for all firms and all announcements, and then the portfolio return equation is: 
 ̃           ̃   ∑         ̃  
 
    (3) 
 
To investigate the impact of Islamic debt offering (equation 1), the Islamic debt 
characteristics (equation 2) and firm performance (equation 3) on the CAAR, a 
multivariate regression model (MVRM) is employed.  Hence, the MVRM formula 
for each part is as follows: 
    (     )                        (1) 
    (     )                     
 
 ⁄           (2) 
    (     )           (3) 
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where: 
CAAR-t, +t : the cumulative average abnormal return at time -1 to +1, -3 to +3, -5 
to +5, -10 to +10, -15 to +15. 
IDFREQ : the frequency of Islamic debt issuance. 
IDTYPE : the type of Islamic debt issued. 
IDOS : the ratio of Islamic debt size offering divided by total asset for the 
period prior to the announcement. 
IDMAT : the Islamic debt maturity length. 
D/E : the ratio of total debt to total asset for the period prior to the 
announcement date. 
SIZE : the logarithm of the total asset. 
FP : firm performance (Tobin’s Q, EVA, ROA and ROE) 
 
Before proceeding to the model specification, diagnostic testing of normality, 
heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation, was conducted to 
determine the appropriate method used in this study. This step is necessary 
because the estimators in the regression model have to comply with the basic 
assumptions that estimators should be linear, unbiased and have minimum 
variance, and these basic assumptions are commonly referred to as the best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE) coefficients.  
 
For group 1, there is a heteroskedasticity problem in equations, as the p-value is 
lower than the level of significance range from 1% to 5% significance level. 
Therefore, the regression method used for all equations has to encounter this 
problem. For skewness and kurtosis, the value for all equations is greater than 10% 
level of significance, suggesting that all the equations have a normal distribution. 
The value for multicollinearity is less than ten, suggesting no multicollinearity 
among the independent variables. The value of linearity for all equations is greater 
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than 10% level of significance. Thus, the null hypothesis of linearity cannot be 
rejected and all the equations have linear functions. At last, there is no 
endogeneity problem found in all equations model (the results for all specification 
testing can be seen in Chapter seven Table 7.1). Therefore, the regression method 
employed for group 1 is Feasible Generalised Least Square (FGLS) regression. As 
mentioned previously, if the sample size is considerably large and errors exhibit 
autocorrelation, then feasible generalised least square (FGLS) is appropriate. 
Furthermore, Greenberg (2003) affirmed that the OLS with panel corrected errors 
provided more efficient estimation than the FGLS. Moreover, if the model 
exhibits autocorrelation, first differences (Wooldrige, 2002) or GLS corrected for 
autoregressive moving average (Sayrs, 1989) can be used. 
 
For group 2, there is no heteroskedasticity problem in all equations, as the p-value 
is greater than the level of significance range from 10% level of significance. For 
skewness and kurtosis, the value for all equations is greater than 10% level of 
significance, suggesting that all the equations have a normal distribution. The 
value for multicollinearity is less than ten, suggesting no multicollinearity among 
the independent variables. The value of linearity for all equations is greater than 
10% level of significance. Thus, the null hypothesis of linearity cannot be rejected, 
and all the equations have linear functions. At last, there is no endogeneity 
problem found in all equations model (the results for all specification testing can 
be seen in Chapter seven Table 7.2). Therefore, the regression method employed 
for group 2 is Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. 
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4.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the research framework for this thesis and presents a 
conceptual model for the empirical analysis. The sample and data used in this 
study are presented. Variables are also defined and a summary of variables are 
given. It explores the research methods used for data analysis to test the 
hypotheses. As this thesis contains three chapters of analysis, in which each 
chapter employs a different method, three sections of model specification are 
provided. 
 
Diagnostic testing, dynamic panel GMM and PCSE are described for panel data 
analysis. Abnormal returns, t-test for AAR, t-test for CAAR and unit root are 
described for event study analysis. Finally, for multivariate regression model for 
event study, the specification testing, GLS regression and OLS regression are also 
presented. 
 
Chapter 5 provides the empirical results for the relationship between the debt 
choice and financial performance according to the method used and discussed in 
this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIC DEBT ON FIRM 
VALUE AND/OR FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the relationship between the debt 
choices and financial performance of firms in Malaysia and Indonesia. A panel 
data analysis is employed, and specific panel regression models are employed 
according to specification testing results. Henceforth, Malaysia is referred to as 
group 1 and Indonesia is referred to as group 2. These two groups are tested 
separately to determine the most appropriate method, and according to the 
specification testing results, a linear dynamic panel GMM is employed for group 
1 and a linear panel corrected standard errors is employed for group 2. The 
specification testing used is described in chapter four including the name for each 
test. This chapter has five sections; first, a specification testing; second, a 
description of the sample; third, a pairwise correlation; fourth, the discussions of 
the results; five, a brief conclusion of the results. 
 
5.1 SPECIFICATION TESTING RESULTS 
As mentioned in chapter four, the specification testing is employed for group 1 
and group 2.  The specification testing results are shown in Table 5.1 for group 1 
and group 2, while the endogeneity testing results are provided in a separate table 
due to the different dependent variables used for each equation. The endogeneity 
test results for group 1 and group 2 are provided in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. 
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For group 1, the results for the Roy-Zellner poolability test, across firms and 
across time, are 10.86 with p-value 0.9001 and 144.71 with p-value 0.000 
respectively. Though the result across time can reject the null hypothesis, however, 
the result across firms cannot reject the null hypothesis of poolability, suggesting 
that the panel method is appropriate for group 1 according to cross section testing. 
In contrast to the result for group 1, the results for the Roy-Zellner poolability test, 
across firms and across time for group 2, can reject the null hypothesis which 
suggest not to panel. However, a rejection of the null hypothesis does not imply 
that the data from different factors cannot be pooled for estimation. This notion is 
supported by Liu, Tung and Pong (2006), as they affirmed that the hypothesis of 
equality for intercepts and slopes is not the correct hypothesis for poolability 
across design factors. 
 
The heteroskedasticity result for group 1 is 462.99 with p-value 0.0000, 
suggesting that group 1 exhibits a heteroskedaticity problem. Therefore, this 
problem needs to be catered to obtain efficient and unbiased results. In contrast, 
the heteroskedasticity result for group 2 is 12.5800 with p-value 0.9605, 
suggesting no heteroskedaticity problem imposed. 
 
The skewness and kurtosis results for group 1 are 45.72 with p-value 0.000 and 
4.25 with p-value 0.0392, suggesting that group 1 exhibits non-normal 
distribution, thus this non-normal distribution has to be treated. Therefore, outliers’ 
checking is conducted prior to data analysing. In contrast, the skewness and 
kurtosis results for group 2 are 8.1500 with p-value 0.2270 and 1.9300 with p-
value 0.1652, suggesting that group 2 exhibits a normal distribution. 
154 
 
The multicollinearity result for group 1 is 10.9100 with p-value 0.000, suggesting 
no multicollinearity problem among the explanatory variables. Similar to the 
multicollinearity result for group 1, the multicollinearity result for group 2 is 2.34 
with p-value 0.000, which suggests no multicollinearity problem posed. 
 
Before proceeding to the endogeneity test and linearity test results, a brief 
conclusion made for group 1 is that heteroskedasticity and non-normality 
problems have to be treated. Meanwhile no other treatment is employed for group 
2. 
 
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 present the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test results for group 1 
and group 2. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose the instrumental variable (IV) 
technique to overcome the endogeneity by using the lagged instruments. Further, 
Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal, (2002) employ lagged independent variables to 
address the endogeneity problem in their model. This technique reveals consistent 
estimations, hence, lagged leverage (lagged independent variable) is used as the 
instrument to test the endogeneity in this study. The reason is mainly because 
capital structure is only one of the factors affecting the firm value, and it is 
assumed that firms change their capital structure over time, and the changes might 
contribute to the firm value. The endogeneity test result for group 1 reveals that 
the regressors in the model present endogeneity. In contrast to the group 1 result, 
the endogeneity test for group 2 reveals no endogeneity in the model. In particular, 
the form of endogeneity in group 1 is non-Islamic debt for Tobin’s Q, ROE, and 
EVA; meanwhile, the form of endogeneity for ROA is Islamic debt. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of the specification testing results 
Tests Group 1 p-value Group 2 p-value 
Poolability across time 144.71*** 0.0000 - - 
Poolability across firms 10.8600 0.9001 - - 
Heteroskedasticity 462.99*** 0.0000 12.5800 0.9605 
Skewness 45.72*** 0.0000 8.1500 0.2270 
Kurtosis 4.25*** 0.0392 1.9300 0.1652 
Multicollinearity 10.91*** 0.0000 2.34*** 0.0000 
Linearity 2.9055*** 0.0000 -4.659*** 0.0000 
Endogeneity Endogeneity exist No endogeneity exist 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level,  *Sig. at 10% significance level 
 
 
Table 5.2: The DWH test for endogeneity of regressors group 1 
Variables Tobin’s Q ROA ROE EVA 
Islamic Debt Proportion 0.0820 6.9848*** 0.0035 0.2473 
  (0.7745) (0.0083) (0.9526) (0.6190) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 37.4723*** 0.0036 14.2038*** 4.0904** 
  (0.0000) (0.9523) (0.0002) (0.0432) 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Probability value is in 
parentheses 
 
 
Table 5.3: The DWH test for endogeneity of regressors group 2 
Variables Tobin’s Q ROA ROE 
Islamic Debt Proportion 0.5916 0.0234 0.0003 
  (0.4421) (0.8783) (0.9857) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 0.0135 0.0037 0.0033 
  (0.9074) (0.9517) (0.9540) 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Probability value is in 
parentheses 
 
 
The linearity test result for group 1 is 2.905506 with p-value 0.0000, which rejects 
the null hypothesis of nonlinearity. This suggests that the model for group 1 is a 
linear model. Similar to the result for group 1, the linearity test result for group 2 
is -4.659 with p-value 0.000, supporting the linear model. 
 
In conclusion, according to specification testing results, a linear dynamic panel 
GMM is employed for group 1, and a linear panel corrected standard errors is 
employed for group 2. 
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5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
There are two groups of sample used in this study. Ten years of financial data, 
which is quarterly data, is used. The sample used for group 1 consists of 80 listed 
firms issuing Islamic debt for the period of 2000 to 2009. Therefore, there are 
approximately 3,200 observations used for group 1. The sample used for group 2 
consists of 14 listed firms issuing Islamic debt for the period of 2000 to 2009. 
Therefore, there are approximately 560 observations used for group 2. 
 
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 provide the descriptive statistics for group 1 and group 2 
used in this study.  The table depicts the number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum value of each variable. The dependent 
variables are Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE and EVA for group 1, while the dependent 
variables are Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE for group 2, and each of these dependent 
variables is regressed toward its explanatory variables.This study divides all 
explanatory variables into four categories. The first category is the debt structure 
used by the firm. The second category is the frequency of Islamic debt issuance. 
The third category is the Islamic debt proportion issued. The fourth category is the 
Islamic debt type issued. Firm size and year of Islamic debt issued are used as 
control variables. 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics group 1 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables           
Tobin’s Q 80 0.1679 0.2129 -1.6600 1.9938 
ROA 80 0.0925 0.0004 0.0100 0.1526 
ROE 80 0.0156 0.0352 0.0021 0.2292 
EVA 80 0.3948 0.5871 -0.3946 3.0791 
Explanatory variables           
The debt structure of the firm           
Islamic Debt Proportion 80 0.0806 0.0847 0.0102 0.4576 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 80 0.2174 0.1725 0.0598 0.8732 
The frequency of Islamic debt 
issuance           
First Issuance 80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Second Issuance 80 0.1316 0.3381 0.0000 1.0000 
More Than two Issuance 80 0.4211 0.4938 0.0000 1.0000 
The proportion of Islamic debt 
issued           
Islamic Debt Below Average 80 0.8813 0.3235 0.0000 1.0000 
Islamic Debt Average 80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Islamic Debt Above Average 80 0.1164 0.3208 0.0000 1.0000 
The type of Islamic debt issued 80         
Debt Type of Islamic Debt 80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Asset Type of Islamic Debt 80 0.1053 0.3069 0.0000 1.0000 
Equity Type of Islamic Debt 80 0.1316 0.3381 0.0000 1.0000 
Control Variables           
Size effect           
Firm Size 80 6.0388 0.7254 4.6032 8.4924 
Year effect           
Year 2001 80 0.0119 0.1081 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2003 80 0.0625 0.2440 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2004 80 0.1563 0.3660 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2005 80 0.3438 0.4787 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2006 80 0.1719 0.3803 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2007 80 0.1406 0.3504 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2008 80 0.0938 0.2938 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2009 80 0.0313 0.1754 0.0000 1.0000 
 
 
For group 1: 
1) Tobin’s Q: The mean value for Tobin’s Q is 0.1679 with a range of -1.6600 
to 1.9938, suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm 
performance based on the market measure. A low Tobin’s Q may indicate 
that the stock is undervalued. Theoretically, stock being undervalued is likely 
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to happen in a firm which has a stable earning history, a historically 
consistent return on equity and a higher earnings growth rate compared to the 
market average. Apparently, this seems to be consistent with the sample used 
for this group, in which the majority of firms are large firms (see point 17 
below; the mean value of firm size, which suggests that most of the firms are 
big firms). 
2) ROA: The mean value for ROA is 0.0925 with a range of 0.0100 to 0.1526. 
Though the mean value of ROA is considerably small, this positive value 
indicates that the firms in the sample create shareholder value over the 
sampling period. This positive value also indicates an effective utilisation of 
firm assets in generating an operating surplus in the business. This lower 
value of ROA may indicate that the firms are asset-intensive firms. If so, they 
thus require more money to be invested into the business to continue 
generating earnings. According to a common rule, ROA below 5% indicates 
asset-heavy firms (for example; manufacturing, railroads, telecommunication 
providers, car manufacturers, etc); meanwhile ROA above 20% indicates 
asset-light firms (for example, agency firms, software firms, advertising firms, 
etc). The ROA is approximately 9% which may indicate that the majority of 
the firms used in the sample are asset-heavy firms, and represent a variety of 
sectors. These are a few examples of the firms used in the sample: Esso 
Malaysia is one of the biggest fuel providers in Malaysia, Hubline is one of 
the biggest shipping service providers, Kinsteel is one of the largest steel 
millers, Kuala Kepong is the largest rubber plantation and manufacturer, and 
Zecon is a construction, infrastructure, toll concession and property 
development. 
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3) ROE: The mean value for ROE is 0.0156 with a range of 0.0021 to 0.2292, 
suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm performance based on 
accounting measures. However, the positive value indicates that the firms in 
the sample create shareholder value and operating efficiency is positively 
translated into benefits to the owners. Furthermore, the lower value of ROE 
may indicate that the majority of the firms require more capital invested as 
discussed in point two, where it is noted that the majority of the firms are 
asset-heavy firms. Therefore, the lower value of ROE does not mean that they 
have lower performance. Moreover, those asset-heavy firms have less 
competition as the entry barrier is high. This can be said to be one of the 
competitive advantages of these firms. 
4) EVA: The mean value for EVA is 0.3948 with a range of -0.3946 to 3.0791, 
suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm performance based on 
economic value measure. EVA tells corporate managers and investors if the 
value of a business has been created or destroyed. Since EVA is greater than 
zero, it indicates that the project will add value for shareholders. This metric 
is appropriate as the majority of the firms in the sample are asset-heavy firms. 
5) Islamic debt proportion: The mean value for Islamic debt proportion is 
0.0806 with a range of 0.0102 to 0.4576, indicating that most of the firms 
issued small amounts of Islamic debt. This may be due to the fact that this 
Islamic debt is traded in the thin trading, moreover, some of the Islamic debt 
type certificates cannot be traded in the stock exchange due to its Islamic law 
issue. 
6) Non-Islamic debt proportion: The mean value for non-Islamic debt 
proportion is 0.2174 with a range of 0.0598 to 0.8732, indicating that most of 
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the firms are not highly leveraged. This also suggests that the majority of the 
firms are less risky since excessive debt can lead to greater interest payments 
and principal repayment burden. 
7) The first issuance: First issuance is used as a baseline category for the 
frequency of Islamic debt issuance, and it takes the value of zero. 
8) The second issuance: The mean value for the second issuance of Islamic 
debt is 0.1316 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that only 13.16% 
of the firms issued Islamic debt for the second time. 
9) More than two issuance: The mean value for more than two issuance is 
0.4211 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that most of the firms 
issued Islamic debt more than twice. 
10) Islamic debt below average: The average of the Islamic debt proportion is 
8.06%, which is calculated by the total of the Islamic debt proportion over the 
total firms in the sample, and thus, this 8.06% average value is used as the 
average category. The mean value for Islamic debt below average is 0.8831 
with a range of 0.0000 to 1.000, suggesting that most of the firms issued 
Islamic debt no greater than 10% (below the average). 
11) Islamic debt average: Islamic debt average is used as a baseline category for 
the proportion of Islamic debt issued and it takes the value of zero. 
12) Islamic debt above average: The mean value of Islamic debt above average 
is 0.1164 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that only a few firms 
issued Islamic debt greater than the average. This may be due to the fact that 
excessive debt issued might increase the probability of default. Therefore, the 
issuers have to assess the trade-off between the Islamic debt and any other 
potential risks arising as a result of this debt. 
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13) Debt type of Islamic debt: Debt type is used as a baseline category for the 
Islamic debt type and it takes the value of zero. 
14) Asset type of Islamic debt: The mean value for asset type of Islamic debt is 
0.1053 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that only 10.53% of the 
firms in the sample issued this type of Islamic debt. 
15) Equity type of Islamic debt: The mean value for the equity type of Islamic 
debt is 0.1316 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that only 13.16% 
of the firms in the sample issued this type of Islamic debt. 
16) Firm size effect: The mean value for firm size is 6.0388 with a range of 
4.6032 to 8.4924, suggesting that most of the firms are big firms (see 
explanation on point two). 
17) Year effect: During the sampling period 2000 to 2009, Islamic debt is only 
issued during these eight years – 2001, 2003 to 2009. Islamic debt is mostly 
issued in 2005 which accounted for 34.38%. The mean value for 2001, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 are 1.19%, 6.25%, 15.63%, 34.38%, 
17.19%, 14.06%, 9.38% and 3.13% respectively from the total sample. 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics group 2 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables           
Tobin’s Q 14 1.5192 1.7874 -0.2489 25.5134 
ROA 14 0.0300 0.4244 -7.6563 0.1031 
ROE 14 0.0320 0.0634 -0.0030 0.1489 
Explanatory variables           
The debt structure of the firm           
Islamic Debt Proportion 14 0.0085 0.0062 0.0010 0.0312 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 14 0.3205 0.1726 0.2895 0.9115 
The frequency of Islamic debt 
issuance           
First Issuance 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Second Issuance 14 0.0714 0.2578 0.0000 1.0000 
The proportion of Islamic debt 
issued           
Islamic Debt Below Average 14 0.8679 0.3389 0.0000 1.0000 
Islamic Debt Average 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Islamic Debt Above Average 14 0.1321 0.3389 0.0000 1.0000 
The type of Islamic debt issued           
Asset Type of Islamic Debt 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Equity Type of Islamic Debt 14 0.2857 0.4522 0.0000 1.0000 
Control Variables           
Size effect           
Firm Size 14 6.2201 0.5072 4.9997 7.6766 
Year effect           
Year 2003 14 0.0714 0.2673 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2004 14 0.2857 0.4688 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2005 14 0.1429 0.3631 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2007 14 0.0714 0.2673 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2008 14 0.2857 0.4688 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2009 14 0.1429 0.3631 0.0000 1.0000 
 
 
 
For group 2 
1) Tobin’s Q: The mean value for Tobin’s Q is 1.5192 with a range of -0.2489 
to 25.5134, suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm 
performance based on the market measure. A low Tobin’s Q may indicate 
that the stock is undervalued. According to theory, undervalued of stock is 
most probably happened to a firm which has a stable earning history, a 
historically consistent return on equity and a higher earnings growth rate 
compared to the market average. Apparently, this seems to be consistent with 
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the sample used for this group, in which the majority of firms are large firms 
(see point 14 below; the mean value of firm size, which suggests that most of 
the firms are big firms). 
2) ROA: The mean value for ROA is 0.0300 with a range of -7.6563 to 0.1031, 
suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm performance based on 
accounting measures. Though the mean value of ROA is considerably small, 
this positive value indicates that the firms in the sample create shareholder 
value over the sampling period. This positive value also indicates an effective 
utilisation of firm assets in generating an operating surplus in the business. 
This lower value of ROA may indicate that the firms are asset-intensive firms. 
If so, they require more money to be invested into the business to continue 
generating earnings. According to a common rule, ROA below 5% indicates 
asset-heavy firms (for example; manufacturing, railroads, telecommunication 
providers, car manufacturers, etc); meanwhile ROA above 20% indicates 
asset-light firms (for example; agency firms, software firms, advertising firms, 
etc). The ROA is approximately 3% which may indicate that the majority of 
the firms used in the sample are asset-heavy firms, and represent a variety of 
sectors. These are a few examples of the firms used in the sample: Bakrie is 
one of the largest group firms which has some subdivision such as coal, 
agribusiness, oil and gas, metal, infrastructure, telecommunication and 
property; Berlian Laju Tanker is one of Indonesia’s largest oil and gas 
shipping firms, Apexindo is one of Indonesia’s largest oil, gas and 
geothermal drilling firms, Mayora Indah is one of the largest sellers of 
various food products, HITS is an international shipping company, Adhi 
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Karya is a major Indonesian state-owned enterprise (BUMN) engaged in 
construction services, including roads, buildings, bridges, etc. 
3) ROE: The mean value for ROE is 0.0320 with a range of -0.0030 to 0.1489, 
suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm performance based on 
accounting measures. However, the positive value indicates that the firms in 
the sample create shareholder value and operating efficiency is positively 
translated into benefits to the owners. The lower value of ROE may indicate 
that the majority of the firms require more capital invested as discussed in 
point two that the majority of the firms are asset-heavy firms. Therefore, the 
lower value of ROE does not mean that they have lower performance. 
Moreover, those asset-heavy firms have less competition as the entry barrier 
is high, a competitive advantage held by these firms (see a few example of the 
firms used as sample). 
4) Islamic debt proportion: The mean value for Islamic debt proportion is 
0.0085 with a range of 0.0100 to 0.0312, indicating that most of the firms 
issued small amounts of Islamic debt. This may be due to the fact that this 
Islamic debt is traded in the thin trading, moreover, Islamic debt is considered 
a new instrument in Indonesia, therefore, greater amounts issued may affect 
the investors’ perspective on the current performance of the firm. 
5) Non-Islamic debt proportion: The mean value for non-Islamic debt 
proportion is 0.3205 with a range of 0.2895 to 0.9115, indicating that most of 
the firms are not highly leveraged. This also suggests that the majority of the 
firms are less risky since excessive debt can lead to greater interest payments 
and principal repayment burden. 
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6) The first issuance: First issuance is used as a baseline category for the 
frequency of Islamic debt issuance, and it takes the value of zero. 
7) The second issuance: The mean value for the second issuance of Islamic 
debt is 0.0714 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that only 7.14% 
of the firms issued Islamic debt for the second time. 
8) Islamic debt below average: The average of the Islamic debt proportion is 
0.85%, which is calculated by the total of the Islamic debt proportion over the 
total companies, and thus this average value is used as the average category. 
The mean value for Islamic debt below average is 0.8679 with a range of 
0.0000 to 1.000, suggesting that most of the firms issued Islamic debt no 
greater than 0.85% or no greater than the average. 
9) Islamic debt average: Islamic debt average is used as a baseline category for 
the proportion of Islamic debt issued, and it takes the value of zero. 
10) Islamic debt above average: The mean value of Islamic debt above average 
is 0.1321 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that only few firms 
issued Islamic debt greater than the average. This may indicate that only 
13.12% of the sample issued Islamic debt greater than the average (0.85%). 
11) Asset type of Islamic debt: Asset type is used as a baseline category for the 
Islamic debt type, and it takes the value of zero. 
12) Equity type of Islamic debt: The mean value for the equity type of Islamic 
debt is 0.2857 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that the majority 
of the firms in the sample are issued asset type. 
13) Firm size effect: The mean value for firm size is 6.2201 with a range of 
4.9997 to 7.6766, suggesting that most of the firms are big firms (see the 
explanation in point two) 
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14) Year effect: During the sampling period 2000 to 2009, Islamic debt is only 
issued during these six years: 2003 to 2005 and 2007 to 2009. Islamic debt is 
mostly issued in 2004 and 2008 which accounted for 28.57% for each year. 
The mean value for 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009 are 7.14%, 
28.57%, 14.29%, 7.14%, 28.57% and 14.29% respectively from the total 
sample. 
 
5.3 PAIRWISE CORRELATION OF THE EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
A pairwise correlation matrix of the explanatory variables for group 1 and group 2 
is provided in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. The highest correlation for group 1 is 
between the Islamic debt proportion and Tobin’s Q, which counts for 0.4379 (p-
value 0.0000) and this value is significant. The second highest correlation is 
between the proportion of Islamic debt and the Islamic debt above average, which 
counts for 0.5979 (p-value 0.0000). The third highest correlation is between the 
proportion of Islamic debt and the Islamic debt below average, which counts for -
0.5965 (p-value 0.0000). The rest of the correlation coefficient for group 1 is less 
than 0.5, and it is considered as a low correlation between the explanatory 
variables, thus, giving less cause for concern about the multicollinearity problem.  
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Table 5.6: Pairwise correlation matrix for explanatory variables group 1 
Variables 
Tobin’s Q ROA ROE EVA 
Islamic 
Debt 
Proportion 
Non-
Islamic 
Debt 
Proportion 
First 
Issuance 
Tobin’s Q 1.0000             
                
ROA 0.1525*** 1.0000           
  (0.0000)             
ROE 0.0382** 0.1829*** 1.0000         
  (0.0353) (0.0000)           
EVA 0.0055 0.0925*** 0.3106*** 1.0000       
  (0.7614) (0.0000) (0.0000)         
Islamic Debt 
Proportion 
0.4379*** 0.0393** 0.1006*** 0.0127 1.0000     
(0.0000) (0.0304) (0.0000) (0.4846)       
Non-Islamic Debt 
Proportion 
0.0997*** 0.0528*** 0.0466*** 0.0938* -0.2773*** 1.0000   
(0.0000) (0.0036) (0.0101) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
First Issuance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Second Issuance -0.0681*** 0.0285 0.003 0.1270* -0.0847*** -0.0919*** 0.0000 
  (0.0002) (0.1162) (0.8666) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
More Than 2 Issuance 
-0.0699*** 0.0346** 0.0920*** 0.0296 -0.0334* -0.0780*** 0.0000 
(0.0001) (0.0565) (0.0000) (0.1024) (0.0659) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Islamic Debt Below 
Average 
-0.3119*** 0.0780*** 0.1048*** 0.0042 -0.5965*** 0.0788*** 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8172) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Islamic Debt Average 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Islamic Debt Above 
Average 
0.3119*** 0.0813*** 0.1059*** 0.0062 0.5979*** -0.0817*** 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7327) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Debt Type of Islamic 
Debt 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Asset Type of Islamic 
Debt 
-0.0556*** 0.0228 0.0087 0.0511* -0.0400** -0.0587*** 0.0000 
(0.0021) (0.2080) (0.6304) (0.0048) (0.0274) (0.0012) (0.0000) 
Equity Type of 
Islamic Debt 
0.0045 0.0073 0.1006*** -0.0141 0.1094*** 0.2026*** 0.0000 
(0.8056) (0.6892) (0.0000) (0.4387) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm Size -0.2079*** 0.0082 0.1971*** 0.0110 -0.1369*** 0.4492*** 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.6878) (0.0000) (0.5868) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2001 -0.0056 0.0000 -0.0483*** -0.0109 0.1882*** 0.1362*** 0.0000 
  (0.7587) (1.0000) (0.0078) (0.5493) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2003 0.0573*** 0.0000 -0.0292 -0.0290 0.0611*** 0.0971*** 0.0000 
  (0.0016) (1.0000) (0.1074) (0.1095) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2004 0.0348** -0.1001*** -0.0884*** -0.0019 0.0271 -0.1106*** 0.0000 
  (0.0547) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9161) (0.1349) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2005 0.2012*** 0.0097 -0.0105 0.0461* 0.3000*** -0.0901*** 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.5919) (0.5624) (0.0109) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2006 0.0689*** 0.0000 0.0037 0.0532* 0.0496*** -0.0866*** 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (1.0000) (0.8368) (0.0033) (0.0062) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2007 0.0078 0.0355** 0.0542*** 0.1515* 0.0237 0.0624*** 0.0000 
  (0.6681) (0.0501) (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.1917) (0.0006) (0.0000) 
Year 2008 -0.0361** 0.0000 0.0732*** -0.0050 0.0153 0.0330*** 0.0000 
  (0.0466) (1.0000) (0.0001) (0.7838) (0.398) (0.0690) (0.0000) 
Year 2009 -0.0688*** 0.0000 0.0010 0.0027 -0.0177 -0.0148 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (1.0000) (0.9572) (0.8813) (0.3304) (0.4135) (0.0000) 
  
Second 
Issuance 
More Than 
2 Issuance 
Islamic 
Debt Below 
Average 
Islamic 
Debt 
Average 
Islamic 
Debt Above 
Average 
Debt Type 
of Islamic 
Debt 
Asset Type 
of Islamic 
Debt 
Second Issuance 1.0000             
                
More Than 2 Issuance 
-0.3320*** 1.0000           
(0.0000)             
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Islamic Debt Below 
Average 
0.1188*** -0.0309* 1.0000         
(0.0000) (0.0886)           
Islamic Debt Average 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000       
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)         
Islamic Debt Above 
Average 
-0.1170*** 0.0290 -0.9890*** 0.0000 1.0000     
(0.0000) (0.1103) (0.0000) (0.0000)       
Debt Type of Islamic 
Debt 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000   
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
Asset Type of Islamic 
Debt 
-0.1335*** 0.0548*** 0.0199 0.0000 -0.0209 0.0000 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0025) (0.2732) (0.0000) (0.2487) (0.0000)   
Equity Type of 
Islamic Debt 
-0.0364** -0.0166 0.0075 0.0000 -0.0109 0.0000 -0.1335*** 
(0.0450) (0.3603) (0.6785) (0.0000) (0.5496) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm Size 0.1010*** -0.0076 0.2083*** 0.0000 -0.2060*** 0.0000 -0.0363* 
  (0.0000) (0.7086) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0740) 
Year 2001 -0.0426*** -0.0934*** -0.1008*** 0.0000 0.1025*** 0.0000 -0.0375** 
  (0.0188) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0384) 
Year 2003 0.0088 0.0000 -0.1189*** 0.0000 0.1218*** 0.0000 -0.0900*** 
  (0.6293) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2004 0.0458*** -0.0926*** -0.0096 0.0000 0.0119 0.0000 -0.0144 
  (0.0115) (0.0000) (0.5979) (0.0000) (0.5132) (0.0000) (0.4266) 
Year 2005 0.0449*** -0.0038 -0.3430*** 0.0000 0.3406*** 0.0000 -0.0897*** 
  (0.0132) (0.8321) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2006 -0.1011*** 0.1730*** -0.0761*** 0.0000 0.0744*** 0.0000 -0.0186 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3065) 
Year 2007 0.0231 0.0733* -0.0665*** 0.0000 0.0591*** 0.0000 0.1052*** 
  (0.2020) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2008 0.0046 -0.0772*** -0.0102 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000 0.0168 
  (0.8011) (0.0000) (0.5737) (0.0000) (0.8405) (0.0000) (0.3550) 
Year 2009 -0.0200 0.0082 0.0189 0.0000 -0.0186 0.0000 0.0661*** 
  (0.2704) (0.6508) (0.2987) (0.0000) (0.3040) (0.0000) (0.0003) 
  
Equity 
Type of 
Islamic 
Debt Firm Size Year 2001 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 
Equity Type of 
Islamic Debt 
1.0000             
              
Firm Size 0.2151*** 1.0000           
  (0.0000)             
Year 2001 -0.0426*** 0.0085 1.0000         
  (0.0188) (0.6746)           
Year 2003 -0.1022*** 0.0167 -0.0287 1.0000       
  (0.0000) (0.4107) (0.1131)         
Year 2004 -0.1200*** -0.1020*** -0.0338* -0.0810*** 1.0000     
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0627) (0.0000)       
Year 2005 -0.0618*** -0.0172 -0.0474*** -0.1137*** -0.1335*** 1.0000   
  (0.0007) (0.3959) (0.0089) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
Year 2006 -0.1011*** -0.0618*** -0.0284 -0.0682*** -0.0801*** -0.1124*** 1.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0023) (0.1171) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Year 2007 0.0781*** 0.0917*** -0.0244 -0.0585*** -0.0688*** -0.0966*** -0.0579*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1784) (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0014) 
Year 2008 0.2361*** 0.1215*** -0.0150 -0.0360** -0.0422*** -0.0593*** -0.0356** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4085) (0.0474) (0.0198) (0.0011) (0.0499) 
Year 2009 -0.0200 0.0244 -0.0056 -0.0135 -0.0158 -0.0222 -0.0133 
  (0.2704) (0.2299) (0.7566) (0.4573) (0.3826) (0.2202) (0.4623) 
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  Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009         
Year 2007 1.0000             
                
Year 2008 -0.0305* 1.0000           
  (0.0922)             
Year 2009 -0.0115 -0.0070 1.0000         
  (0.5278) (0.6981)           
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Probability value is in 
parentheses 
 
 
 
Table 5.7: Pairwise correlation matrix for explanatory variables group 2 
Variables 
Tobin’s Q ROA ROE 
Islamic 
Debt 
Proportion 
Non-
Islamic 
Debt 
Proportion 
First 
Issuance 
Second 
Issuance 
Tobin’s Q 1.0000             
                
ROA 0.0532 1.0000           
  (0.2087)             
ROE 0.0369 0.7386*** 1.0000         
  (0.3835) (0.0000)           
Islamic Debt 
Proportion 
0.1210*** 0.0082 0.0252 1.0000       
(0.0041) (0.8466) (0.5521)         
Non-Islamic Debt 
Proportion 
-0.1479*** -0.0683 -0.0579 -0.1676*** 1.0000     
(0.0004) (0.1064) (0.1710) (0.0001)       
First Issuance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000   
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
Second Issuance -0.1802*** -0.0197 -0.0136 -0.0133 -0.2037*** 0.0000 1.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.6411) (0.7483) (0.7532) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Islamic Debt Below 
Average 
-0.1524*** -0.0278 -0.0191 -0.8622*** 0.1250*** 0.0000 0.0263 
(0.0003) (0.5120) (0.6517) (0.0000) (0.0031) (0.0000) (0.5342) 
Islamic Debt Average 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Islamic Debt Above 
Average 
-0.1524*** -0.0278 -0.0191 0.8622*** -0.1250*** 0.0000 -0.0263 
(0.0003) (0.5120) (0.6517) (0.0000) (0.0031) (0.0000) (0.5342) 
Debt Type of Islamic 
Debt 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Asset Type of Islamic 
Debt 
0.2437*** 0.0359 -0.0694 0.2388*** -0.2280*** 0.0000 0.1754*** 
(0.0000) (0.3964) (0.1010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Equity Type of 
Islamic Debt 
-0.2437*** -0.0359 0.0694 -0.2388*** 0.2280*** 0.0000 -0.1754*** 
(0.0000) (0.3964) (0.1010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm Size -0.5017*** -0.0962** 0.0976** -0.2646*** 0.3417*** 0.0000 0.2374*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0228) (0.0208) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2003 -0.1114*** 0.0128 -0.0088 -0.1084*** 0.3205*** 0.0000 -0.0636 
  (0.0083) (0.7627) (0.8349) (0.0103) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1326) 
Year 2004 0.0917** -0.0531 0.0901** 0.5058*** -0.025 0.0000 -0.1262*** 
  (0.0301) (0.2094) (0.0330) (0.0000) (0.5545) (0.0000) (0.0028) 
Year 2005 -0.1531*** -0.0903** -0.0168 -0.0405 -0.064 0.0000 -0.0769* 
  (0.0003) (0.0327) (0.6923) (0.3388) (0.1303) (0.0000) (0.0689) 
Year 2007 -0.0935** 0.0105 -0.0072 -0.0329 -0.1757*** 0.0000 -0.041 
  (0.0269) (0.8040) (0.8642) (0.4373) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3323) 
Year 2008 -0.0870** 0.0175 -0.0121 0.1096*** -0.0422 0.0000 0.1707*** 
  (0.0395) (0.6786) (0.7759) (0.0094) (0.3190) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2009 -0.0358 0.0086 -0.0052 0.0151 -0.0899** 0.0000 -0.0334 
  (0.3979) (0.8398) (0.9030) (0.7212) (0.0334) (0.0000) (0.4304) 
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Islamic 
Debt Below 
Average 
Islamic 
Debt 
Average 
Islamic 
Debt Above 
Average 
Debt Type 
of Islamic 
Debt 
Asset Type 
of Islamic 
Debt 
Equity 
Type of 
Islamic 
Debt Firm Size 
Islamic Debt Below 
Average 
1.0000             
              
Islamic Debt Average 0.0000 1.0000           
  (0.0000)             
Islamic Debt Above 
Average 
-1.0000*** 0.0000 1.0000         
(0.0000) (0.0000)           
Debt Type of Islamic 
Debt 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000       
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)         
Asset Type of Islamic 
Debt 
-0.2234*** 0.0000 0.2234*** 0.0000 1.0000     
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)       
Equity Type of 
Islamic Debt 
0.2234*** 0.0000 -0.2234*** 0.0000 -1.0000 1.0000   
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (1.0000)     
Firm Size 0.3357*** 0.0000 -0.3357*** 0.0000 -0.4419*** 0.4419*** 1.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Year 2003 0.0895** 0.0000 -0.0895** 0.0000 -0.3627*** 0.3627*** 0.4741*** 
  (0.0342) (0.0000) (0.0342) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Year 2004 -0.3682*** 0.0000 0.3682*** 0.0000 0.0360 -0.0360 -0.0488 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3957) (0.3957) (0.2493) 
Year 2005 0.1082*** 0.0000 -0.1082*** 0.0000 0.1754*** -0.1754*** 0.1268*** 
  (0.0104) (0.0000) (0.0104) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0026) 
Year 2007 0.0577 0.0000 -0.0577 0.0000 -0.2340*** 0.2340*** 0.1213*** 
  (0.1724) (0.0000) (0.1724) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0040) 
Year 2008 -0.1311*** 0.0000 0.1311*** 0.0000 0.0195 -0.0195 0.1013*** 
  (0.0019) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0000) (0.6458) (0.6458) (0.0164) 
Year 2009 0.0025 0.0000 -0.0025 0.0000 0.0761* -0.0761* 0.0711* 
  (0.9522) (0.0000) (0.9522) (0.0000) (0.0718) (0.0718) (0.0929) 
  Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009   
Year 2003 1.0000             
                
Year 2004 -0.1044*** 1.0000           
  (0.0135)             
Year 2005 -0.0636 -0.1262*** 1.0000         
  (0.1326) (0.0028)           
Year 2007 -0.0339 -0.0673 -0.041 1.0000       
  (0.4227) (0.1116) (0.3323)         
Year 2008 -0.0565 -0.1120*** -0.0683 -0.0364 1.0000     
  (0.1820) (0.0080) (0.1065) (0.3895)       
Year 2009 -0.0276 -0.0548 -0.0334 -0.0178 -0.0296 1.0000   
  (0.5142) (0.1957) (0.4304) (0.6740) (0.4840)     
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Probability value is in 
parentheses 
 
 
Similar to group 1 results, most of the correlation for group 2 is smaller than 
0.5000. The highest correlation for group 2 is between the Islamic debt type and 
firm size, which counts almost 0.5000 (p-value 0.0000) and this value is 
significant. None of the remaining variables are correlated to an extent that merits 
noting. Further, low correlation among explanatory variables indicates no 
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dependency among them, thus indicating low likelihood of multicollinearity in the 
OLS regressions. In conclusion, the correlation matrix coefficients result for 
group 1 and group 2 supports the multicollinearity testing in part 5.1. 
 
 
5.4 PANEL DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
5.4.1 DYNAMIC PANEL GMM REGRESSION RESULTS FOR GROUP 1 
Table 5.8, Table 5.9, Table, Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 present the dynamic GMM 
panel regression results. In addition, Table 5.12 is provided to summarise the 
regression results for four dependent variables, Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE and EVA. 
Using stepwise regression, this study observes the changes of the coefficients and 
the standard deviations. Table 5.8 presents the regression result for Tobin’s Q. 
There are four regression equations, and there are four explanatory variable 
categories. The regression process is done using a step by step process (stepwise 
process), by including each explanatory variable category in each equation 
(REG,1, REG 2, REG 3, and REG 4). REG 1 is the first regression equation 
which regress only the debt structure of the firm. REG 2 is the second regression 
equation which regress the debt structure of the firm and the frequency of Islamic 
debt issuance. REG 3 is the third regression equation which regress the debt 
structure of the firm, the frequency of Islamic debt issuance and the proportion of 
Islamic debt issued. REG 4 is the fourth regression equation which regress all 
explanatory variables. That means, for the REG 2, REG 3 and REG 4, more 
explanatory variables are added into the regression equation to observe the 
changes of the coefficient and standard errors. 
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Table 5.8: Regression result for group 1 
Variables 
Dynamic GMM 
REG_1 REG_2 REG_3 REG_4 
L1 0.5968*** 0.5872*** 0.5839*** 0.5742*** 
  (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0197) (0.0174) 
Constant 0.3049*** 0.2879*** 0.2764*** 0.3180*** 
  (0.0571) (0.0778) (0.0809) (0.0988) 
The debt structure of the firm         
Islamic Debt Proportion 0.8388*** 0.8598*** 0.8166*** 0.7441*** 
  (0.0215) (0.0520) (0.0530) (0.0723) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 0.5060*** 0.5518*** 0.5489*** 0.5372*** 
  (0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0152) (0.0159) 
The frequency of Islamic debt issuance         
First Issuance - (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
Second Issuance - -0.1727** -0.2631** -0.0961* 
    (0.0748) (0.1222) (0.0951) 
More Than 2 Issuance - 0.1612*** 0.1420*** 0.2090*** 
    (0.0260) (0.0227) (0.0562) 
The proportion of Islamic debt issued         
Islamic Debt Below Average - - 0.0191* 0.0006* 
      (0.0111) (0.0129) 
Islamic Debt Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
Islamic Debt Above Average - - -0.0283*** -0.0248** 
      (0.0109) (0.0111) 
The type of Islamic debt issued         
Debt Type of Islamic Debt - - - (Omitted) 
          
Asset Type of Islamic Debt - - - 0.0423 
        (0.1076) 
Equity Type of Islamic Debt - - - 0.1764* 
        (0.1049) 
Control Variables         
Size effect         
Firm Size -0.0624*** -0.0680*** -0.0652*** -0.0844*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0142) 
Year effect         
Year 2001 -0.4859 -0.2470*** -0.2400*** -1.5848* 
  (0.6808) (0.0362) (0.0358) (0.9510) 
Year 2003 0.0148 0.0377 0.0496*** 0.0458*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0409) (0.0083) (0.0098) 
Year 2004 0.0105 0.0083 0.0070 0.0130 
  (0.0116) (0.0099) (0.0111) (0.0109) 
Year 2005 0.0232*** 0.0158*** 0.0130** 0.0171*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0048) 
Year 2006 -0.0340*** -0.0360*** -0.0408*** -0.0346*** 
  (0.0054) (0.0076) (0.0080) (0.0072) 
Year 2007 0.1124*** 0.1146*** 0.1149*** 0.1160*** 
  (0.0071) (0.0140) (0.0160) (0.0177) 
Year 2008 0.0255 0.0515* 0.0480* 0.0397* 
  (0.0222) (0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0236) 
Year 2009 0.0702*** 0.0521** 0.0547** 0.0587** 
  (0.0263) (0.0276) (0.0274) (0.0294) 
J-Statistics 9151.05 8095.91 18001.15 21514.85 
Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
 
173 
 
1) The debt structure of the firm and Tobin’s Q 
As can be seen in the Table 5.8 column II (REG 1), the coefficient of Islamic debt 
and non-Islamic debt are a positive and significant, indicating that these two 
variables have a positive effect on a firm’s financial performance. Both variables 
are statistically significant at a 1% level. This finding can be better explained by 
trade-off theory. According to prior literature, a firm has an optimal capital 
structure by offsetting the advantages of debt and the cost of debt (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1963; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Haris & 
Raviv, 1990; Frank & Goyal, 2003), and this theory apparently can also be 
applied to Islamic debt. Trade-off theory refers to the idea that a company chooses 
how much debt finance and how much equity finance to use by balancing the 
costs and benefits. It states that there is an advantage to financing with debt and 
the tax benefits of debt, and fortunately Islamic debt is exempted from the taxes. 
Moreover, the use of leverage is one way to improve firm performance 
(Champion, 1999), and firms prefer debt financing because they anticipate a 
higher return (Hadlock & James, 2002). Furthermore, this finding is in line with 
Krishnan and Moyer (1997) and Abor (2005) who find a positive relationship 
between capital structure choice and firm financial performance in developing 
countries. In particular, Krishnan and Moyer (1997) include Malaysia as one of 
the sample in their study. 
 
Although both debt types have a positive impact, the coefficient for Islamic debt 
is higher than the coefficient for non-Islamic debt, suggesting that the Islamic debt 
provides a higher contribution to the improvement of firms’ financial performance 
compared to non-Islamic debt. It can be concluded that when Islamic debt is 
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chosen as a tool of firm financing, the markets react positively to firm 
performance, thus this positive reaction might lead to the stock becoming 
overvalued. There are a few reasons for the market to react positively to this 
Islamic debt issuance. First, Islamic debt is claimed and advertised as a secure 
investment due to its structure. Second, Islamic debt is given a special privilege 
such as stamp duty and exempted tax for both issuers and investors. Third, Islamic 
debt is guaranteed by the special purpose vehicle (SPV); in case of default the 
Islamic debt holders may recourse the assets underlying the Islamic debt. Fourth, 
though there were a few cases of default in Middle East, those cases have no 
impact on the investors’ perspective, as some investors investing in Islamic debt 
only do so only to comply with the religious matter. Fifth, the majority of 
investors are non-Muslim, with an increasing presence of foreign investors 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers Malaysia, 2008). Sixth, the Islamic debt issuance 
contributes to an increase in the issuer’s stock returns (Nagano, nd.). 
 
The positive result for Islamic debt coefficient obtained supports the trade-off 
theory which derived from the models based on taxes and agency cost. From the 
point of few of internal management, having Islamic debt in their debt structure 
brings more pressure to the management as Islamic debt is more expensive 
compared to non-Islamic debt, hence, improving the firm’s efficiency is important 
to maximise asset utilisation due to the Islamic debt obtained. At the end, this 
action leads to improvement in the firm performance. Moreover, debt may reduce 
agency costs by reducing cash flows available for expropriation and investments in 
negative net present value projects (Harris & Raviv, 1990; Jensen, 1986), as does 
Islamic debt. Furthermore, compared to equity issues, the issue of debt will not dilute 
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the managers’ equity holdings as a proportion of total equity, but further enhance the 
alignment of interests (Fleming et al., 2005). In addition, though conventional debt 
and Islamic debt are fundamentally different, they perform similarly in a competitive 
market as these two instruments are affected by the same factors (Kraciska & Nowak, 
2012). 
 
2) The frequency of Islamic debt issuance and Tobin’s Q 
Column III (REG 2) provides the results for the second regression. When more 
variables are added to the regression equation, more coefficients are significant. 
The coefficients for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt are a positive and 
significant at 1% level of significance, and this has been explained in section one 
above. The coefficient for first issuance of Islamic debt is a positive and 
significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting that the first issuance of Islamic 
debt affects higher firm performance. This also indicates that the markets react 
positively to the issuance of Islamic debt when it is first introduced to the market. 
Furthermore, one of the reasons for higher firm performance is that the managers 
of the firms are compelled to put more effort into generating more profits. 
Because some of Islamic debt is in the form of partnership (profit and loss sharing 
agreement), Islamic debt tends to place greater pressure on the managers to 
manage the firms effectively. 
 
However, the coefficient for the second issuance of Islamic debt is a negative and 
significant at 5% level of significance, suggesting that the issuance of Islamic debt 
for a second time lowers firm performance. This negative finding is similar to the 
study by Godlewski et al. (2010), which suggest that Islamic debt expansion has a 
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detrimental effect on firm value. From the point of the internal management, this 
may indicate that either the management of the firms have loosened their control 
because of overconfidence from the first successful issuance of Islamic debt or 
that the management have expropriated the firms’ previous profits. From the point 
of the markets, it may indicate that the markets have experienced, observed and 
learnt from the first Islamic debt issuance, leading under confidence in the 
markets over this second issuance, which in turn may affect the share price of 
those firms issuing Islamic debt. Furthermore, debt is also a source of information 
which indicates the firm’s current condition that investors can use to monitor and 
evaluate major operating decisions of the firm in two ways. Firstly, the mere ability of 
the firm to make its contractual payments to debt-holders provides information. 
Secondly, in the event that the organisation fails to make the payments, their ways to 
resolve the matter either through informal negotiation or formal bankruptcy 
proceedings will disseminate considerable information to the investors (Harris & 
Raviv, 1990). In addition, the use of credit ratings in sukuk plays a vital role in the 
development of the Islamic debt market (Al Amine, 2008). Therefore, the negative 
relationship of the second issuance of Islamic debt and its firm’s performance is 
probably either a result of the previous firm performance in meeting their obligation 
of payment or a result of inefficient utilisation of their firms’s assets. 
 
Fortunately, the coefficient for more than two issuance of Islamic debt is a 
positive and significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting the issuance of 
Islamic debt for more than two improves a firm’s financial performance. This may 
indicate that after having a few experiences in issuing Islamic debt, the issuance 
of Islamic debt later on impacts positively on firm performance. This may be 
caused by the fact that the debt-holders of Islamic debt closely monitor the 
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management of the firm to ensure that the firm can generate profits and distribute 
a periodic stream of cash flow over time. Thus, Islamic debt also reduces the 
agency problem within the company and hence increases firm value. From the 
view point of markets, this may indicate that the markets have learnt through 
several issuances of Islamic debt and therefore they have greater confidence in 
subsequent issuances compared to the second issuance of Islamic debt. However, 
investors are irrational according to the behavioural finance theory. Their decision 
may be influenced by the magnitude issue, their bias selection and the lucky event 
issue. 
 
3) The proportion of Islamic debt issued and Tobin’s Q 
Coloum IV (REG 3) provides the results for the third regression. For the third 
regression, the coefficients for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt proportion are 
still a positive and significant. There are also no changes for the frequency of 
Islamic debt issuance coefficients as discussed in point two above (see the 
explanation on section one and two previously). The coefficients for the 
proportion of Islamic debt below the average and at the average are a positive and 
significant at 10% and 1% level of significance. These positive and significant 
results may be caused by internal and external factors. In terms of internal factors, 
the proportion of Islamic debt issued at a certain level stimulates the management 
to work effectively. For external factors, there are two views; first from the 
markets’ view, second from the view of government support. From the markets’ 
view, the proportion of a certain level of Islamic debt may be considered as tax 
exempted stimulation as the profits derived from Islamic debt are exempted from 
the taxes. Furthermore, the markets have confidence over the assets/projects 
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underlying the Islamic debt contract which may bring profits in future, therefore, 
this market confidence affects their stock price. With regards to government 
support,  the Malaysian government has provided an interesting model to promote 
the co-existence of an ethical and societal-based finance through issuing a few 
regulations that appeal to Muslim and non-Muslim investors; hence these 
regulations issued can assure the credibility of this instrument. Furthermore, the 
regulating body has taken vital steps to develop a facilitative regulatory 
framework, to create a large pool of players, to introduce a comprehensive range 
of innovative and competitive Islamic financial product and services, and to 
ensure sufficient depth to facilitate liquidity management, hence creating market 
confidence. 
 
Though debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow 
available for spending at the discretion of managers (Jensen, 1986), an increased 
leverage also has costs; as leverage increases the risk of default also increases. 
This theory supports the result for Islamic debt above the average which is a 
negative and significant at 1% level of significance. This finding suggests that the 
greater the proportion of Islamic debt issued, the lower the firm performance. This 
result is similar to the empirical result for non-Islamic debt, in that the proportion 
of debt at a certain level may hamper firm performance as an additional 
incurrence of debt gives no guarantee that firm performance will be higher. This is 
mainly because as the leverage increases, so does the risk of default, which provides 
a greater incentive for lenders to monitor the firm.  
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4) The type of Islamic debt and Tobin’s Q 
Column V (REG 4) provides the results for all explanatory variables for four 
categories and all control variables. There are no changes for the coefficients’ 
significance and sign of the debt structure of the firm, the frequency of Islamic 
debt issued, the proportion of Islamic debt issued; there are only slightly changes 
on the coefficients value (see the explanation for section one, two and three 
above). The coefficients for the debt-type and equity-type are a positive and 
significant at 1% and 10% level of significance. This suggests that debt-types and 
equity-types affect higher firm performance. The result supports the notion that 
certain types of debts have a different impact on shareholders’ wealth (Mikkelson 
& Partch, 1986); hence, this finding can also be applied to Islamic debt. 
 
The coefficient for asset-types is a positive but not significant, which may suggest 
that the asset-type (ijarah sukuk) of Islamic debt can be used as an incentive in 
economic development and to stimulate productive industries (Kamali, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, the finding can be explained by the different Islamic debt structure. 
This is important since the structure determines the obligation of the 
originator/issuers. There is typically a requirement that on maturity of the Islamic 
debt or upon an event of default, the originator has a purchase obligation to 
repurchase the assets which enables the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to redeem 
the outstanding certificates and repay the sukuk holders. In this regard, the rights 
of sukuk holders in the event of default will vary depending on whether the sukuk 
structure is an asset-based or an asset-backed structure. The positive result for 
debt-based and equity-based sukuk may be caused by their structure. The 
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assumptions that may be raised is that debt-based and equity-based are in the 
structure of asset-backed sukuk, and asset-based is in the structure of asset-based 
sukuk. Thus, the rights of the sukuk-holders depend on the structure of Islamic debt.  
For example, in the case of sukuk ijarah, if the sukuk is asset-backed, this allows the 
holders to liquidate the underlying asset in the event of default to recover most of 
their investments. On the other hand, if the sukuk is asset-based, this only represents 
beneficial ownership on the underlying asset and it restricts the holders’ rights in the 
event of a default. 
 
The coefficient for firm size is a negative and significant for all four regression 
equations, suggesting that bigger firms which having Islamic debt in their debt 
structure have a lower firm performance. The negative result may be due to the 
fact that bigger firms are already well-stabilised in terms of cash flows and profits 
because of their well-stabilised capital structure; hence changing its capital 
structure with a new unproven instrument may endanger the firm’s credibility and 
ability to maintain their stable cash flows and profits. This notion leads to the 
markets’ perspective on the firms’ capability in the future; the markets may have 
lower confidence and in turn, this affects the stock price of the firms. 
 
Apart from year 2004, all the years reveal a significant result. All the years (2003, 
2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009) have a positive coefficient except year 2001 
and year 2006. Malaysia, with its economic strength, supportive government 
policies, educated workforce, developed infrastructure, vibrant business 
environment and quality of life, has always been an attractive market for foreign 
investors. Therefore, the coefficients for year 2003, 2004 and 2005 are supported. 
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Despite the challenging global economy, Malaysia has continued to pursue 
liberalisation, enhancing the entrepreneurial and investment environments. The 
economy scores above the world average in many of the ten economic freedoms 
(World Bank, 2011). The trade regime is relatively open despite lingering non-
tariff barriers. However, corruption and a judicial system that remains vulnerable 
to political influence pose significant challenges to economic freedom. 2001 and 
2006 were two years which yielded a negative and significant impact. The first, 
2001, may be due to the global economic slowdown overall. Significantly, though, 
a general election was held in 2003 and again in 2008, revealing a pattern in 
which there is a two year gap between this political event and a year yielding a 
negative and significant impact. This may indicate that before the general election, 
the political situation in Malaysia heats up, which affects the market players. 
 
The Malaysian economy has been surprisingly resilient in spite of the global 
slowdown in 2007. Malaysia has only felt a minor impact from the slowing US 
economy, but emerging challenges in the form of soaring food prices and the 
persistent rise in global oil prices are weighing down heavily on economic 
prospects. Furthermore, to avoid the fiscal deficit, the government announced a 
revamp in oil subsidies, pushing up the price of petrol diesel, which has adverse 
implications for inflation and economic growth. However, in 2008 and 2009, the 
business confidence index increased as it indicates by the rise of sales and 
production, higher export sales, higher capacity utilisation, higher domestic 
demands and higher capital investment. The gross domestic product growth was 
sustained at a certain targeted level. This growth was driven by high commodity 
prices, strong private consumption and steady investment, and supported by fiscal 
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spending. The business condition index would be a better indicator of current 
economic activity as it relies on firm-level information. Therefore, the positive 
and significant coefficients for year 2007, 2008 and 2009 are supported. 
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Table 5.9: Regression result for group 1 
Variables 
Dynamic GMM 
REG_1 REG_2 REG_3 REG_4 
L1 0.1611*** 0.1541*** 0.1128*** 0.1220*** 
  (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0041) 
Constant 8.3687*** 8.3486*** 8.8399*** 8.7500*** 
  (0.0290) (0.0310) (0.0500) (0.0410) 
The debt structure of the firm         
Islamic Debt Proportion 0.0059*** 0.0068*** 0.0369*** 0.0159*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0025) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 0.0137*** 0.0154*** 0.0235*** 0.0177*** 
  (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0015) 
The frequency of Islamic debt issuance         
D1_First Issuance - (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D2_Second Issuance - -0.0416*** 0-.0605*** -0.0774*** 
    (0.0101) (0.0137) (0.0140) 
D3_More Than 2 Issuance - 0.0278*** 0.0230*** 0.0323*** 
    (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0026) 
The proportion of Islamic debt issued         
D1_ID Below Average - - 0.0185*** 0.0181*** 
      (0.0014) (0.0010) 
D2_ID Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D3_ID Above Average - - -0.0041*** -0.0036*** 
      (0.0010) (0.0010) 
The type of Islamic debt issued         
D1_Debt Type of ID - - - (Omitted) 
          
D2_Asset Type of ID - - - 0.0250*** 
        (0.0074) 
D3_Equity Type of ID - - - 0.0346*** 
        (0.0027) 
Control Variables         
Size effect         
Firm Size -0.0028*** -0.0035*** -0.0011*** -0.0040*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Year effect         
Year 2001 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0038* -0.0169* 
  (0.0033) (0.0047) (0.0079) (0.0097) 
Year 2003 0.0007 0.0005 0.0068*** 0.0092*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0024) 
Year 2004 0.0324*** 0.0214*** 0.0187*** 0.0173*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
Year 2005 0.0036*** 0.0045*** 0.0067*** 0.0058*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0014) 
Year 2006 -0.0023*** -0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0018*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Year 2007 0.0023*** 0.0052*** 0.0093*** 0.0080*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0020) 
Year 2008 0.0028 0.0017 0.0037*** 0.0017*** 
  (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0006) 
Year 2009 0.0058*** 0.0037*** 0.0058*** 0.0048*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
J-Statistics 12220.05 12270.05 2941.60 78177.74 
Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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1) The debt structure of the firm and ROA 
Column II (REG 1) provides the result for the first regression. The coefficients for 
Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt are positive and significant at a 1% level of 
significance, indicating that these two variables have a positive effect on a firm’s 
financial performance. This finding suggests that Islamic debt not only improves 
the effectiveness of the firm’s management s in managing their assets to generate 
profits, but it also improves the operating efficiency of the total business. 
Moreover, from the issuers’ perspective, there are benefits issuing Islamic 
securities, in particular, Islamic debt. The key benefits are tax incentives, value 
proposition and regulatory process. First, for tax incentives, the issuers are 
exempted from stamp duty, tax deductible of issuance cost, and the special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) is exempted from tax, and tax neutrality. Second, for value 
proposition, there is a wider investors’ base, Islamic debt is attractively priced due 
to the strong demand, there is strong structuring expertise in the Islamic finance 
industry, and Islamic debt enhances the issuers’ profile. Third, in terms of 
regulatory process, the process facilitates the issuance process, the rating of 
Islamic debt is automatically approved for AAA-rated for Islamic debt issued in 
domestic (Malaysian) currency and A-rated Islamic debt issued in foreign 
currency, any amendment to terms of approved Islamic debt need only to inform 
the Securities Commission, and exchangeable Islamic debt is exempted from 
rating. 
 
These key benefits encourage the management to efficiently manage the firm. 
Furthermore, the result supports the theory that the choice of capital structure may 
help mitigate agency costs (Jensen, 1976). According to the agency costs theory, 
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high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside 
equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act 
more in the interests of shareholders. Moreover, corporate debt has a disciplining 
effect on management, since it serves to reduce the free cash flow and therefore 
minimises management’s discretionary spending. 
 
The coefficient for Islamic debt is slightly close to the coefficient for non-Islamic 
debt, suggesting that both debts contribute equally to the improvement of firms’ 
financial performance in the context of accounting measures. This result is 
different to the result for the Tobin’s Q, in which the coefficient for Islamic debt 
is higher than the coefficient for non-Islamic debt. This difference may be due to 
the different items used to calculate each metric whereas Tobin’s Q emphasises 
the market valuation. 
 
Overall, the finding for ROA is similar to Tobin’s Q which also supports the 
trade-off theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Haris & Raviv, 1990; Frank & Goyal, 2003), and this theory 
apparently can also be applied to Islamic debt. 
 
2) The frequency of Islamic debt issuance and ROA 
Column III (REG 2) provides the results for the second regression. The 
coefficients for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt are a positive and significant at 
1% level of significance (see explanation on section one above). The coefficient 
for Islamic debt first issuance is a positive and significant at 1% level of 
significance, suggesting that the first issuance of Islamic debt affects firm 
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performance (ROA). This may indicate that the firm effectively utilises its assets 
to generate profits, and additional debt, in particular Islamic debt, pushes the 
management to perform better. Furthermore, cost-competitiveness and efficiency 
are keys to success in a business, a principle which is also applicable to Islamic 
finance. Quality, cost-competitiveness and efficiency are important aspects to be 
observed and to support the demand from consumers. Thus, the long-term growth 
of firms therefore depend on how the needs of business (and business-minded) 
people are addressed, on top of being a platform for meeting compliance with 
Shariah. In this regard, the two important factors that promote cost-
competitiveness and efficiency are infrastructure and capacity. 
 
In the beginning of the Islamic finance initiation, Islamic debt offered those 
competitiveness features, particularly cost effectiveness, secureness and efficiency. 
As such, the market had high expectations of this new instrument, the upshot of 
which Islamic debt brought more pressure on managers to manage their firms 
effectively in order to meet market expectations. Furthermore, apart from being 
well-regulated by various standards and guidelines, Malaysia is also the only 
country that makes it compulsory for all tradable corporate debt securities to be 
rated to enhance investors' confidence and to assist in the investment decision-
making process. Another distinguishing factor for the Malaysian Islamic debt 
market is the establishment of a centralised, national level Shariah supervisory 
board, which ensures that every Islamic debt issued in Malaysia, is in full 
compliance with the Shariah. All these factors provide sufficient protection to 
investors in the Islamic debt and conventional debt markets. 
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However, the coefficient for the second issuance of Islamic debt is a negative and 
significant at 5% level of significance, suggesting that the issuance of Islamic debt 
for the second time declines firm performance. This negative finding is similar to 
Godlewski et al. (2010), which suggests that Islamic debt expansion has a 
detrimental effect on firm value. This may indicate that firms issuing Islamic debt 
failed to meet the expectations of the market as explained above. In addition, the 
debt rating is a crucial factor; hence it can be suspected that firms failed to meet 
their high ratings. The Islamic debt rating is an indication of the issuers’ credibility; 
high rating indicates high credibility/creditworthiness and vice versa. Hence, low 
credit rating is associated as high risk. The gap between the first and the second 
Islamic debt issuance ranges between two to six years. Presumably, in that time 
period, investors observed the firm’s performance, their Islamic debt rating, the 
market conditions such as the frequency of default cases of Islamic debt. In 
Malaysia, cases of Islamic debt default were few and it is something that raises 
concern on the investors’ protection because a default occurs due to the breach of any 
binding obligations under the original terms of the agreement between the issuer and 
the sukuk holders. Thus this factor may contribute to the negative result. 
 
Fortunately, the coefficient for more than two issuances of Islamic debt is a 
positive and significant at 1% level, suggesting that the issuance of Islamic debt 
more than twice improves a firm’s financial performance as measured by ROA. 
This also suggests that the management is more effective in utilising their assets 
to generate profits. Furthermore, this finding indicates that as the industry grows, 
it is more apparent that there is more demand by non-Muslim investors and 
issuers to play a role in the industry. Here in Malaysia, for instance, there is just as 
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strong a demand for Shariah compliant products among non-Muslims as there is 
among Muslims (PricewaterhouseCoopers Malaysia, 2008). 
 
3) The proportion of Islamic debt issued and ROA 
Coloum IV (REG 3) provides the results for the third regression. For the third 
regression, the coefficients for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt proportion are 
still a positive and significant. There are also no changes for the frequency of 
Islamic debt issuance coefficients as discussed in point two above (see 
explanation in section one and two). The coefficient for the Islamic debt 
proportion below the average and at the average is a positive and significant at 10% 
and 1% level of significance, suggesting that the proportion of Islamic debt below 
and at the average affect positively on firm performance (ROA). This finding is in 
line with Harris and Raviv (1990), which implies that higher leverage can be 
expected to be associated with larger firm value, higher debt level relative to 
expected income, and lower probability of reorganization following default. 
Moreover, higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and 
managers concerning the choice of investment (Myers, 1977), and a greater 
financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat 
of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, 
perquisites, etc. (Grossman & Hart 1982, Williams, 1987). 
 
However the coefficient for Islamic debt above the average is a negative and 
significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting that the greater the Islamic debt 
issued, the lower the firm performance. This may indicate that at a certain level, 
an additional debt gives no guarantee that the firm performance will be higher. 
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Though it is claimed that Islamic debt is more secure than the conventional debt, 
this result finds no support for that claim. On the contrary, this finding supports 
the notion that as the leverage increases, the probability of default also increases, 
and Islamic debt is no exception to this rule.  
 
4) The type of Islamic debt and ROA 
Column V (REG 4) provides the results for all four categories of explanatory 
variables and all control variables. There are no changes in terms of significance 
and sign of the coefficients for the debt structure of the firm, the frequency of 
Islamic debt issued, and the proportion of Islamic debt issued. The changes are 
only the value of coefficients, but it is a slight change (see explanation on section 
one, two and three above). The coefficients for debt-type, asset-type and equity-
type are a positive and significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting that all 
debt types affect higher firm performance. Though the finding for ROA is slightly 
different than for Tobin’s Q, this result does not impair on the Tobin’s Q result, as 
it is common for different methods of calculation to give different results. 
 
There is no change for the firm size coefficient, which is a negative and 
significant for all four regression equations, suggesting that bigger firms which 
have Islamic debt in their debt structure have a lower firm performance. The 
negative result may be due to the fact that bigger firms are already well-stabilised 
in terms of cash flows and profits because of their well-stabilised capital structure, 
hence changing its capital structure with a new unproven instrument may 
endanger the firm’s credibility and ability to maintain their stable cash flows and 
profits. Furthermore, apart from year 2004, all the years reveal a significant result. 
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All the years (2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009) have a positive coefficient 
but year 2001 and year 2006 (see explanation for year effect for Tobin’s Q). 
191 
 
Table 5.10: Regression result for group 1 
Variables 
Dynamic GMM 
REG_1 REG_2 REG_3 REG_4 
L1 0.1848*** 0.1690*** 0.1693*** 0.1547*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015) 
Constant 1.9864*** 0.2088** 0.2583** 0.8463** 
  (0.1067) (0.3597) (0.3574) (0.4264) 
The debt structure of the firm         
Islamic Debt Proportion 0.5863*** 1.0279*** 0.8803*** 0.0276** 
  (0.0398) (0.0952) (0.1508) (0.2540) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 0.1455*** 0.5133*** 0.5121*** 0.3357*** 
  (0.0150) (0.0390) (0.0506) (0.0544) 
The frequency of Islamic debt issuance         
D1_First Issuance - (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D2_Second Issuance - -0.4039*** -0.3710*** -0.7018*** 
    (0.1200) (0.1229) (0.2332) 
D3_More Than 2 Issuance - 1.3812*** 1.3690*** 1.2480*** 
    (0.0721) (0.0825) (0.1135) 
The proportion of Islamic debt issued         
D1_ID Below Average - - 0.0900*** 0.1319* 
      (0.0103) (0.1146) 
D2_ID Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D3_ID Above Average - - -0.0327*** -0.0135** 
      (0.0076) (0.1266) 
The type of Islamic debt issued         
D1_Debt Type of ID - - - (Omitted) 
          
D2_Asset Type of ID - - - 0.3337 
        (0.2695) 
D3_Equity Type of ID - - - 1.0458*** 
        (0.0532) 
Control Variables         
Size effect         
Firm Size -0.3470*** -0.1373** -0.1297** -0.2354*** 
  (0.0164) (0.0619) (0.0614) (0.0654) 
Year effect         
Year 2001 -0.1313*** -0.2070*** -0.1655** -0.5066*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0600) (0.0760) (0.1019) 
Year 2003 -0.6633*** -0.2180*** -0.1938** -0.0786* 
  (0.1134) (0.0836) (0.0921) (0.0433) 
Year 2004 0.1487*** 0.1698*** 0.2040*** 0.3969*** 
  (0.0371) (0.0528) (0.0420) (0.0657) 
Year 2005 0.2590*** 0.1235*** 0.1272*** 0.0981*** 
  (0.0196) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0159) 
Year 2006 -0.0305*** -0.1357*** -0.1527*** -0.0392*** 
  (0.0044) (0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0078) 
Year 2007 -0.2825*** -0.0930*** -0.1276*** -0.0889*** 
  (0.0241) (0.0225) (0.0315) (0.0298) 
Year 2008 0.7144*** 0.9287*** 0.9454*** 0.8061*** 
  (0.0153) (0.0660) (0.0750) (0.1146) 
Year 2009 0.3970* 0.7791** 0.1835 0.7980** 
  (0.1233) (0.6834) (0.6973) (2.8289) 
J-Statistics 5.05e+06 155326.13 601078.69 1.27e+06 
Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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1) The debt structure of the firm and ROE 
Column II (REG 1) provides the result for the first regression. The coefficient of 
Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt are positive and significant at a 1% level of 
significance, indicating that these variables have a positive effect on the firm’s 
financial performance. This finding suggests that firms are effective in managing 
their operation efficiency which in the end contributes to the owners’ wealth 
because ROE measures the performance from the perspective of the equity-
holders. From the point of view of shareholders, the usage of debt increases their 
wealth, and because of this, markets believe that Islamic debt positively 
contributes to the firm performance. Moreover, Islamic debt issuance contributes 
to an increase in the issuers’ total factor productivity (Nagano, n.d.). Furthermore, 
the positive result may be due to the stabilised nature of the Malaysian financial 
system which has evolved in line with the changing structure of the economy. The 
changes in the economic structure and financial system in turn have had an 
important influence in shaping the increasing complexity and sophisticated nature 
of its capital market along with the implementation of regulations, and these 
changes support firms to operate more effectively and efficiently, increasing the 
confidence of markets. Moreover, a more diversified financial system, in 
particular, the rapid growth of the Malaysian Islamic Capital Market and the 
Malaysian debt market, has increased the alternative sources of financing 
available to corporations. 
 
The coefficient for Islamic debt is higher than the coefficient for non-Islamic debt, 
suggesting that the Islamic debt contributes more to improve the financial 
performance of firms than non-Islamic debt. The result for ROE is in line with the 
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result for Tobin’s Q. Overall, this finding also supports the trade-off theory 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Haris & Raviv, 1990; Frank & Goyal, 2003). 
 
2) The frequency of Islamic debt issuance and ROE 
Column III (REG 2) provides the results for the second regression. There is no 
change for the result of Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt coefficients which are 
positive and significant at 1% level of significance (see explanation on section 
one). The coefficient for the first issuance of Islamic debt is a positive and 
significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting that the first issuance of Islamic 
debt affects firm performance (ROE). This also may indicate that managers are 
effective in utilising their resources to generate profits for the shareholders. There 
are several factors that might contribute to this positive finding. First, there is a 
broad based coordination of government policies which resulted in a 
comprehensive public policy that supports growth and innovation in the Islamic 
financial market, in particular, Islamic debt. Second, the importance of 
government intervention, such as tax incentives and required ratings improves 
issuers’ and investors’ confidence. 
 
The rapid growth of Islamic finance signifies that Islamic debt has moved from 
the pioneering stage to being an established financing instrument that serves as a 
commercially viable and effective tool for mobilising investment assets to finance 
productive economic activities. However, the coefficient for the second issuance 
of Islamic debt is a negative and significant at 1% level of significance, 
suggesting that the issuance of Islamic debt for the second time declines firm 
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performance (ROE).This negative finding is similar to Godlewski et al. (2010) 
which suggests that Islamic debt expansion has a detrimental effect on firm value. 
As mentioned before, the time period between the first and the second Islamic 
debt issuance ranges between two to six years. During this time frame, there were 
a few cases of Islamic debt defaults, both global and domestic, which have put a 
damper on the issuance of new sukuk and decreased market confidence. In 
addition, the economic slowdown created unfavourable conditions for the firms, 
thus affecting firm performance.  
 
Fortunately, the coefficient for more than two issuances of Islamic debt is a 
positive and significant at 1% level, suggesting that the issuance of Islamic debt 
more than twice improves a firm’s financial performance, as measured by ROE. It 
indicates that at a certain level, experiences from past failure increases the 
pressure on managers to improve their performance to generate profits, which in 
turn may attract more investors and market confidence. 
 
3) The proportion of Islamic debt issued and ROE 
Coloum IV (REG 3) provides the results for the third regression. For the third 
regression, the coefficients for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt proportion are 
still a positive and significant. There are also no changes for the frequency of 
Islamic debt issuance coefficients as discussed in point two above (see 
explanation on section one and two). The coefficients for the Islamic debt 
proportion below the average and at the average are a positive and significant at 1% 
level of significance. However, the greater the Islamic debt, the lower the firm 
performance, as can be seen from the coefficient for Islamic debt above the 
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average which is a negative and significant at 1% level of significance. This 
negative finding may be caused by the general structure of Islamic financing 
which requires sharing of risks and profits in some pre-agreed ratios. Therefore, 
the greater the Islamic debt proportion, the greater the chances of sharing the risks 
and profits. Overall, the result for Islamic debt proportion is similar to the Tobin’s 
Q and ROA result; therefore, the reasons for this positive result will be similar to 
two previous metrics provided previously. 
 
4) The type of Islamic debt and ROE 
Column V (REG 4) provides the results for all four categories of explanatory 
variables and all control variables. There are no changes in terms of significance 
and sign for the debt structure of the firm, the frequency of Islamic debt issued, 
the proportion of Islamic debt issued, but only slight changes on the coefficients 
value (see explanation on section one, two and three above). The coefficients for 
debt-type and equity-type are a positive and significant at 1% level of significance, 
while the coefficient for asset-type is a positive but not significant, suggesting that 
debt-type and equity-type are more favourable than asset-type. This may indicate 
that debt-type and equity-type generates higher firm performance. This result is in 
line with the result for Tobin’s Q. 
 
The coefficient for firm size is a negative and significant for all four regression 
equations, suggesting that bigger firms which have Islamic debt in their debt 
structure have a lower firm performance. The negative result may be due to the 
fact that bigger firms are already well-stabilised in terms of cash flows and profits 
because of their well-stabilised capital structure, hence changing its capital 
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structure with a new unproven instrument may endanger the firm’s credibility and 
ability to maintain their stable cash flows and profits. 
 
Results for the year effect are slightly different than the results for Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. All the coefficients are significant, however, the coefficients for year 2001, 
2003, 2006 and 2007 are a negative, while for Tobin’s Q and ROA, this is only 
true for year 2001 and 2006. 
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Table 5.11: Regression result for group 1 
Variables 
Dynamic GMM 
REG_1 REG_2 REG_3 REG_4 
L1 0.0514*** 0.0599*** 0.0623*** 0.0697*** 
  (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0030) 
Constant 0.5476*** 0.7202*** 0.5483*** 1.0153*** 
  (0.0727) (0.0750) (0.1290) (0.1389) 
The debt structure of the firm         
Islamic Debt Proportion 0.5909*** 0.0725** 0.0939** 0.6051*** 
  (0.1465) (0.0600) (0.2331) (0.2005) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 0.1233*** 0.1165*** 0.0905*** 0.0430** 
  (0.0301) (0.0305) (0.0360) (0.0434) 
The frequency of Islamic debt issuance         
D1_First Issuance - (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D2_Second Issuance - -0.6563*** -0.6411*** -0.5815*** 
    (0.0509) (0.0488) (0.0839) 
D3_More Than 2 Issuance - 0.0797*** 0.0655** 0.0914*** 
    (0.0268) (0.0332) (0.0293) 
The proportion of Islamic debt issued         
D1_ID Below Average - - 0.1530*** 0.1319*** 
      (0.0430) (0.0344) 
D2_ID Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D3_ID Above Average - - -0.1237*** -0.1314*** 
      (0.0298) (0.0167) 
The type of Islamic debt issued         
D1_Debt Type of ID - - - (Omitted) 
          
D2_Asset Type of ID - - - 0.7865*** 
        (0.0416) 
D3_Equity Type of ID - - - 0.2646*** 
        (0.0580) 
Control Variables         
Size effect         
Firm Size -0.0408*** -0.1028*** -0.0979*** -0.1896*** 
  (0.0124) (0.0142) (0.0236) (0.0276) 
Year effect         
Year 2001 0.3780*** 0.3483*** 0.3127*** 0.7437*** 
  (0.0641) (0.0808) (0.1088) (0.1477) 
Year 2003 -0.1654*** -0.1098*** -0.0859*** -0.0424* 
  (0.0219) (0.0203) (0.0259) (0.0797) 
Year 2004 -0.1292*** -0.1080*** -0.1110*** -0.0567*** 
  (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0136) 
Year 2005 -0.0370*** -0.0121*** -0.0004 -0.0422*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0050) (0.0108) (0.0121) 
Year 2006 -0.1236*** -0.0738*** -0.0542*** -0.0485 
  (0.0157) (0.0270) (0.0183) (0.0796) 
Year 2007 0.3288*** 0.3559*** 0.3513*** 0.2466*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0231) (0.0383) (0.0340) 
Year 2008 0.0386** 0.0140 0.0829** 0.0109 
  (0.0141) (0.1201) (0.1352) (0.0102) 
Year 2009 -0.2970* -0.5345** -0.6176*** -0.5079*** 
  (0.1758) (0.2513) (0.1880) (0.1208) 
J-Statistics 24781.31 77498.33 60713.80 200949.84 
Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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1) The debt structure of the firm and EVA 
Column II (REG 1) provides the regression result for the first regression. The 
coefficients for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt are a positive and significant at 
1% level of significance, indicating that these two variables have a positive effect 
on the firm’s financial performance. EVA is performance evaluation measure and 
is calculated as being the net operating profit after taxes less the cost of the capital 
of both equity and debt employed to produce those profits. Since EVA is the 
excess money remaining after the cost of the capital (both equity and debt),a tax 
exemption of Islamic debt supports the higher EVA, since there is no tax 
deduction for the profit obtained from the Islamic debt project. One of the 
important sets of tax incentives in Malaysia is comprised of stamp duty waivers 
for Islamic securities, bonds and financings, and these waivers put the Islamic 
debt sector on an equal footing with the traditional debt sector, and may even 
create a marginal advantage. Thus, the positive result may indicate that Islamic 
debt, which is mostly based on the projects, creates value to the business, and in 
the end it adds value for shareholders. Furthermore, the positive result may be 
also helped by the government’s supportive influence over the growth and 
integrity of the market in Malaysia. For example, all new securities are issued 
with a rating from an approved rating agency. 
 
The coefficient for Islamic debt is higher than the coefficient for non-Islamic debt, 
suggesting that Islamic debt contributes more to the improvement of a firm’s 
financial performance than non-Islamic debt. This finding is similar to the result 
for Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. Overall, this finding for EVA also supports the 
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trade-off theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Haris & Raviv, 1990; Frank & Goyal, 2003). 
 
2) The frequency of Islamic debt issuance and EVA 
Column III (REG 2) provides the results for the second regression. The 
coefficients for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt are a positive and significant at 
1% level of significance (see explanation from section one above). The coefficient 
for the first issuance of Islamic debt is a positive and significant at 1% level of 
significance, suggesting that the first issuance of Islamic debt affects higher firm 
performance. This may indicate that Islamic debt brings more economic profit to 
the company because the return on the firm’s economic capital employed is 
greater than the cost of bearing Islamic debt. The credit rating of Islamic debt 
issued in Malaysia may also contribute to the positive finding in this study. 
Malaysia is one of the first few countries in the world to require the recognition of a 
credit rating agency for the purpose of rating a debt or Islamic debt issue. This is in 
recognition of their vital role in evaluating the probability of default of Islamic debt 
issue, and the importance investors place on ratings for their investment decisions. 
The credit rating agency is required to be recognised by the Securities Commission 
for the purpose of rating debt or Islamic debt issues in Malaysia, pursuant to the 
guidelines on recognition of credit rating agencies by the securities commission for 
the purpose of rating debt issues. 
 
However, the coefficient for the issuance of Islamic debt for the second time is a 
negative and significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting the second 
issuance of Islamic debt decreases firm performance. This may indicate that the 
issuance of Islamic debt for the second time creates no value to the business, and 
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in the end it decreases the value for shareholders. This negative finding is similar 
to Godlewski et al. (2010) which suggests that Islamic debt expansion has a 
detrimental effect on firm value. As mentioned before, the gap between the first 
and the second issuance of Islamic debt ranges between two to six years. During 
this gap, the firm may experience lower firm performance due to factors such as 
an economic slowdown, asset price bubbles, inflation, etc. Those conditions may 
affect the firms’ operating business and in the end affect the credit rating of 
Islamic debt because most of the Islamic debt is based on the project. Thus, a 
rating is not a recommendation to purchase, sell or hold a security’s market price or 
its suitability for a particular investment. Fortunately, the coefficient for more than 
two issuances of Islamic debt is a positive and significant at 1% level, suggesting 
that more than two issuances of Islamic debt improved a firm’s financial 
performance, as measured by EVA.  
 
3) The proportion of Islamic debt issued and EVA 
Coloum IV (REG 3) provides the results for the third regression. The coefficients 
for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt proportion are still a positive and significant. 
There are also no changes for the frequency of Islamic debt issuance coefficients 
as discussed in point two above (see explanation on section one and two above). 
The coefficients for the Islamic debt proportion below the average and at the 
average are a positive and significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting that 
the proportion of Islamic debt below and at the average creates value to the 
business. However, the greater the Islamic debt, the lower the firm performance, 
as can be seen from the coefficient for Islamic debt proportion above the average, 
which is a negative and significant at 1% level of significance. This may indicate 
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that at a certain level, an additional debt gives no guarantee that the firm 
performance will be higher. Furthermore, EVA is calculated by subtracting the net 
profit with its cost of capital, which means the greater the debt proportion, the 
higher the cost of capital that has to be paid. 
 
4) The type of Islamic debt and EVA 
Column V (REG 4) provides the results for all four categories of explanatory 
variables and all control variables. There are no changes of the coefficients in 
terms of significance and sign for the debt structure of the firm, the frequency of 
Islamic debt issuance, the proportion of Islamic debt issued, but only slight 
changes on the coefficients value (see explanation on section one, two and three 
above). The coefficients for debt-type, asset-type and equity-type are a positive 
and significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting that all debt types affect 
higher firm performance. 
 
The coefficient for firm size is a negative and significant for all four regression 
equations, suggesting that bigger firms which have Islamic debt in their debt 
structure have a lower firm performance. The negative result may be due to the 
fact that bigger firms are already well-stabilised in terms of cash flows and profits 
because of their well-stabilised capital structure, hence changing its capital 
structure with a new unproven instrument may endanger the firm’s credibility and 
ability to maintain their stable cash flows and profits. 
 
The results for the year effect are slightly different than the results for Tobin’s Q, 
ROA and ROE. All the coefficients are significant, however, only the coefficients 
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for year 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2009 are a negative; meanwhile for Tobin’s Q and 
ROA, only year 2001 and 2006 are negative and significant, and similarly, year 
2001, 2003, 2006 and 2007 for ROE. 
 
Table 5.12 provides the summary of the regression results for four dependent 
variables. For all four regression equations, there are only slightly differences in 
the coefficient value. Almost all the coefficient signs and significance values 
reveal the same direction and a similar significance value. 
 
In sum, the findings for all four categories of explanatory variables along with 
their control variables for all metrics (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE and EVA) are 
almost identical. The coefficients for Islamic debt is higher than the coefficient for 
non-Islamic debt and, overall, the findings for Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE and EVA 
support the trade-off theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; DeAngelo & Masulis, 
1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Haris & Raviv, 1990; Frank & Goyal, 2003) and 
this theory apparently can also be applied to Islamic debt. 
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Table 5.12: Summary of the regression result for group 1 
Variables 
Dynamic GMM 
Tobin’s Q ROA ROE EVA 
L1 0.5742*** 0.1220*** 0.1547*** 0.0697*** 
  (0.0174) (0.0041) (0.0015) (0.0030) 
Constant 0.3180*** 8.7500*** 0.8463** 1.0153*** 
  (0.0988) (0.0410) (0.4264) (0.1389) 
The debt structure of the firm         
Islamic Debt Proportion 0.7441*** 0.0159*** 0.0276** 0.6051*** 
  (0.0723) (0.0025) (0.2540) (0.2005) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 0.5372*** 0.0177*** 0.3357*** 0.0430** 
  (0.0159) (0.0015) (0.0544) (0.0434) 
The frequency of Islamic debt issuance         
D1_First Issuance (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D2_Second Issuance -0.0961* -0.0774*** -0.7018*** -0.5815*** 
  (0.0951) (0.0140) (0.2332) (0.0839) 
D3_More Than 2 Issuance 0.2090*** 0.0323*** 1.2480*** 0.0914*** 
  (0.0562) (0.0026) (0.1135) (0.0293) 
The proportion of Islamic debt issued         
D1_ID Below Average 0.0006* 0.0181*** 0.1319* 0.1319*** 
  (0.0129) (0.0010) (0.1146) (0.0344) 
D2_ID Average (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D3_ID Above Average -0.0248** -0.0036*** -0.0135** -0.1314*** 
  (0.0111) (0.0010) (0.1266) (0.0167) 
The type of Islamic debt issued         
D1_Debt Type of ID (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D2_Asset Type of ID 0.0423 0.0250*** 0.3337 0.7865*** 
  (0.1076) (0.0074) (0.2695) (0.0416) 
D3_Equity Type of ID 0.1764* 0.0346*** 1.0458*** 0.2646*** 
  (0.1049) (0.0027) (0.0532) (0.0580) 
Control Variables         
Size effect         
Firm Size -0.0844*** -0.0040*** -0.2354*** -0.1896*** 
  (0.0142) (0.0005) (0.0654) (0.0276) 
Year effect         
Year 2001 -1.5848* -0.0169* -0.5066*** 0.7437*** 
  (0.9510) (0.0097) (0.1019) (0.1477) 
Year 2003 0.0458*** 0.0092*** -0.0786* -0.0424* 
  (0.0098) (0.0024) (0.0433) (0.0797) 
Year 2004 0.0130 0.0173*** 0.3969*** -0.0567*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0019) (0.0657) (0.0136) 
Year 2005 0.0171*** 0.0058*** 0.0981*** -0.0422*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0014) (0.0159) (0.0121) 
Year 2006 -0.0346*** -0.0018*** -0.0392*** -0.0485 
  (0.0072) (0.0003) (0.0078) (0.0796) 
Year 2007 0.1160*** 0.0080*** -0.0889*** 0.2466*** 
  (0.0177) (0.0020) (0.0298) (0.0340) 
Year 2008 0.0397* 0.0017*** 0.8061*** 0.0109 
  (0.0236) (0.0006) (0.1146) (0.0102) 
Year 2009 0.0587** 0.0048*** 0.7980** -0.5079*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0019) (2.8289) (0.1208) 
J-Statistics 21514.85 78177.74 1.27e+06 200949.84 
Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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5.4.2 PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERROR REGRESSION 
RESULTS FOR GROUP 2 
Table 5.13, Table 5.14 and Table 5.15 present the regression result. There are 
three dependent variables: Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. Similar to the regression 
process for group 1, there are four regression equations. REG 1 is the first 
regression equation which regresses only the debt structure of the firm. REG 2 is 
the second regression equation which regresses the debt structure of the firm and 
the frequency of Islamic debt issuance. REG 3 is the third regression equation 
which regresses the debt structure of the firm, the frequency of Islamic debt 
issuance and the proportion of Islamic debt issued. REG 4 is the fourth regression 
equation which regresses all explanatory variables. That means for the REG 2, 
REG 3 and REG 4, more explanatory variables are added into the regression 
equation to observe the changes of the coefficient and standard errors. 
 
There is no debt-type of Islamic debt for group 2. This is due to the fact that 
Indonesian Islamic scholars seem to be more prudent in implementing Islamic law 
principles into Islamic finance. Indonesian Islamic scholars tend to have similar 
views to Middle East scholars even though Indonesian scholars have the same 
school of thought as Malaysian scholars, which is the Syafi’i madzhab. Therefore, 
the debt-type contract is prohibited as this type of debt is considered a pure debt, 
which is similar to money. Consequently, this debt-type should not be used in 
structuring transactions. 
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Table 5.13: Regression result for group 2 
Variables 
PCSE 
REG_1 REG_2 REG_3 REG_4 
Constant 14.2852*** 13.8775*** 13.7643*** 12.1986*** 
  (0.9767) (0.9536) (0.9887) (1.0423) 
The debt structure of the firm         
Islamic Debt Proportion 22.1151** 20.2015** 7.8141* 13.0124* 
  (10.9539) (10.6730) (21.3378) (21.6586) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion -0.2034 -0.3449 -0.3163 -0.3963 
  (0.5277) (0.6206) (0.6207) (0.6349) 
The frequency of Islamic debt issuance         
D1_First Issuance - (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D2_Second Issuance - -0.2625* -0.2569* -0.5259** 
    (0.2054) (0.2035) (0.2569) 
The proportion of Islamic debt issued         
D1_ID Below Average - - 0.2619 0.2260 
      (0.3565) (0.3578) 
D2_ID Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D3_ID Above Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
The type of Islamic debt issued         
D1_Debt Type of ID - - - - 
          
D2_Asset Type of ID - - - (Omitted) 
          
D3_Equity Type of ID - - - 0.4784*** 
        (0.1185) 
Control Variables         
Size effect         
Firm Size -2.0481*** -1.9707*** -1.9980*** -1.7834*** 
  (0.1422) (0.1532) (0.1513) (0.1692) 
Year effect         
Year 2003 1.3892*** 1.3091*** 1.3308*** 1.4234*** 
  (0.2291) (0.2254) (0.2255) (0.2180) 
Year 2004 0.5260*** 0.4770*** 0.4607*** 0.4472*** 
  (0.1539) (0.1728) (0.1749) (0.1756) 
Year 2005 -0.4121*** -0.4726*** -0.4902*** -0.7130*** 
  (0.1030) (0.1407) (0.1443) (0.1881) 
Year 2007 -0.2230 -0.3200 -0.3221 -0.1215 
  (0.2890) (0.3403) (0.3395) (0.2882) 
Year 2008 -0.0221 -0.0208 -0.0043 -0.0266 
  (0.1320) (0.1299) (0.1298) (0.1298) 
Year 2009 0.1998 0.1183 0.1170 0.1231 
  (1.2422) (1.2511) (1.2488) (1.2680) 
R-squared 0.2871 0.2881 0.2886 0.2973 
Wald chi2, Prob.>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
 
 
1) The debt structure of the firm and Tobin’s Q 
Column II (REG 1), the coefficient for Islamic debt, is a positive and significant at 
5% level of significance, indicating that Islamic debt affects positively on firm 
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performance. Meanwhile the coefficient for non-Islamic debt is a negative but not 
significant. This positive and significant finding for Islamic debt supports the 
trade-off theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Haris & Raviv, 1990; Frank & Goyal, 2003), but in contrast 
with the study by Ang, Fatemi and Tourani-Rad (1997) which finds weak support 
for the trade-off theory for Indonesia. Furthermore, this finding is consistent with 
previous studies in revealing that there is a positive relationship between capital 
structure and firm performance as measured (Champion, 1999; Gosh et al., 2000; 
Hadlock & James, 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2003; Berger & Bonnarccorsi di Patti, 
2006) and this theory apparently can also be applied to Islamic debt. As a 
Muslim-majority country – about 85% of the 230 million  are Muslim – Indonesia 
offers bright prospects for the development of the Islamic financial industry. After 
a huge hit to the economic and financial sector in 1997, much progress has been 
achieved in reconstructing the economy, including the stabilisation of the 
economic growth and inflation. This stabilised economic condition promises  
good prospects in the future for the industry in sustaining businesses through a 
lower cost of financing. When new Islamic instruments were offered, in particular 
Islamic debt, the markets perceived them positively. This demonstrates that the 
Indonesian corporate sector regards Islamic debt as a potential and feasible 
alternative for use in overall corporate asset and liabilities management. This 
finding is similar to the result for group 1. The result, however, for non-Islamic 
debt is different from group 1 in that the coefficient for non-Islamic debt is a 
negative but not significant, indicating that non-Islamic debt has no impact on 
firm performance. It can be concluded that Islamic debt has a significant impact 
compared to non-Islamic debt. 
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2) The frequency of Islamic debt issuance and Tobin’s Q 
Column III (REG 2) provides the results for the second regression. There is no 
change of the coefficient sign and coefficient significance for Islamic debt and 
non-Islamic debt (see explanation in section one above). The coefficient for the 
first issuance of Islamic debt is a positive and significant at 1% level of 
significance, suggesting that the first issuance of Islamic debt affects positively on 
firm performance. Apart from being a new debt instrument (typically, new 
instruments are well received initially), Islamic debt has been one of several 
investment instruments that individual/corporate investors find attractive, giving 
comparable, or sometimes higher, returns compared with bank deposits’ average 
rates of between four and seven percent per year. Furthermore, the positive result 
may be due to the fact that Islamic debt pushes the managers of the firms to put 
more effort into generating more profits because the return for the investors 
depends on the profit generated from that asset/project. Therefore, it places more 
pressure on managers to manage their firms effectively, because of the return they 
have distributed to the investors. As discussed in chapter three, Islamic debt 
provides profit/return to the investors based on the pre-agreed ratio and profit-loss 
sharing arrangement. Therefore, losses mean that no returns will be distributed to 
the investors. If it is the case that the firm generates losses, there are at least two 
consequences that the firms must bear: first, the rating of the debt decreases, and 
second, the investors’ confidence decreases regarding the firm’s prospect. In the 
end, the investors will try to re-sell it before it matures, and this will impact on 
both the stock price and debt price of that firm. 
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However, the coefficient for the second issuance of Islamic debt is a negative and 
significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting that the second issuance of 
Islamic debt decreases firm performance. This may be due to the fact that 
Indonesia’s Shariah capital market is not showing the same vigorous growth as 
the Shariah banking system in Indonesia. Furthermore, in terms of presence on the 
international Shariah capital market, Indonesia lags far behind Malaysia, another 
Muslim-majority country, although Indonesia potentially has a tremendous 
opportunity to build its share of that market. In addition, the obstacles and 
challenges confronting Indonesia in the development of the Shariah financial 
market are indeed formidable. 
 
The issues involved are multi-faceted. Most important, however, is the inadequate 
legal framework, institutional structures, supervision, limitations in human 
resources, taxation problems, risk management and mitigation, a small market 
share compared to conventional financial products, and the lack of a secondary 
market. These issues may compel firms to perform well as the markets may doubt 
whether firms issuing Islamic debt are capable of overcoming those challenges 
and generating profits. Therefore, the further establishment of institutional 
infrastructure and standard-setting and regulatory bodies will be an important 
point. The aim should be to find ways to align standards in the conventional 
finance industry with those in the Islamic sector to create global finance offerings 
that meet Shariah requirements as well as the needs of all users of finance. In 
addition, more human resources will be required to meet the expertise, experience 
and talent-pool demands that will be faced by the industry to sustain anticipated 
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long-term growth. This means training programs for all players and increasing the 
number of effective shariah scholars. 
 
3) The proportion of Islamic debt issued and Tobin’s Q 
Column IV (REG 3) provides the results for the third regression. The coefficients 
for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt proportion are still a positive and significant. 
There are also no changes for the frequency of Islamic debt issuance coefficients 
(see explanation on section one and two). The coefficient for the Islamic debt 
proportion below the average is a positive but not significant, suggesting that a 
smaller amount of Islamic debt has no impact on firm performance. According to 
Indonesia Capital Market Law, there are four types of costs firms must bear when 
issuing both corporate debt and Islamic corporate debt: first, market costs such as 
stamp duty, and brokerage fee, second, registration costs, third, listing fees and 
fourth, other costs such as the cost of clearing depository fees. Moreover, unlike 
Malaysia that exempts both issuers and investors from taxes, Indonesia charges 15% 
to 20% tax on debt, in particular capital gain tax (CGT), therefore, issuing a small 
amount of debt brings more costs. 
 
The coefficient for Islamic debt proportion at the average is a positive and 
significant at 1% level of significance. The result may indicate that the greater the 
Islamic debt, the higher the firm performance; as can be seen from the change in 
coefficient significance from no impact on firm performance when the Islamic 
debt issued was below the average to affecting higher firm performance when the 
Islamic debt issued was at the average. This finding can be better explained by 
asymmetric information theory (Ross, 1977). According to this theory, investors 
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consider larger debt levels as a signal of higher quality, because managers of low-
quality firms do not imitate higher-quality firms by issuing more debt. Moreover, 
lower-quality firms have higher marginal expected bankruptcy costs for any level 
of debt. The result for Islamic debt above the average is omitted automatically due 
to collinearity.  
 
4) The type of Islamic debt and Tobin’s Q 
Column V (REG 4) provides the results for all four categories of explanatory 
variables and all control variables. There are no changes in terms of significance 
and sign for the debt structure of the firm, the frequency of Islamic debt issued, 
the proportion of Islamic debt issued, but only slight changes on the coefficients 
value (see explanation on section one, two and three). For group 2, there are only 
two types of Islamic debt issued during the sample period: asset-type and equity-
type, which count 71.43% and 28.57% respectively. The coefficient for asset-type 
and equity type is a positive and significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting 
that the asset-type and equity-type affect higher firm performance. The way that 
Islamic finance and, in particular, Islamic debits unique is the focus on linking 
financing to an underlying tangible asset. However, there is often a wide gap 
between this idea and the reality of what investors can expect during a bankruptcy. 
Most Islamic debts provide investors with the right to recourse only through an 
asset that is held in trust by the issuer’s special purpose vehicle (SPV). This 
provides both benefits and costs for investors. On the one hand, there is an asset 
that can be sold by investors to recover some principal that is insulated from 
claims by the issuers’ other creditors. On the other hand, most Islamic debts are 
structured so that investors do not have recourse to the issuers’ other assets and 
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recovery of principal is solely determined by either a repurchase by the issuer or a 
sale of the underlying assets. 
 
The coefficient for firm size is a negative and significant for all four regression 
equations, suggesting that bigger firms which have Islamic debt in their debt 
structure have a lower firm performance. The negative result may be due to the 
fact that bigger firms, for example Indosat, Bakrie, Berlian, Mayora Indah, Aneka 
Gas are the top and large firms in their respective sectors, are already highly stable  
in terms of cash flows and profits because of their well-stabilised capital structure. 
As such, changing their capital structure by introducing a new unproven 
instrument may risk the firm’s credibility and ability to maintain their stable cash 
flows and profits.  
 
Only the coefficients for year 2003, 2004 and 2005 are significant. However, only 
the coefficient for year 2005 is a negative. That means year 2007, 2008 and 2009 
have no significant impact in affecting firm performance. The positive and 
significant result for year 2003 and 2004 might be due to the fact that there was an 
expansion or an increase in business activities in 2003 and 2004. A raised 
domestic demand has been an important cause factor of the expansion. On this 
particular survey period, the expansion was seemingly related to the seasonal 
factors as well. Moreover, in the agriculture sector, there was a good rice harvest 
in a wide spread of production areas as the longer rainy season had a positive 
impact to paddy field production. Other factors contributing to the expansion 
included the stable market situation, the calm social-political conditions, and the 
slow but steady increase of banking in the sub sector operation. Evaluated by 
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sector, all nine sectors experienced expansion, with the biggest contribution 
coming from the finance sector and services sector, followed by the agriculture 
sector and trade, hotel and restaurant sector. Indication of increases in business 
activities was also reflected by the improvement of the production capacity 
variable, the volume of domestic or foreign demand/order/contract, company 
financial condition, business situation, selling price/ tariff/ wholesale/interest rate, 
agricultural product supply and the usage of labour. For year 2005, though there 
was business activity expansion as shown by its positive business survey index, 
this was still slower than the previous year (Indonesian Bank, 2003, 2004 and 
2005). 
 
In conclusion, the more variables added to the regression equation, the more 
significant the results and the higher the coefficient. 
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Table 5.14: Regression result for group 2 
Variables 
PCSE 
REG_1 REG_2 REG_3 REG_4 
Constant 57.1750** 64.6327** 64.5055** 58.1687** 
  (26.5882) (31.1487) (29.8314) (30.30046) 
The debt structure of the firm         
Islamic Debt Proportion 33.0070* 22.2358* 11.6814* 9.3563* 
  (297.7084) (298.7783) (649.9596) (616.498) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion -14.3916 -11.7864 -11.7543 -12.0781 
  (9.1553) (8.9050) (8.7100) (9.4287) 
The frequency of Islamic debt issuance         
D1_First Issuance - (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D2_Second Issuance - -4.8354* -4.8418* -3.7532* 
    (3.7852) (5.7985) (4.8020) 
The proportion of Islamic debt issued         
D1_ID Below Average - - 0.2942 0.1491 
      (8.0907) (7.8630) 
D2_ID Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D3_ID Above Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
The type of Islamic debt issued         
D1_Debt Type of ID - - - - 
          
D2_Asset Type of ID - - - (Omitted) 
         
D3_Equity Type of ID - - - 1.9361 
        (5.6142) 
Control Variables         
Size effect         
Firm Size -8.7613** -10.1870** -10.2177* -9.3496* 
  (4.2442) (5.1640) (2.5528) (5.2432) 
Year effect         
Year 2003 13.9040* 15.3780* 15.4021* 15.7773* 
  (7.6121) (8.5667) (8.7997) (9.3636) 
Year 2004 6.9886 6.0872 6.1057 6.1600 
  (8.5381) (8.5231) (8.9045) (8.9862) 
Year 2005 -13.5066 -12.3930 -12.4129 -13.3142 
  (11.5405) (11.8400) (11.6280) (11.8880) 
Year 2007 -2.5537 -4.3424 -4.3400 -5.1519 
  (2.8499) (4.2000) (4.2012) (4.6370) 
Year 2008 -3.1363 -3.1104 -3.1290 -3.0388 
  (2.8378) (2.8162) (2.6680) (2.6630) 
Year 2009 2.5602 4.0611 4.0596 3.0880 
  (2.8712) (3.9698) (3.9743) (5.0709) 
R-squared 0.2620 0.2680 0.2680 0.2700 
Wald chi2, Prob.>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
 
 
1) The debt structure of the firm and ROA 
Column II (REG 1), the coefficient for Islamic debt is a positive and significant at 
10% level of significance, indicating that Islamic debt affects positively on firm 
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performance. This finding supports the trade-off theory (Modigliani & Miller, 
1963; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Haris & Raviv, 
1990; Frank & Goyal, 2003), but is in contrast to the study by Ang, Fatemi and 
Tourani-Rad (1997), which finds weak support for the trade-off theory for 
Indonesia. According to the Indonesia Capital Market Law, there are three 
corporate debts available in Indonesia; corporate debt, corporate Islamic debt and 
corporate convertible debt. Investors in the Indonesian debt market include 
corporate and individual bodies, mutual funds, Securities Companies, insurance 
companies, pension funds, financial institutions, foundations and others. Mutual 
funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and financial institutions are the 
largest investors for both conventional and Islamic debt in Indonesia. Corporate 
debt activities, including conventional and Islamic debt offerings, accelerated 
significantly at the beginning of 2003 and have maintained momentum since then. 
Islamic debts, which are based on Shariah principles, play a major role in 
Indonesian capital markets. This demonstrates that the Indonesian corporate sector 
regards Islamic debt as a potential and feasible alternative for use in overall 
corporate asset and liabilities management. This finding is similar to the result for 
group 1. The result for non-Islamic debt is different to group 1 where the 
coefficient for non-Islamic debt is a negative but not significant, indicating that 
non-Islamic debt has no impact on firm performance. This non-significant result 
for non-Islamic debt is in line with the study done by Adhari and Viverita (2012) 
which examines the effect of capital structure and ownership structure on firm 
performance in three ASEAN countries including Indonesia. They find that a 
firm’s capital structure positively and significantly affects its performance in all 
countries but Indonesia. 
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2) The frequency of Islamic debt issuance and ROA 
Column III (REG 2) provides the results for the second regression. There is no 
change of the coefficient sign and coefficient significance for Islamic debt and 
non-Islamic debt (see explanation on section one above). The coefficient for the 
first issuance of Islamic debt is a positive and significant at 10% level of 
significance, suggesting that the first issuance of Islamic debt has a positive effect 
on firm performance. This positive finding might be caused by the positive 
sentiment from the market toward this new instrument because, after the financial 
crisis, which hit ASEAN countries including Indonesia, the capital structure of the 
firms are dominated by short-term debt financing among Indonesian firms 
(Prasetyantoko, nd.). This might be due to the fact that firms in Asia became more 
fragile after the crisis. Before the crisis, the debt ratio had an upward trend in both 
book and market value, and Indonesia is one of the five highest leverage ratios 
together with South Korea, Thailand, India and Brazil (Prasetyantoko, nd.; Fan et 
al., 2004). Furthermore, Booth et al. (2001) assert that it is a common 
phenomenon for the book value of debt to increase during a recession and to 
decrease during an expansion period due to the business cycle effect. 
 
Therefore, when a new instrument comes to the market, this might prove 
attractive to the market, and hence the firm issuing such debt has to prove that this 
new instrument stimulates the firm’s performance. Thus, managers have to work 
harder in utilising the firms’ assets to generate profits. Furthermore, the positive 
result may be due to the fact that Islamic debt pushes the managers of the firms to 
put more effort into generating more profits because the return for investors 
depends on the profit generated from that asset/project. As noted previously, this 
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places more pressure on managers to manage their firms effectively. Chapter three 
had also discussed how Islamic debt provides profit/returns to the investors based 
on the arrangement of a pre-agreed ratio and profit-loss sharing. The basic 
principle of profit and loss sharing is that, instead of lending money at a fixed rate 
of return, the banker forms a partnership with the borrower sharing in a venture’s 
profits and losses. If the returns are good the profits are shared equitably and this 
is the case with losses as well. So the return to investors depends on the 
productivity of the investment, and nothing is pre-fixed.  
 
The coefficient for the second issuance of Islamic debt is a negative and 
significant at 10% level of significance, suggesting that the issuance of Islamic 
debt for the second time lowers a firm’s performance (see explanation on section 
two for Tobin’s Q group 2). 
 
3) The proportion of Islamic debt issued and ROA 
Coloum IV (REG 3) provides the results for the third regression. For the third 
regression, the coefficients for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt proportion are 
still a positive and significant. There are also no changes for the frequency of 
Islamic debt issuance coefficients (see explanation section one and two above). 
The coefficient for the Islamic debt proportion below the average is a positive but 
not significant, suggesting that a smaller amount of Islamic debt has no impact on 
firm performance. According to Indonesia Capital Market Law, there are four 
types of costs firms must bear when issuing both corporate debt and Islamic 
corporate debt: first, market costs such as stamp duty and brokerage fee, second, 
registration costs, third, listing fees, and fourth, other costs such as the cost of 
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clearing depository fees. Moreover, unlike Malaysia, which exempts both issuers 
and investors from taxes, Indonesia charges 15% to 20% tax on debt, in particular, 
capital gain tax (CGT). Therefore, issuing a small amount of debt incurs more 
costs. This finding is in contrast with group 1. 
 
The coefficient for Islamic debt proportion at the average is a positive and 
significant at 5% level of significance. The result may indicate that the greater the 
Islamic debt, the higher the firm performance; as can be seen from the coefficient 
significance change from no impact on firm performance when the Islamic debt 
issued was below the average to generating the higher performance of firms when 
the Islamic debt issued is at the average. This finding can be better explained by 
asymmetric information theory (Ross, 1977). According to asymmetric 
information theory that investors consider larger debt levels as a signal of higher 
quality, because managers of low-quality firms do not imitate higher-quality firms 
by issuing more debt. Moreover, lower-quality firms have higher marginal 
expected bankruptcy costs for any level of debt. The result for Islamic debt above 
the average is omitted automatically due to collinearity. 
 
4) The type of Islamic debt and ROA 
Column V (REG 4) provides the results for all four categories of explanatory 
variables and all control variables. There are no changes in terms of significance 
and sign for the debt structure of the firm, the frequency of Islamic debt issued, 
the proportion of Islamic debt issued, but only slight changes on the coefficients 
value (see explanation on section one, two and three). In the sample, there are 
only two types of Islamic debt issued, asset-type and equity-type, which count 
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71.43% and 28.57% respectively. The coefficient for asset-type is a positive and 
significant at 5% level of significance, suggesting that asset-type has an impact on 
firm performance. Meanwhile, the coefficient for equity-type is a positive but not 
significant, suggesting that equity-type has no impact on firm performance. This 
finding is slightly different than the result for Tobin’s Q, in which both Islamic 
debt types have a significant impact on firm performance. 
 
The coefficient for firm size is a negative and significant for all four regression 
equations, suggesting that bigger firms which have Islamic debt in their debt 
structure have a lower firm performance. The negative result may be due to the 
fact that bigger firms, for example Indosat, Bakrie, Berlian, Mayora Indah, Aneka 
Gas, are the top firms in their respective sectors and are already well-stabilised in 
terms of cash flows and profits due to their well-stabilised capital structure. Hence, 
changing their capital structure by introducing a new unproven instrument may 
endanger their credibility and ability to maintain their stable cash flows and 
profits. 
 
The result for the year effect is different than the result for Tobin’s Q where only 
year 2003 is a significant and positive. The other years have no significant impact 
in affecting firm performance. The positive and significant result for year 2003 
might be due to the fact that there was an expansion or an increase in business 
activities in 2003 (see explanation on section four for Tobin’s Q). 
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Table 5.15: Regression result for group 2 
Variables 
PCSE 
REG_1 REG_2 REG_3 REG_4 
Constant 4.4693** 5.2056** 4.8454** 4.2698** 
  (2.3590) (2.6980) (0.4985) (2.0060) 
The debt structure of the firm         
Islamic Debt Proportion 25.4311* 27.9517* 61.3609* 59.4498* 
  (24.8610) (24.3276) (47.2832) (44.7229) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion -0.5021 -0.2450 -0.1540 -0.1835 
  (0.7613) (0.6890) (0.6549) (0.7250) 
The frequency of Islamic debt issuance         
D1_First Issuance - (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D2_Second Issuance - -0.4774** -0.4955** -0.6966* 
    (0.2497) (0.2615) (0.2421) 
The proportion of Islamic debt issued         
D1_ID Below Average - - 0.8332 0.8200 
      (0.5432) (0.5260) 
D2_ID Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
D3_ID Above Average - - (Omitted) (Omitted) 
          
The type of Islamic debt issued         
D1_Debt Type of ID - - - - 
          
D2_Asset Type of ID - - - (Omitted) 
          
D3_Equity Type of ID - - - 0.1759 
        (0.4690) 
Control Variables         
Size effect         
Firm Size -0.7225** -0.8632** -0.9500** -0.8710** 
  (0.3723) (0.4379) (0.4909) (0.4076) 
Year effect         
Year 2003 1.0072 1.1528 1.2213 1.2554 
  (0.6725) (0.7434) (0.7871) (0.8577) 
Year 2004 0.8825 0.7935 0.8457 0.8507 
  (0.7713) (0.7567) (0.7808) (0.7865) 
Year 2005 -0.2924 -0.4023* -0.3461 -0.2642 
  (0.1844) (0.2354) (0.2183) (0.1741) 
Year 2007 -0.3195** -0.4960** -0.4893** -0.5631* 
  (0.1659) (0.2545) (0.2568) (0.3891) 
Year 2008 -0.1530 -0.1504 -0.2029 -0.1947 
  (0.1774) (0.1771) (0.1852) (0.1739) 
Year 2009 0.2003 0.3485 0.3440 0.2559 
  (0.1706) (0.2479) (0.2501) (0.2527) 
R-squared 0.2590 0.2710 0.2910 0.2950 
Wald chi2, Prob.>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
 
 
1) The debt structure of the firm and ROE 
Column II (REG 1), the coefficient of Islamic debt is a positive and significant at 
10% level of significance, indicating that Islamic debt affects positively on firm 
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performance. This finding supports the trade-off theory (Modigliani & Miller, 
1963; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Haris & Raviv, 
1990; Frank & Goyal, 2003), but is in contrast to the study by Ang, Fatemi and 
Tourani-Rad (1997), which finds weak support for the trade-off theory for 
Indonesia. Conversely, the coefficient for non-Islamic debt is a negative but not 
significant, suggesting that non-Islamic debt has no impact on firm performance. 
This finding is in line with the findings for Tobin’s Q and ROA. Therefore it can 
be concluded that this finding also supports the trade-off theory. Although Islamic 
debt has its attractions –low yields, scarce supply, high demand and strong 
regional prospects are some examples – which may impact on firm performance, 
there are still concerns that corporate Islamic debt is not performing as well as 
government issues. 
 
2) The frequency of Islamic debt issuance and ROE 
Column III (REG 2) provides the results for the second regression. There is no 
change of the coefficient sign and coefficient significance for Islamic debt and 
non-Islamic debt as discussed in part one above. The coefficient for the first 
issuance of Islamic debt is a positive and significant at 10% level of significance, 
suggesting that the first issuance of Islamic debt affects positively on firm 
performance. This finding is also similar with the finding for Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
The positive result might be due to Islamic debt being cheaper and less volatile 
than conventional issuances, therefore investors favour it. Moreover, Islamic debt 
gives issuers access to high liquidity and a wide investor base, and hence the 
management of the firm has a responsibility to boost their performance and 
generate profits. 
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The coefficient for the second issuance of Islamic debt is a negative and 
significant at 10% level of significance, suggesting that the second issuance of 
Islamic debt lowers firm performance. This finding is also similar with the finding 
for Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
 
3) The proportion of Islamic debt issued and ROE 
Coloum IV (REG 3) provides the results for the third regression. The coefficients 
for Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt proportion are still a positive and significant. 
There are also no changes for the frequency of Islamic debt issuance coefficients 
as discussed in point two above. The coefficient for the Islamic debt proportion 
below the average is a positive but not significant, suggesting that smaller 
amounts of Islamic debt has no impact on firm performance. As discussed 
previously, there are considerable costs issuers have to pay in issuing debt and 
Islamic deb, and if the amounts issued are smaller, then they have to off-set the 
net benefit of having Islamic debt (see explanation in section three for Tobin’s Q 
and ROA). This finding is in contrast with group 1. 
 
The coefficient for Islamic debt proportion at the average is a positive and 
significant at 10% level of significance. The result may indicate that the greater 
the Islamic debt, the higher the firm performance; as can be seen from the 
coefficient significance change of no impact on firm performance when Islamic 
debt is issued below the average to generating higher performance in a firm when  
the Islamic debt is issued at the average. This finding can, again, be better 
explained by asymmetric information theory. According to asymmetric 
information theory that investors consider larger debt levels as a signal of higher 
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quality, because managers of low-quality firms do not imitate higher-quality firms 
by issuing more debt. Moreover, lower-quality firms have higher marginal 
expected bankruptcy costs for any level of debt. The result for Islamic debt 
proportion above the average is omitted automatically due to collinearity. 
 
4) The type of Islamic debt and ROE 
Column V (REG 4) provides the results for all four categories for explanatory 
variables and all control variables. There are no changes in terms of significance 
and sign for the debt structure of the firm, the frequency of Islamic debt issued, 
the proportion of Islamic debt issued, but only slight changes on the coefficients 
value (see explanation on section one, two and three above). In the sample, there 
are only two types of Islamic debt issued, asset-type and equity-type, which count 
71.43% and 28.57% respectively. The coefficient of asset-type is a positive and 
significant at 5% level of significance, suggesting that asset-type creates higher 
firm performance. Meanwhile, the coefficient for equity-type is a positive but not 
significant, suggesting that equity-type has no impact on firm performance. This 
finding is slightly different than the finding for Tobin’s Q.  
 
The coefficient for firm size is a negative and significant for all four regression 
equations, suggesting that bigger firms which have Islamic debt in their debt 
structure have a lower firm performance. Again, the negative result may be due to 
the fact that bigger firms, are already well-stabilised in terms of cash flows and 
profits because of their well-stabilised capital structure and changing their capital 
structure with a new unproven instrument may endanger the firm’s credibility and 
ability to maintain their stable cash flows and profits.  
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For the year effect, only the coefficient for year 2007 is a significant but negative. 
Although the index of business activities is a positive which indicates there was 
an expansion of economic activities during the year, the global financial crisis 
seems to have affected the Indonesian economy and business activities 
(Indonesian Bank, 2007). 
 
Table 5.16 provides the summary of the regression results for three dependent 
variables. For all three regression equations, there are only slight differences in 
the coefficient value. All the coefficient signs and significance values reveal the 
same direction and slightly similar significance value. In sum, the findings for all 
three categories of explanatory variables along with their control variables for all 
metrics (Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE) are almost identical. The Islamic debt has a 
positive and significant impact on firm performance while non-Islamic debt has 
no significant impact on firm performance. Overall, the findings for Tobin’s Q, 
ROA and ROE support the trade-off theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; 
DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Haris & Raviv, 1990; 
Frank & Goyal, 2003), but are in contrast to the study by Ang, Fatemi and 
Tourani-Rad (1997), which finds weak support for the trade-off theory for 
Indonesia. As such, it would appear that the trade-off theory can also be applied to 
Islamic debt. 
 
Table 5.17 provides the regression summary for group 1 and group 2 using all 
four categories of explanatory variables and all control variables. The findings for 
all categories for group 1 are similar to findings for group 2. Moreover, the result 
for the effect of a firm’s size effect is similar for both groups, but this is not the 
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case for the effect of the year. The different results between group 1 and group 2 
for the year effect might be caused by the different policies implemented in each 
country, the different structure of the market in each nation and of course, the 
different events happening in  each location.  
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Table 5.16: Summary of the panel corrected standard error regression result for 
group 2 
Variables 
PCSE 
Tobin’s Q ROA ROE 
Constant 12.1986*** 58.1687** 4.2698** 
  (1.0423) (30.30046) (2.0060) 
The debt structure of the firm       
Islamic Debt Proportion 13.0124* 9.3563* 59.4498* 
  (21.6586) (616.498) (44.7229) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion -0.3963 -12.0781 -0.1835 
  (0.6349) (9.4287) (0.7250) 
The frequency of Islamic debt issuance       
D1_First Issuance (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
        
D2_Second Issuance -0.5259** -3.7532* -0.6966* 
  (0.2569) (4.8020) (0.2421) 
The proportion of Islamic debt issued       
D1_ID Below Average 0.2260 0.1491 0.8200 
  (0.3578) (7.8630) (0.5260) 
D2_ID Average (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
        
D3_ID Above Average (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
        
The type of Islamic debt issued       
D1_Debt Type of ID (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
        
D2_Asset Type of ID (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
  
 
  
D3_Equity Type of ID 0.4784*** 1.9361 0.1759 
  (0.1185) (5.6142) (0.4690) 
Control Variables       
Size effect       
Firm Size -1.7834*** -9.3496* -0.8710** 
  (0.1692) (5.2432) (0.4076) 
Year effect       
Year 2003 1.4234*** 15.7773* 1.2554 
  (0.2180) (9.3636) (0.8577) 
Year 2004 0.4472*** 6.1600 0.8507 
  (0.1756) (8.9862) (0.7865) 
Year 2005 -0.7130*** -13.3142 -0.2642 
  (0.1881) (11.8880) (0.1741) 
Year 2007 -0.1215 -5.1519 -0.5631* 
  (0.2882) (4.6370) (0.3891) 
Year 2008 -0.0266 -3.0388 -0.1947 
  (0.1298) (2.6630) (0.1739) 
Year 2009 0.1231 3.0880 0.2559 
  (1.2680) (5.0709) (0.2527) 
R-squared 0.2973 0.2700 0.2950 
Wald chi2, Prob.>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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Table 5.17: Summary of the regression result for group 1 and group 2 
Variables 
Tobin’s Q ROA ROE 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 
L1 0.5742*** - 0.1220*** - 0.1547*** - 
  (0.0174)   (0.0041)   (0.0015)   
Constant 0.3180*** 12.1986*** 8.7500*** 58.1687** 0.8463** 4.2698** 
  (0.0988) (1.0423) (0.0410) (30.30046) (0.4264) (2.0060) 
The debt structure of the firm             
Islamic Debt Proportion 0.7441*** 13.0124* 0.0159*** 9.3563* 0.0276** 59.4498* 
  (0.0723) (21.6586) (0.0025) (616.498) (0.2540) (44.7229) 
Non-Islamic Debt Proportion 0.5372*** -0.3963 0.0177*** -12.0781 0.3357*** -0.1835 
  (0.0159) (0.6349) (0.0015) (9.4287) (0.0544) (0.7250) 
The frequency of Islamic debt 
issuance             
D1_First Issuance (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
              
D2_Second Issuance -0.0961* -0.5259** -0.0774*** -3.7532 -0.7018*** -0.6966* 
  (0.0951) (0.2569) (0.0140) (4.8020) (0.2332) (0.2421) 
D3_More Than 2 Issuance 0.2090*** - 0.0323*** - 1.2480*** - 
  (0.0562)   (0.0026)   (0.1135)   
The proportion of Islamic 
debt issued             
D1_ID Below Average -0.0006 0.2260 0.0181*** 0.1491 0.1319* -0.8200 
  (0.0129) (0.3578) (0.0010) (7.8630) (0.1146) (0.5260) 
D2_ID Average (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
              
D3_ID Above Average -0.0248** (Omitted) -0.0036*** (Omitted) -0.0135** (Omitted) 
  (0.0111)   (0.0010)   (0.1266)   
The type of Islamic debt 
issued             
D1_Debt Type of ID (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
              
D2_Asset Type of ID 0.0423 (Omitted) 0.0250*** (Omitted) 0.3337 (Omitted) 
  (0.1076)   (0.0074)   (0.2695)   
D3_Equity Type of ID 0.1764* 0.4784*** 0.0346*** 1.9361 1.0458*** 0.1759 
  (0.1049) (0.1185) (0.0027) (5.6142) (0.0532) (0.4690) 
Control Variables             
Size effect             
Firm Size -0.0844*** -1.7834*** -0.0040*** -9.3496* -0.2354*** -0.8710** 
  (0.0142) (0.1692) (0.0005) (5.2432) (0.0654) (0.4076) 
Year effect             
Year 2001 -1.5848* - -0.0169* - -0.5066*** - 
  (0.9510)   (0.0097)   (0.1019)   
Year 2003 0.0458*** 1.4234*** 0.0092*** 15.7773* -0.0786* 1.2554 
  (0.0098) (0.2180) (0.0024) (9.3636) (0.0433) (0.8577) 
Year 2004 0.0130 0.4472*** 0.0173*** 6.1600 0.3969*** 0.8507 
  (0.0109) (0.1756) (0.0019) (8.9862) (0.0657) (0.7865) 
Year 2005 0.0171*** -0.7130*** 0.0058*** -13.3142 0.0981*** -0.2642 
  (0.0048) (0.1881) (0.0014) (11.8880) (0.0159) (0.1741) 
Year 2006 -0.0346*** - -0.0018*** - -0.0392*** - 
  (0.0072)   (0.0003)   (0.0078)   
Year 2007 0.1160*** -0.1215 0.0080*** -5.1519 -0.0889*** -0.5631* 
  (0.0177) (0.2882) (0.0020) (4.6370) (0.0298) (0.3891) 
Year 2008 0.0397* -0.0266 0.0017*** -3.0388 0.8061*** -0.1947 
  (0.0236) (0.1298) (0.0006) (2.6630) (0.1146) (0.1739) 
Year 2009 0.0587** -0.1231 0.0048*** 3.0880 0.7980** 0.2559 
  (0.0294) (1.2680) (0.0019) (5.0709) (2.8289) (0.2527) 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed and explored the results of the impact of Islamic debt 
on firm performance using a panel data analysis. There are four categories of 
explanatory variables; first, the debt structure of the firm which is Islamic debt 
and non-Islamic debt; second, the frequency of Islamic debt issuance which is 
divided into the first issuance, the second issuance, and issuances that number 
more than twice; third, the proportion of Islamic debt which is below, at the 
average, and above the average; fourth, the type of Islamic debt issued which is 
debt-type, asset-type and equity-type. Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE and EVA were the 
dependent variables used. The two control variables employed were firm size 
effect and year effect. 
 
Overall, this study finds that Islamic debt has a positive and significant impact on 
firm value and/or firm financial performance. This positive and significant finding 
for group 1 and group 2 supports the trade-off theory. In particular, the first 
issuance of Islamic debt and all types of Islamic debt have a positive and 
significant impact on firm value and/or firm financial performance. Moreover, the 
proportion of Islamic debt at the average represents the best likelihood of 
affecting higher firm value and/or firm financial performance. 
 
Furthermore, compared to non-Islamic debt, Islamic debt has a greater impact on 
affecting the higher value of a firm and/or the firm financial performance for 
group 1. Meanwhile for group 2, only Islamic debt has a positive and significant 
impact in affecting the higher value of a firm and/or the firm’s financial 
performance. 
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The next chapter reports the results for the event study analysis and discusses 
these results. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIC DEBT 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the market reaction toward the 
Islamic debt issue announcement for Malaysia and Indonesia. As previously noted, 
Malaysia is referred to as group 1 and Indonesia is referred to as group 2. This 
chapter has three sections: first, the result of the event study analysis; second, the 
result for the unit root test; third, a summary of the results. The first section is 
divided into two parts: first, the results for average abnormal return and 
cumulative abnormal return; and second, the t-test results for CAAR. The second 
section provides the results for the unit root test. After having examining the 
evidence of the existence of abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date 
and the event date, this study investigates whether the price movements are 
predictable or not. 
 
6.1 EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS RESULTS 
6.1.1 AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN AND CUMULATIVE AVERAGE 
ABNORMAL RETURN 
6.1.1.1 AAR AND CAAR ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT DATE, ONE DAY 
PRIOR TO AND AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
Two different timeframes were used to observe the impact of the event date when 
firms announced their issuance of Islamic debt: the first is 3 days (-1 to +1), and 
the second is 31 days (-15 to +15). Table 6.1, Table 6.2, Table 6.3, Table 6.4, 
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Table 6.5 and Table 6.6provide the result for the 3 day time span, and Table 6.7, 
Table 6.8, Table 6.9, Table 6.10, Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 provide the result for 
the 31 day time span. For each span, the results provided are for group 1 and 
group 2. Furthermore, for each group, there are three different results provided 
according to the abnormal return benchmarks used in this study (mean adjusted 
return, market adjusted return and market model return). 
 
Table 6.1 shows the impact of the Islamic debt announcements using the mean 
adjusted return for group 1. The effect of the announcement is a negative and 
significant for both AAR and CAAR. Furthermore, the result for one day prior to 
the announcement is a positive but not significant, and one day after the 
announcement is a negative and significant. 
Table 6.1: Mean adjusted return for group 1 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-1 0.0009 0.9891 0.0009 0.9891 
0 -0.0043 -5.9488 -0.0034 -4.7527 
1 0.0016 1.7627 -0.0018 -1.9381 
 
Table 6.2 shows the impact of the Islamic debt announcements using the market 
adjusted return for group 1. The effect of the announcement is a negative and 
significant for both AAR and CAAR. Furthermore, the result for one day prior to 
and one day after the announcement is a positive and significant. 
Table 6.2: Market adjusted return for group 1 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-1 0.0017 1.6779 0.0017 1.6779 
0 -0.0024 -3.4968 -0.0006 -0.9381 
1 0.0025 2.9363 0.0018 2.1708 
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Table 6.3 shows the impact of the Islamic debt announcements using the mean 
adjusted return for group 1. The effect of the announcement is a negative and 
significant for both AAR and CAAR. Furthermore, the result for one day prior to 
the announcement is a positive and significant, and one day after the 
announcement is a positive but not significant. 
Table 6.3: Market model return for group 1 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-1 0.0020 2.0198 0.0020 2.0198 
0 -0.0023 -3.4123 -0.0003 -0.4974 
1 0.0011 1.1575 0.0007 0.7899 
 
Overall, a negative and significant finding obtained at the announcement date 
using three benchmarks return model for group 1 support the negative impact 
hypothesis, proposed by the likes of Miller and Rock (1985), Myers and Majluf 
(1984), and Covits and Harrison (1999). According to this theory, the 
announcement of risky debt should have a negative impact on a firm’s market 
value. Islamic debt is claimed as more secure than conventional debt since most of 
the contract is based on the underlying assets or partnership; however, this gives 
no guarantee that the Islamic debt is free from the risk of being defaulted. 
Moreover, since Islamic debt is viewed as a new instrument, the markets have a 
lack of experience in utilising it and they therefore lack a strong belief that they 
will earn profits. Furthermore, there might be an adverse selection mechanism 
which favours the use of Islamic debt by lower-quality debtor companies 
(Godlewski et al., 2010). 
 
In addition, this negative finding is similar to the study by Godlewski et al. (2010) 
which finds a negative and significant stock market reaction to the announcement 
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of Islamic debt issuance. In addition, Modirzadehbami and Mansourfar (2010 and 
2011) also find that at the announcement date of Islamic debt issuance, the return 
is a negative; however, their result is not significant. Although this finding 
supports the negative impact hypothesis, this finding is in contrast with the 
finding find by Ashhari et al. (2009) which found that the Islamic debt 
announcement has a positive and significant impact on shareholders’ wealth. In 
addition, Ibrahim and Minai (2009) also find a positive but not significant impact. 
The different results obtained may be due to the different periods of observation 
time employed and the different number of samples used. 
 
Table 6.4 shows the impact of the Islamic debt announcements using the mean 
adjusted return for group 2. The effect of the announcement is a positive and 
significant for both AAR and CAAR. Furthermore, the result for one day prior to 
and one day after the announcement is a positive and significant. In addition, this 
finding for group 2 is in contrast with group 1 in that it yields a negative finding. 
Table 6.4: Mean adjusted return for group 2 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-1 -0.0068 -7.4828 -0.0068 -7.4828 
0 0.0135 12.6455 0.0066 6.2256 
1 0.0054 24.5262 0.0120 54.5466 
 
Table 6.5 shows the impact of the Islamic debt announcements using the market 
adjusted return for group 2. The effect of the announcement is a positive and 
significant for both AAR and CAAR. Furthermore, the result for one day prior to 
and one day after the announcement is a positive and significant. In addition, this 
finding for group 2 is in contrast with group 1 in that it yields a negative finding. 
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Table 6.5: Market adjusted return for group 2 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-1 0.0032 2.7924 0.0032 2.7924 
0 0.0083 8.5134 0.0115 11.8625 
1 0.0017 5.9595 0.0132 47.4296 
 
Table 6.6 shows the impact of the Islamic debt announcements using the market 
model return for group 2. The effect of the announcement is a positive and 
significant for both AAR and CAAR. Furthermore, the result for one day prior to 
the announcement is a negative and significant, and one day after the 
announcement is a positive and significant. In addition, this finding for group 2 is 
in contrast with group 1 in that it yields a negative finding. 
Table 6.6: Market model return for group 2 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-1 -0.0055 -6.9447 -0.0055 -6.9447 
0 0.0122 13.3129 0.0066 7.2478 
1 0.0024 9.6192 0.0090 35.9052 
 
Overall, a positive and significant finding obtained at the announcement date 
using three benchmarks return model for group 2 supports the positive impact 
hypothesis, proposed by the likes of Modigliani and Miller (1963), Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973), Brennan and Schwartz (1978), DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1976), Myers (1977), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Leland and Pyle (1977). 
According to this theory, the announcement of debt has a positive impact on a 
firm’s market value. The positive impact might be (1) the result of a tax shield 
generated by debt that makes the value of the company increase with the 
proportion of debt over assets (Modigliani & Miller, 1963), (2) the trade-off 
between a tax advantage and a cost of financial distress (Kraus & Litzenberger, 
1973; Brennan & Schwartz, 1978; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980), (3) the trade-off 
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between a tax advantage of debt and agency costs and adverse managerial effects 
of debt (Myers, 1977), (4) the trade-off between agency costs of debt and agency 
costs of equity (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), (5) information asymmetries where 
managers have superior information relative to the investors (Leland & Pyle, 1977; 
Heinkel, 1982). 
 
6.1.1.2 AAR AND CAAR ON 15 DAYS PRIOR TO AND 15 DAYS AFTER 
THE ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
This section discusses the impact of the announcement for the longer timeframe of 
31 days (-15 to +15). Table 6.7 shows the impact of Islamic debt announcement 
using the mean adjusted return model. The effect of the announcement is a 
negative and significant for AAR and CAAR on the event day. As noted 
previously, the 31 day span of the event window ranges between -15 to +15, and 
during this time span, only -14 day and +12, +13, +15 day are not significant. One 
day before and after the announcement, the AAR is a positive and significant, but 
this is not the case for CAAR. However, the AAR is a negative start from the 
second day after the announcement until day five, and this may be caused by the 
pessimistic reaction of the market towards this new type of debt, hereafter the 
AAR fluctuates. The individual days prior to and following the announcement and 
their respective cumulative abnormal returns are significant from zero, therefore 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. The significant results of the CAAR over -15 
to +15 may suggest that the issuance information was leaked to the market prior to 
the announcement on the stock exchange. The positive return prior the 
announcement date continues to record a positive return after the announcement 
date until day one. 
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Table 6.8 shows the impact of Islamic debt announcement using the market 
adjusted return model. The effect of the announcement is a negative and 
significant for AAR but a positive and significant for CAAR on the event day. 
The span of the event window ranges between -15 to +15, and during this span, 
only -11 day and +11 day are not significant. One day before and after the 
announcement, the AAR and CAAR is a positive and significant. However, the 
AAR is a negative start from the second day after the announcement until day five, 
and this may be caused by the pessimistic reaction of the market to this new type 
of debt, hereafter the AAR fluctuates. The individual days prior to and following 
the announcement and their respective cumulative abnormal returns are significant 
from zero, therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. The significant results of 
the CAAR over -15 to +15 may suggest that the issuance information was leaked 
to the market prior to the announcement on the stock exchange. The positive 
return prior to the announcement date continues to record a positive return after 
the announcement date until day one.  
 
Table 6.9 shows the impact of Islamic debt announcement using the market model 
return. The effect of the announcement is a negative and significant for AAR but a 
positive and significant for CAAR on the event day. The event window spans -15 
to +15, and during this span, only +5 day is not significant. One day before and 
after the announcement, the AAR and CAAR is a positive and significant. 
However, the AAR is a negative start from the third day after the announcement 
until day five, and this again may be caused by the market’s pessimistic reaction 
to this new type of debt, hereafter the AAR fluctuates. The individual days prior 
to and following the announcement and their respective cumulative abnormal 
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returns are significant from zero, therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
The significant results of the CAAR over -15 to +15 may suggest that the issuance 
information was leaked to the market prior to the announcement on the stock 
exchange. The positive return prior the announcement date continues to record a 
positive return after the announcement date until day one.  
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Table 6.7: Mean adjusted return for group 1 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-15 -0.0013 -2.5986 -0.0013 -2.5986 
-14 0.0009 1.4829 -0.0004 -0.6036 
-13 -0.0032 -6.2209 -0.0035 -6.9674 
-12 -0.0028 -4.6714 -0.0063 -10.5512 
-11 -0.0039 -5.6991 -0.0103 -14.9282 
-10 0.0018 2.1083 -0.0085 -10.0456 
-9 -0.0056 -15.1405 -0.0141 -38.2162 
-8 0.0014 2.5342 -0.0127 -22.8285 
-7 -0.0025 -3.0307 -0.0151 -18.5702 
-6 -0.0006 -1.2477 -0.0158 -30.7434 
-5 0.0005 0.6286 -0.0153 -19.8011 
-4 0.0021 2.6586 -0.0132 -16.7137 
-3 0.0018 1.3728 -0.0114 -8.7595 
-2 -0.0012 -1.4043 -0.0126 -15.0344 
-1 0.0009 0.9891 -0.0117 -13.4328 
0 -0.0043 -5.9488 -0.0160 -22.1930 
1 0.0016 1.7627 -0.0144 -15.5187 
2 -0.0023 -1.9003 -0.0167 -13.7170 
3 -0.0038 -6.9317 -0.0205 -37.0393 
4 -0.0019 -1.9058 -0.0224 -22.4661 
5 -0.0039 -5.3430 -0.0263 -36.0375 
6 0.0016 2.3763 -0.0247 -36.0886 
7 -0.0072 -11.8655 -0.0318 -52.7749 
8 -0.0015 -1.9462 -0.0334 -42.0530 
9 -0.0033 -5.6778 -0.0367 -62.9781 
10 0.0027 2.3686 -0.0340 -29.6895 
11 -0.0024 -2.3793 -0.0364 -35.8658 
12 0.0554 0.2400 0.0190 0.0824 
13 -0.0151 -1.2233 0.0040 0.3222 
14 -0.0017 -1.7921 0.0023 2.3554 
15 -0.0025 -2.1384 -0.0003 -0.2425 
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Table 6.8: Market adjusted return for group 1 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-15 0.0009 2.4280 0.0009 2.4280 
-14 0.0032 6.6218 0.0041 8.4016 
-13 -0.0021 -5.1418 0.0020 4.9681 
-12 -0.0006 -1.2318 0.0014 2.7539 
-11 -0.0023 -2.7950 -0.0010 -1.1472 
-10 0.0024 3.6430 0.0014 2.1621 
-9 -0.0028 -6.5567 -0.0014 -3.2828 
-8 0.0036 7.8610 0.0022 4.7963 
-7 -0.0011 -1.7270 0.0011 1.6015 
-6 0.0008 1.6079 0.0019 3.6908 
-5 0.0035 4.3570 0.0054 6.6999 
-4 0.0047 6.4922 0.0101 13.8303 
-3 0.0029 2.4619 0.0130 11.0366 
-2 -0.0015 -2.8002 0.0115 21.0900 
-1 0.0017 1.6779 0.0132 12.7012 
0 -0.0024 -3.4968 0.0108 15.8722 
1 0.0025 2.9363 0.0133 15.8884 
2 -0.0003 -0.3141 0.0130 14.7264 
3 -0.0002 -0.3309 0.0128 23.8679 
4 -0.0007 -0.6830 0.0121 11.8556 
5 -0.0017 -1.9810 0.0105 12.4168 
6 0.0032 5.8946 0.0137 25.2635 
7 -0.0055 -11.8384 0.0082 17.6310 
8 0.0013 1.9520 0.0095 13.9477 
9 -0.0022 -4.1112 0.0073 13.4494 
10 0.0051 5.0479 0.0124 12.2561 
11 -0.0012 -1.5158 0.0111 13.7340 
12 0.0574 0.2360 0.0685 0.2818 
13 -0.0119 -1.1801 0.0567 5.6325 
14 0.0004 0.4676 0.0570 69.9866 
15 -0.0001 -0.0889 0.0569 45.6985 
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Table 6.9: Market model return for group 1 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-15 -0.0007 -1.3365 -0.0007 -1.3365 
-14 0.0031 6.1332 0.0024 4.7117 
-13 -0.0018 -6.3987 0.0005 1.9148 
-12 -0.0020 -5.1060 -0.0014 -3.6898 
-11 -0.0026 -5.1155 -0.0040 -7.8974 
-10 0.0030 4.5322 -0.0010 -1.5219 
-9 -0.0045 -21.1072 -0.0056 -25.8294 
-8 0.0022 6.1316 -0.0034 -9.6831 
-7 -0.0017 -2.6093 -0.0051 -7.8602 
-6 0.0009 2.7303 -0.0041 -11.9515 
-5 0.0018 3.1372 -0.0024 -4.2337 
-4 0.0038 6.6940 0.0014 2.4901 
-3 0.0044 3.7620 0.0058 4.9785 
-2 0.0000 0.0537 0.0058 12.2155 
-1 0.0020 2.0198 0.0077 8.0013 
0 -0.0023 -3.4123 0.0055 8.1354 
1 0.0011 1.1575 0.0065 7.1694 
2 0.0001 0.1324 0.0066 7.7680 
3 -0.0035 -7.6934 0.0032 6.9916 
4 -0.0001 -0.1602 0.0030 3.4686 
5 -0.0026 -3.8471 0.0005 0.6904 
6 0.0025 5.1911 0.0029 6.1479 
7 -0.0087 -10.1003 -0.0058 -6.6895 
8 -0.0001 -0.1060 -0.0058 -9.6688 
9 -0.0016 -3.5896 -0.0074 -16.6547 
10 0.0041 4.3621 -0.0033 -3.5616 
11 -0.0008 -0.9776 -0.0041 -5.3240 
12 -0.0037 -7.6604 -0.0078 -16.0688 
13 -0.0009 -2.8282 -0.0088 -26.3189 
14 -0.0013 -1.4660 -0.0101 -11.0447 
15 -0.0009 -0.9040 -0.0111 -10.7580 
 
 
Overall, a negative and significant finding obtained at the announcement date 
using three benchmarks return model for group 1 support the negative impact 
hypotheses proposed by scholars such as Miller and Rock (1985), Myers and 
Majluf (1984), and Covitz and Harrison (1999). The negative result is caused by 
the asymmetric information where uninformed investors will ask for a discount to 
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hedge against the risk of buying an overvalued security. However, CAAR is 
positive which may suggest the positive impact hypotheses at work. This theory 
suggests that an issuance of debt should generate a positive abnormal return. 
 
The next table 6.10 shows the impact of Islamic debt announcement using the 
mean adjusted return for group 2. The effect of the announcement is a positive 
and significant for AAR but a negative and significant for CAAR on the event day. 
The event window spans -15 to +15, and during this span, only -10, -9, +2 and +5 
are significant for AAR, while +12 and +15 were significant days for CAAR. One 
day before the announcement, the AAR is a negative and significant, while the 
day after the announcement, the AAR is a positive and significant. For CAAR, the 
day before and after the announcement, is a negative and significant. However, 
the AAR is a negative start from the third day until one day before the 
announcement, and this may be caused by the pessimistic market reaction to this 
new type of debt as two days after the announcement the AAR fluctuates. All the 
days for the CAAR is a negative and mostly significant except +12 and +15.The 
individual days before and after the announcement and their respective cumulative 
abnormal returns are significant from zero, therefore the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. The significant results of the CAAR over -15 to +15 may suggest that the 
issuance information was leaked to the market prior to the announcement on the 
stock exchange. The positive return prior to the announcement date continues to 
remain positive after the announcement date until day one.  
 
Table 6.11 shows the impact of Islamic debt announcement using the market 
adjusted return for group 2. The effect of the announcement is a positive and 
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significant for AAR but a negative and significant for CAAR on the event day. 
The event window spans -15 to +15, and during this span, only days +12 and +14 
are not significant for CAAR. One day before and after the announcement, the 
AAR is a positive and significant; one day before and after the announcement, the 
CAAR is a negative and significant. However, the AAR is a negative start from 
the third day until the second day before the announcement, and this may be 
caused by the market’s pessimistic reaction to this new type of debt. Two days 
after the announcement day the AAR fluctuates. The majority of the CAAR is a 
negative and mostly significant except days +12 and +14. The individual days 
before and after the announcement and their respective cumulative abnormal 
returns are significant from zero, therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
The significant results of the CAAR over -15 to +15 may suggest that the issuance 
information was leaked to the market prior to the announcement on the stock 
exchange. The positive return prior to the announcement date continues to record 
a positive return after the announcement date until day one. 
 
Table 6.12 shows the impact of Islamic debt announcement using the market 
model return for group 2. The effect of the announcement is a positive and 
significant for AAR but a negative and significant for CAAR on the event day. 
The event window spans -15 to +15, and during this span, only days +12 and +15 
are not significant for CAAR. One day before the announcement, the AAR is a 
negative and significant, while one day after the announcement, the AAR is a 
positive and significant. For CAAR, one day before and after the announcement, 
is a negative and significant. However, the AAR is a negative start from the 
seventh day until one day before the announcement, and this may be caused by 
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the market’s pessimistic reaction to this new type of debt. Two days after the 
announcement the AAR fluctuates. With the exception of days +12 and +15, all 
the days for CAAR were a negative and significant. The individual days prior to 
and following the announcement and their respective cumulative abnormal returns 
are significant from zero, therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. The 
significant results of the CAAR over -15 to +15 may suggest that the issuance 
information was leaked to the market prior to the announcement on the stock 
exchange. The positive return prior to the announcement date continues to record 
a positive return after the announcement date until day one.  
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Table 6.10: Mean adjusted return for group 2 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-15 -0.0011 -7.8984 -0.0011 -7.8984 
-14 -0.0036 -17.9264 -0.0047 -23.4273 
-13 -0.0036 -11.4295 -0.0083 -26.5458 
-12 -0.0084 -30.8031 -0.0167 -61.1024 
-11 -0.0045 -6.8777 -0.0211 -32.3785 
-10 -0.0004 -0.3213 -0.0215 -18.2492 
-9 0.0018 1.3873 -0.0198 -15.4670 
-8 0.0061 10.2206 -0.0136 -22.7040 
-7 -0.0041 -5.1542 -0.0177 -22.3187 
-6 -0.0039 -14.2592 -0.0216 -79.5517 
-5 -0.0105 -33.3984 -0.0321 -102.2182 
-4 0.0106 9.1860 -0.0215 -18.6523 
-3 -0.0157 -32.1999 -0.0372 -76.1794 
-2 -0.0046 -11.8627 -0.0418 -107.7259 
-1 -0.0068 -7.4828 -0.0486 -53.2801 
0 0.0135 12.6455 -0.0352 -33.0662 
1 0.0054 24.5262 -0.0298 -134.9222 
2 0.0005 0.4631 -0.0292 -25.5225 
3 -0.0089 -30.9427 -0.0381 -132.4791 
4 0.0134 18.4918 -0.0247 -34.0270 
5 0.0004 0.8015 -0.0243 -52.5765 
6 0.0071 8.3649 -0.0172 -20.1556 
7 -0.0039 -4.2912 -0.0211 -23.4108 
8 -0.0147 -9.6830 -0.0358 -23.5591 
9 0.0058 6.5987 -0.0300 -34.3890 
10 -0.0021 -5.4073 -0.0321 -83.0432 
11 0.0051 10.3817 -0.0270 -54.7886 
12 0.0292 3.5120 0.0022 0.2662 
13 -0.0090 -8.1723 -0.0068 -6.1567 
14 0.0139 5.3941 0.0072 2.7807 
15 -0.0072 -13.4678 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 6.11: Market adjusted return for group 2 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-15 -0.0055 -10.3771 -0.0055 -10.3771 
-14 0.0003 1.3251 -0.0052 -22.3575 
-13 -0.0147 -27.2127 -0.0198 -36.7818 
-12 -0.0073 -18.0700 -0.0271 -67.1483 
-11 -0.0033 -4.2035 -0.0304 -38.8058 
-10 -0.0005 -0.3838 -0.0309 -25.1677 
-9 0.0055 3.6151 -0.0254 -16.6951 
-8 0.0094 14.0991 -0.0160 -23.8819 
-7 -0.0033 -4.0216 -0.0192 -23.7403 
-6 -0.0082 -18.3435 -0.0274 -61.5921 
-5 -0.0028 -7.7156 -0.0303 -81.8997 
-4 0.0103 7.4827 -0.0199 -14.4850 
-3 -0.0144 -41.5483 -0.0344 -98.9847 
-2 -0.0002 -0.2846 -0.0346 -54.7967 
-1 0.0032 2.7924 -0.0313 -26.9123 
0 0.0083 8.5134 -0.0230 -23.7635 
1 0.0017 5.9595 -0.0214 -77.1159 
2 -0.0060 -10.3050 -0.0274 -46.8361 
3 -0.0034 -11.0328 -0.0308 -100.5416 
4 0.0131 10.4809 -0.0177 -14.1827 
5 -0.0013 -1.7201 -0.0190 -24.9765 
6 -0.0013 -1.6704 -0.0203 -26.2202 
7 -0.0042 -8.0298 -0.0245 -46.8003 
8 -0.0042 -2.1964 -0.0288 -14.9470 
9 0.0000 -0.0185 -0.0288 -19.5341 
10 -0.0032 -4.7707 -0.0320 -48.0150 
11 0.0005 0.7145 -0.0314 -42.9878 
12 0.0349 3.4521 0.0035 0.3414 
13 -0.0046 -4.3272 -0.0012 -1.0915 
14 0.0038 1.4062 0.0026 0.9703 
15 -0.0066 -7.6545 -0.0041 -4.6718 
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Table 6.12: Market model return for group 2 
Day AAR t-value CAAR t-value 
-15 -0.0024 -18.5433 -0.0024 -18.5433 
-14 -0.0012 -8.8654 -0.0036 -27.0442 
-13 -0.0071 -17.7425 -0.0107 -26.7877 
-12 -0.0095 -35.1621 -0.0202 -74.6269 
-11 -0.0040 -7.0045 -0.0242 -42.3389 
-10 0.0002 0.1382 -0.0241 -20.8462 
-9 0.0037 2.8435 -0.0203 -15.5833 
-8 0.0053 10.4503 -0.0150 -29.3657 
-7 -0.0061 -6.1237 -0.0211 -21.1668 
-6 -0.0018 -5.8329 -0.0229 -74.2082 
-5 -0.0096 -29.3868 -0.0326 -99.1589 
-4 0.0104 11.3986 -0.0221 -24.1578 
-3 -0.0132 -29.8330 -0.0353 -79.9159 
-2 -0.0036 -7.6108 -0.0389 -81.8804 
-1 -0.0055 -6.9447 -0.0445 -55.7044 
0 0.0122 13.3129 -0.0323 -35.3368 
1 0.0024 9.6192 -0.0299 -118.5398 
2 0.0023 2.2235 -0.0275 -26.1249 
3 -0.0088 -32.2693 -0.0363 -133.1834 
4 0.0130 18.0106 -0.0234 -32.4157 
5 0.0037 9.0187 -0.0196 -47.1599 
6 0.0053 5.3250 -0.0143 -14.4128 
7 -0.0056 -6.8014 -0.0199 -24.2350 
8 -0.0154 -10.9480 -0.0353 -25.1346 
9 0.0058 6.9808 -0.0295 -35.8171 
10 -0.0009 -1.7197 -0.0304 -60.3769 
11 0.0036 6.0264 -0.0268 -45.0314 
12 0.0287 3.9028 0.0019 0.2639 
13 -0.0087 -5.7055 -0.0067 -4.4269 
14 0.0114 4.6497 0.0047 1.9164 
15 -0.0047 -8.3281 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
Overall, a positive and significant finding obtained at the announcement date 
using three benchmarks return model for group 2 supports the positive impact 
hypotheses (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Brennan & 
Schwartz, 1978; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980, Myers, 1977; Jensen & Meckling, 
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1976, Leland & Pyle, 1977). In addition, in Indonesia there is more demand than 
Islamic debt supply and this triggers the higher pricing. However, the CAAR is a 
negative, and this negative result might be caused by several factors. Firstly, the 
development of Islamic finance has received minimal commitment and support 
from the Indonesian government at all levels. Secondly, there is a lack of Islamic 
finance legal frameworks, therefore market players are hesitant and choose to wait 
and see until they are sure about the government’s position. Thirdly, Islamic 
finance in Indonesia has no Islamic finance governance which regulates the policy 
and benchmark for the Islamic finance industry. Fourthly, asymmetric information 
encourages uninformed investors to ask for a discount in order to hedge against 
the risk of buying an overvalued security. Finally, the market players in Indonesia 
tend to use a buy and hold strategy because of the thin trading. 
 
6.1.2 T-TEST FOR CAAR 
Table 6.13 provides the t-test for CAAR. Using the 31 days, 21 days, 11 days, 7 
days and 3 days event windows, every span, apart from the 21 day span, revealed 
that there is no wealth effect to the shareholders of firms offering Islamic debt. 
This result supports the unit root test result that the market is efficient. In contrast 
with group 1, every span apart from the 3 day span revealed that the 
announcement of Islamic debt had a significant impact. However, the effect is one 
that sees the reduction of the wealth of shareholders of firms offering Islamic debt. 
This result supports the unit root test result that the market is inefficient in the 
context of weak form. 
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Table 6.13: t-test for CAAR 
Interval 
(days) 
Group 1 Group 2 
CAAR p-value CAAR p-value 
-15 to +15 -0.0041 0.2696 -0.0230 0.0000*** 
-10 to +10 -0.0133 0.0106*** -0.0034 0.0855* 
-5 to +5 -0.0068 0.2959 -0.0089 0.0049*** 
-3 to +3 -0.0069 0.3481 -0.0139 0.0010*** 
-1 to +1 -0.0037 0.5144 0.0036 0.5327 
 
6.2 UNIT ROOT TEST 
After examining the impact of Islamic debt announcement on the event date, the 
next section investigated whether the price movements are solely random or 
predictable. Table 6.14 shows the Unit Root Test results for group 1 and group 2. 
For a longer horizon, which is 120 days prior to the announcement, the result for 
group 1 is a significant for lag 0 and lag 1, which means the null hypotheses can 
be rejected. The result for a shorter horizon is also similar to the longer horizon, 
which is a significant for lag 0 and lag 1. These two results indicate that the 
market is efficient in the context of weak form hypotheses, suggesting that the 
price movements are unpredictable (has no trend). In contrast to the result for 
group 1, the result for group 2 for longer and shorter horizons is not significant for 
lag 0 and lag 1, which means the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. This suggests 
that the market is inefficient the context of weak form hypotheses. Therefore, the 
price movements are predictable (has a trend). This predictability for group 2 may 
be due to several reasons such as group 2 having thin trading compared to group 1. 
Other reasons may also include insider trading and high levels of information 
asymmetries. In addition, group 2 has a small sample, although this finding is 
consistent with previous work done by Fitriya (2009) which examines the market 
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efficiency of Indonesian Stock Exchange in the context of weak form hypotheses. 
This previous study had found that the Indonesian Stock Exchange is inefficient. 
Table 6.14: The Unit Root Test results 
  Group 1 Group 2 
  Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 0 Lag 1 
120 days -10.9620*** -7.2720*** -0.0150 -0.0950 
p-value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9572) (0.9499) 
14 days -3.6210*** -2.4650* -0.0920 -0.5580 
p-value (0.0054) (0.0924) (0.9502) (0.8801) 
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
The market reaction to new issues of securities has been the focus of interest in 
the last few decades. The majority of empirical investigations find that the 
announcement of new equity issuance has a negative average effect while new 
debt issue announcements have a positive average effect on stock prices. However, 
this reaction can be generating throughout the market and the entire environment 
posed for every country may be different. While a number of studies have 
focussed on conventional debt issuance, this study takes a different direction by 
investigating the impact of Islamic debt issue on stock price. This chapter 
provides the findings pertaining to the announcement of Islamic debt issuance. 
The analysis part comprises two sections: within the analysis part: first, the impact 
of the announcement on the event date, and second, whether the price movements 
are predictable or unpredictable. The unit root test is employed to examine 
whether the price movement is predictable or not. This test is solely provided to 
support the event study analysis results. Furthermore, the unit root test tested both 
longer horizons and shorter horizons, which are respectively 120 days and 14 days 
prior to the announcement. 
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The findings for event study analysis using three benchmarks reveal that there is a 
negative and significant impact for both AAR and CAAR for group 1. This 
negative finding supports the negative impact hypothesis. However, the findings 
one day prior to and after the announcement date for three benchmarks are slightly 
different. For the mean adjusted return, the result for one day prior to the 
announcement is a positive but not significant, and one day after the 
announcement is a negative and significant. For the market adjusted return, the 
result for one day prior to and one day after the announcement is a positive and 
significant. For the market model return, the result for one day prior to the 
announcement is a positive and significant, and one day after the announcement is 
a positive but not significant. This difference might be due to the different method 
of calculation employed. The mean adjusted return emphasises the book value 
while the market adjusted return and market model return emphasise the market 
value. 
 
In contrast to the findings for group 1, the impact of Islamic debt announcement 
using three benchmarks is a positive and significant for both AAR and CAAR for 
group 2. This positive finding supports the positive impact hypothesis. However, 
the findings one day prior to and after the announcement date for three 
benchmarks are slightly different. For the mean adjusted return, the result for one 
day prior to and one day after the announcement is a positive and significant. In 
addition, this finding for group 2 is in contrast with group 1 in that it yields a 
negative finding. For the market adjusted return, the result for one day prior to and 
one day after the announcement is a positive and significant. In addition, this 
finding for group 2 is in contrast with group 1 in that it yields a negative finding. 
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For the market model return, the result for one day prior to the announcement is a 
negative and significant, and one day after the announcement is a positive and 
significant. In addition, this finding for group 2 is in contrast with group 1 in that 
it yields a negative finding. 
 
Furthermore, the impact of the announcement for the event window spanning 31 
days (-15 to +15) is varied for the three benchmarks return used in this study. The 
results for this window span reveal that the majority of AAR and CAAR are a 
negative and significant. Furthermore, the results for AAR and CAAR in group 1 
are almost similar to the results found in group 2. 
 
The unit root test result for group 1 indicates that the market is efficient in the 
context of weak form efficiency, which suggests that the price movements are 
unpredictable. In contrast to group 1, the unit root test result for group 2 indicates 
that the market is inefficient in the context of weak form efficiency, which 
suggests that the price movements are predictable. 
 
The next chapter reports the results of the multivariate regression analysis for 
event study and discusses the results found for both groups. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIC DEBT 
CHARACTERISTICS, ISSUANCE FREQUENCY AND 
ISSUANCE TYPES, AND FIRM VALUE/FIRM FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE ON SHAREHOLDERS’ WEALTH 
 
 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the empirical results for the impact of the Islamic debt 
characteristics, Islamic debt issuance frequency and Islamic debt type, and the 
firm value/firm performance on the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) 
surrounding the announcement date for Malaysia and Indonesia. The multivariate 
regression analysis for event study is employed. There are five CAAR spans used 
in this study; CAAR -1 to +1, CAAR -3 to +3, CAAR -5 to +5, CAAR -10 to +10 
and CAAR -15 to +15. These five different CAAR spans are used as alternatives 
to observe the change of the impact. This study observes that the longer the span, 
the lower the strength of the result obtained, which may be due to some other 
factors affecting the stock price movements. As with earlier chapters, Malaysia is 
referred to as group 1 in this chapter and Indonesia is referred to as group 2. This 
chapter has four sections: first, specification testing results; second, a description 
of the sample; third, an analysis of the regression results; fourth, a summary of the 
results. 
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7.1 SPECIFICATION TESTING 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 provide specification testing results for group 1 and group 
2. All the values presented are their p-value. As can be seen in Table 7.1, there is a 
heteroskedasticity problem in all equations, as the p-value is lower than the level 
of significance range of 1% to 5%. Therefore, the regression method used for all 
equations have to grapple with this problem. For skewness and kurtosis, the value 
for all equations is greater than 10% level of significance, suggesting that all the 
equations have a normal distribution. The value for multicollinearity is less than 
ten, suggesting no multicollinearity among the independent variables. The value 
for linearity for all equations is greater than 10% level of significance. Thus, the 
null hypothesis of linearity cannot be rejected, therefore all the equations have a 
linear function. At last, there is no endogeneity problem found in all the equations 
models.  
Table 7.1: Specification testing results for group 1 
  
CAAR -1 
to +1 
CAAR -3 
to +3 
CAAR -5 
to +5 
CAAR -10 
to +10 
CAAR -15 
to +15 
Heteroskedasticity 0.0158 0.0207 0.0211 0.0200 0.0184 
Skewness 0.1034 0.1052 0.1048 0.1052 0.1064 
Kurtosis 0.2915 0.2931 0.2932 0.2931 0.2889 
Multicollinearity 1.3300 1.3300 1.3300 1.3300 1.3300 
Linearity 0.7163 0.6809 0.5084 0.5032 0.9494 
Endogeneity No endogeneity exist 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level,  *Sig. at 10% significance level 
  
 
Table 7.2 shows that there is no heteroskedasticity problem in all the equations, as 
the p-value is greater than the level of significance range from 10% level of 
significance. For skewness and kurtosis, the value for all equations is greater than 
10% level of significance, suggesting that all the equations have a normal 
distribution. The value for multicollinearity is less than ten, suggesting no 
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multicollinearity among the independent variables. The value for linearity for all 
equations is greater than 10% level of significance. Thus, the null hypothesis of 
linearity cannot be rejected, with all the equations having a linear function. Finally, 
there is no endogeneity problem found in all the equations models.  
Table 7.2: Specification testing results for group 2 
  
CAAR -1 
to +1 
CAAR -3 
to +3 
CAAR -5 
to +5 
CAAR -10 
to +10 
Heteroskedasticity 0.6150 0.6781 0.4345 0.3085 
Skewness 0.4894 0.7949 0.2752 0.8736 
Kurtosis 0.2310 0.2069 0.4880 0.6627 
Multicollinearity 3.0500 3.0500 3.0500 3.0500 
Linearity 0.9203 0.8003 0.2554 0.2358 
Endogeneity No endogeneity exist 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level,  *Sig. at 10% significance level 
 
 
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 provide the descriptive statistics used in this study for 
group 1 and group 2. The sample consists of 80 listed firms issuing Islamic debt 
for the period of 2000 to 2009. Table 7.3 depicts the number of observations, the 
mean, the standard deviation, and the minimum and maximum value of each 
variable. The dependent variables are CAAR -1 to +1, CAAR -3 to +3, CAAR -5 
to +5, CAAR -10 to +10, CAAR -15 to +15, and each dependent variable is 
regressed toward its explanatory variables. However, due to incomplete data for 
all the firms, CAAR -15 to +15 is omitted for group 2.Further, due to the fact that 
group 2 contains no instances of more than two issuances of Islamic debt and has 
no debt type, these categories are omitted accordingly. In addition, EVA for group 
2 is omitted due to unavailable data. There are four categories for explanatory 
variables: Islamic debt characteristics, the frequency of Islamic debt issuance, the 
Islamic debt type issued, and firm performance. The year in which the Islamic 
debt is issued is used as the control variable. 
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Table 7.3: Descriptive statistics group 1 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables           
CAAR -1 to +1 80 -0.0137 0.1128 -0.8324 0.1443 
CAAR -3 to +3 80 -0.0412 0.3705 -2.9170 0.1783 
CAAR -5 to +5 80 -0.0386 0.3761 -2.9656 0.1951 
CAAR -10 to +10 80 -0.0427 0.3988 -3.1576 0.1233 
CAAR -15 to +15 80 0.0090 0.0668 -0.1377 0.5150 
Islamic debt Characteristics           
Islamic Debt Offerings Size 80 0.0727 0.0813 0.0011 0.5561 
Islamic Debt Maturity 80 7.9063 6.4727 1.0000 50.0000 
Islamic Debt Maturity (Log) 80 0.8367 0.2190 0.3010 1.6990 
Debt to Equity Ratio 80 0.2493 0.1626 0.0136 0.6378 
Firm Size 80 6.0388 0.7254 4.6032 8.4924 
Islamic debt Frequency           
First Issuance 80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Second Issuance 80 0.1316 0.3381 0.0000 1.0000 
More Than Twice 80 0.4211 0.4938 0.0000 1.0000 
Islamic Debt Type           
Debt Type 80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Asset Type 80 0.1053 0.3069 0.0000 1.0000 
Equity Type 80 0.1316 0.3381 0.0000 1.0000 
Firm Performance           
Tobin’s Q 80 0.1679 0.2129 -1.6600 1.9938 
ROA 80 0.0925 0.0004 0.0100 0.1526 
ROE 80 0.0156 0.0352 0.0021 0.2292 
EVA 80 0.3948 0.5871 -0.3946 3.0791 
Control Variables           
Year 2000 80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Year 2001 80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Year 2002 80 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Year 2003 80 0.0625 0.2440 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2004 80 0.1563 0.3660 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2005 80 0.3438 0.4787 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2006 80 0.1719 0.3803 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2007 80 0.1406 0.3504 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2008 80 0.0938 0.2938 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2009 80 0.0313 0.1754 0.0000 1.0000 
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For group 1: 
1. CAAR -1 to +1: the mean value for the cumulative average abnormal return 
range from -1 to +1 is -0.0137or -1.37% with a range from -83.24% to 
14.43%. 
2. CAAR -3 to +3: The mean value for the cumulative average abnormal return 
range from -3 to +3 is -0.0412 or 4.12% with a range from -29.17% to 
17.83%. 
3. CAAR -5 to +5: The mean value for the cumulative average abnormal return 
range from -5 to +5 is -0.0386 or -3.86 with a range from -29.65% to 19.51%. 
4. CAAR -10 to +10: The mean value for the cumulative average abnormal 
return range from -10 to +10 is -0.0427 or -4.27% with a range from -31.57% 
to 12.33%. 
5. CAAR -15 to +15: The mean value for the cumulative average abnormal 
return range from -15 to +15 is 0.0090 or 0.9% with a range from -13.77% to 
51.50%. 
6. Islamic debt offering size: The mean value for the size of the Islamic debt 
offering is 0.0727 with a range from 0.0011% to 0.5561%. 
7. Islamic debt maturity: The mean value for the Islamic debt length of 
maturity is 7.9 years with a range from 1 to 50 years. 
8. Debt to equity ratio: The mean value for the debt to equity ratio is 24.93% 
with a range from 1.36% to 63.78%. 
9. Firm size: The mean value for the firm size is 6.0388 with a range of 4.6032 
to 8.4924, suggesting that most of the firms are big firms. 
10. First issuance: First issuance is used as a baseline category for the frequency 
of Islamic debt issuance, and it takes the value of zero. 
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11. Second issuance: The mean value for the second issuance of Islamic debt is 
0.1316 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that only 13.16% of the 
firms issued Islamic debt for the second time. 
12. More than twice: The mean value for more than two issuances is 0.4211 
with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that most of the firms issued 
Islamic debt more than twice. 
13. Debt type: Debt type is used as a baseline category for the Islamic debt type, 
and it takes the value of zero. 
14. Asset type: The mean value for the asset type of Islamic debt is 0.1053 with a 
range of 0.0000 to 1.0000. 
15. Equity type: The mean value for the equity type of Islamic debt is 0.1316 
with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000. 
16. Tobin’s Q: The mean value for Tobin’s Q is 0.1679 with a range of -1.6600 
to 1.9938, suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm 
performance based on the market measure. 
17. ROA: The mean value for ROA is 0.0925 with a range of 0.0100 to 0.1526. 
Though the mean value of ROA is considerably small, this positive value 
indicates that the firms in the sample create shareholder value over the 
sampling period. This positive value also indicates an effective utilisation of 
firm assets in generating an operating surplus in the business. 
18. ROE: The mean value for ROE is 0.0156 with a range from 0.0021 to 0.2292, 
suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm performance based on 
accounting measures. However, the positive value indicates that the firms in 
the sample create shareholder value and operating efficiency is positively 
translated into benefits to the owners. 
257 
 
18) EVA: The mean value for EVA is 0.3948 with a range from -0.3946 to 
3.0791, suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm performance 
based on economic value measure. EVA tells corporate managers and 
investors if the value of a business has been created or destroyed. Since EVA 
is greater than zero, it indicates that the project will add value for 
shareholders. 
19) Control variables: During the sampling period of 2000 to 2009, Islamic debt 
is only issued during these eight years (2001, 2003 to 2009). Islamic debt is 
mostly issued in 2005 which accounted for 34.38%. The mean value for 2001, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 are 1.19%, 6.25%, 15.63%, 
34.38%, 17.19%, 14.06%, 9.38% and 3.13% respectively from the total 
sample.
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Table 7.4: Descriptive statistics group 2 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables           
CAAR -1 to +1 14 0.0062 0.0365 -0.0472 0.0674 
CAAR -3 to +3 14 -0.0210 0.0449 -0.0958 0.0505 
CAAR -5 to +5 14 0.0019 0.0684 -0.0700 0.1480 
CAAR -10 to +10 14 -0.0145 0.0754 -0.1218 0.1200 
Islamic debt Characteristics           
Islamic Debt Offerings Size 14 0.0106 0.0097 0.0017 0.0312 
Islamic Debt Maturity 14 4.8571 0.5345 3.0000 5.0000 
Islamic Debt Maturity (Log) 14 0.6831 0.0593 0.4771 0.6990 
Debt to Equity Ratio 14 0.6122 0.1440 0.3627 0.8416 
Firm Size 14 6.2201 0.5072 4.9997 7.6766 
Islamic debt Frequency           
First Issuance 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Second Issuance 14 0.0714 0.2578 0.0000 1.0000 
More Than Twice 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Islamic Debt Type           
Debt Type 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Asset Type 14 0.7143 0.4522 0.0000 1.0000 
Equity Type 14 0.2857 0.4522 0.0000 1.0000 
Firm Performance           
Tobin’s Q 14 11.4354 1.1089 10.4204 13.7915 
ROA 14 0.0300 0.4244 -0.0070 0.1031 
ROE 14 0.0320 0.0634 -0.0030 0.1489 
Control Variables           
Year 2000 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Year 2001 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Year 2002 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Year 2003 14 0.0714 0.2673 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2004 14 0.2857 0.4688 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2005 14 0.1429 0.3631 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2006 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2007 14 0.0714 0.2673 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2008 14 0.2857 0.4688 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2009 14 0.1429 0.3631 0.0000 1.0000 
 
 
For group 2: 
1) CAAR -1 to +1: the mean value for the cumulative average abnormal return 
range from -1 to +1 is 0.0062 or 0.6% with a range from -4.72% to 6.74%. 
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2) CAAR -3 to +3: The mean value for the cumulative average abnormal return 
range from -3 to +3 is -0.0210 or -2.10% with a range from -9.58% to 5.05%. 
3) CAAR -5 to +5: The mean value for the cumulative average abnormal return 
range from -5 to +5 is 0.0019 or 0.19% with a range from -7%% to 14.80%. 
CAAR -10 to +10: The mean value for cumulative average abnormal return 
range from -10 to +10 is -0.0145 or -1.45% with a range from -12.18% to 
12.00%. 
4) Islamic debt offering size: The mean value for the Islamic debt offering size 
is 0.0106 with a range from 0.0017 to 0.0312. 
5) Islamic debt maturity: The mean value for the Islamic debt length of 
maturity is 4.9 years with a range from 3 to 5 years. 
6) Debt to equity ratio: The mean value for the debt to equity ratio is 61.22% 
with a range from 36.27% to 84.16%. 
7) Firm size: The mean value for the firm size is 6.2201 with a range of 4.9997 
to 7.6766, suggesting that most of the firms are big firms. 
8) First issuance: First issuance is used as a baseline category for the frequency 
of Islamic debt issuance, and it takes the value of zero. 
9) Second issuance: The mean value for the second issuance of Islamic debt is 
0.0714 with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000, suggesting that only 7.14% of the 
firms issued Islamic debt for the second time. 
10) Debt type: Debt type is used as a baseline category for the Islamic debt type, 
and it takes the value of zero. 
11) Asset type: The mean value for the asset type of Islamic debt is 0.7143 with a 
range of 0.0000 to 1.0000. 
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12) Equity type: The mean value for the equity type of Islamic debt is 0.2857 
with a range of 0.0000 to 1.0000. 
13) Tobin’s Q: The mean value for Tobin’s Q is 1.5192 with a range of -0.2489 
to 25.5134, suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm 
performance based on the market measure. 
14) ROA: The mean value for ROA is 0.0300 with a range of -7.6563 to 0.1031, 
suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm performance based on 
accounting measures. Though the mean value of ROA is considerably small, 
this positive value indicates that the firms in the sample create shareholder 
value over the sampling period. This positive value also indicates an effective 
utilisation of firm assets in generating an operating surplus in the business. 
15) ROE: The mean value for ROE is 0.0320 with a range of -0.0030 to 0.1489, 
suggesting that most of the firms experienced low firm performance based on 
accounting measures. However, the positive value indicates that the firms in 
the sample create shareholder value and operating efficiency is positively 
translated into benefits to the owners. 
16) Control variables: During the sampling period 2000 to 2009, Islamic debt is 
only issued during these six years (2003 to 2005 and 2007 to 2009). Islamic 
debt is mostly issued in 2004 and 2008 which accounted for 28.57% for each 
year. The mean value for 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009 are 7.14%, 
28.57%, 14.29%, 7.14%, 28.57% and 14.29% respectively from the total 
sample. 
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7.3 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR EVENT 
STUDY RESULTS 
Table 7.5, Table 7.6, and Table 7.7 show the regression results for group 1. Table 
7.8, Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 show the regression results for group 2. The 
dependent variable is CAAR -1 to +1, CAAR -3 to +3, CAAR -5 to +5, CAAR -
10 to +10 and CAAR -15 to +15. Apart from CAAR -15 to +15, all the dependent 
variables used for group 1 are also employed for group 2. For each dependent 
variable, there are two regression results provided; firstly, regression without 
control variables and secondly, regression with control variables. 
 
Table 7.5 presents the results for CAAR -1 to +1, CAAR -3 to +3, CAAR -5 to +5, 
CAAR -10 to +10 and CAAR -15 to +15. There are no differences for the 
coefficient for Islamic debt offerings size and Islamic debt maturity between all 
the different CAAR spans, which are a negative but not significant for Reg.1 and 
Reg.2. This negative finding is similar to the study by Ashhari et al. (2009) which 
finds that Islamic debt offering size and Islamic debt maturity are a negative, 
however, the significance result obtained is different as they find that Islamic debt 
offering size has a significant impact at 5% level of significance. In addition, 
Ibrahim and Minai (2009) also find that the Islamic debt offering size has a 
negative and significant impact on returns. This may suggest that the greater the 
debt amount, the lower the cumulative abnormal return, and the longer the 
maturity, the lower the cumulative abnormal return. These findings can be better 
explained by the negative slope demand theory and asymmetric information 
theory. First, the negative slope demand theory suggests that the greater the 
quantity offered, the lower the price. Second, the asymmetric information theory 
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(Myers & Majluf, 1984) implies that the announcement of debt issues should 
produce either no effect or a very small negative effect on stock price. 
Furthermore, a long maturity period is usually accompanied by higher interest, 
which is attractive to investors. Should the maturity and abnormal return go in the 
opposite direction then this may indicate that the market buys this security not for 
profit but mostly to invest in a secure investment. 
 
Apart from the negative slope demand theory and asymmetric information theory, 
these negative results might also be caused by the risks posed by the Islamic debt 
instrument. Although it is claimed that Islamic debt is safer than conventional 
debt instruments, this does not mean that the former is entirely free of risks. 
Sovereign and corporate sukuk have similar financial risks as conventional debt 
instruments (Wilson, 2008). Participation is the way to encounter default risk. In 
line with that, Muslim scholars have generated much research and discussion to 
escalate product derivation in Islamic debt, in order to create more opportunities 
for both Muslim and non-Muslim investors to diversify their portfolio risks. There 
are some risks associated with the Islamic debt instrument including credit risks, 
operational risks, liquidity risks, exchange rate risks, economic and political risks. 
 
Credit risks arising from adverse changes in the credit quality and recoverability 
of loans, advances and amounts due from counterparties are inherent in a wide 
range of Islamic debt issuers’ businesses. Credit risks could arise from a 
deterioration in the credit quality of specific counterparties of the issuers, from a 
general deterioration in local or global economic conditions or from systemic 
risks with the financial systems, all of which could affect the recoverability and 
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value of issuers’ assets and require an increase in issuers’ provisions for the 
impairment of its assets and other credit exposures. 
 
Operational risks and losses can result from a number of things including fraud, 
error by employees, failure to document transactions properly or to obtain proper 
internal authorisation, failure to comply with regulatory requirements and conduct 
of business rules, the failure of internal systems, equipment and external systems 
and the occurrence of natural disasters. For example, 1) Salam sukuk contracts are 
exposed to the risk that commodities will not be supplied on time or to the agreed 
quantity; 2) Istisna'a sukuk contracts involve performance risk in which the client 
of the bank may default on the conditions of the contract and the sub-contractor 
may fail to render the necessary services. Although the issuers have implemented 
risk controls, and loss mitigation strategies and substantial resources are devoted 
to developing efficient procedures, it is not possible to entirely eliminate any of 
the operational risks. 
 
Liquidity risks could arise from the inability of the issuers to anticipate and 
provide for unforeseen decreases or changes in funding sources which could have 
adverse consequences on the ability of the issuers to meet their obligations when 
they are due. Asset redemption risk arises from the fact that the originator has to 
buy-back the underlying assets from the certificate holder, and the principal 
amount paid may not be equal to the Islamic debt issue amount, and as a result, 
there is a risk that the assets may not be fully redeemed. Therefore, the greater the 
amount of the debt, the higher the risk the investors have to bear. 
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Exchange rate risks could arise if investors issued in foreign currency, and thus 
the issuers have to maintain their accounts and report their results in their home 
currency. The home currency has to be pegged at a fixed exchange rate to the U.S. 
dollar. The issuers are exposed to the potential impact of any alteration to or 
abolition of this foreign exchange peg. Therefore, the longer the maturity, the 
higher the chance of being exposed to interest rate risk; as the interest rate rises, 
the present value of this instrument lowers as does the maturity. At the end, these 
factors affect the investors’ perspective, and they are likely to become risk adverse 
investors. 
 
Developing markets are subject to greater risks than developed markets, including 
in some cases significant legal, economic and political risks. Accordingly, 
investors should exercise particular care in evaluating the risks involved and they 
must decide for themselves whether, in the light of those risks, their investment is 
appropriate. Generally, investment is only suitable for sophisticated investors who 
fully appreciate the significance of the risk involved. In the end, all those factors 
affect the investors’ perspective, and they are likely to become risk adverse 
investors. 
 
Furthermore, there are no differences for the coefficient for debt to equity ratio 
among all CAAR spans which are a negative and significant for Reg.1 and Reg.2. 
This suggests that the higher the debt to equity ratio, the lower the abnormal 
return. This finding supports the notion that the debt level of a firm is taken into 
account by investors in order to determine stock prices (Giner & Reverte, 2001). 
Moreover, this finding is in contrast with Asharri et al. (2009) who  find that debt 
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to equity ratio is a positive but not significant. This negative and significant result 
may indicate that the market believes the notion that at a certain level, the addition 
of debt may hamper the firm’s performance as agency costs are higher with regard 
to profit-loss sharing arrangements. 
 
There are no differences for the coefficient for firm size among all CAAR spans, 
which are a positive and significant for Reg.1 and Reg.2, suggesting that the 
bigger the firm size, the higher the abnormal return. This finding is similar with 
Ashhari et al. (2009) who find that firm size has a positive impact on return, 
however their finding is not significant. This may indicate that the markets have a 
higher level of confidence with these kinds of issuers as they are believed to have 
a stable cash flow and profits. Hence, the risk of a default is also believed to be 
minor. For the control variables, none of the years provide significant results. 
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Table 7.5: Regression result for group 1 
Variables 
CAAR -1to+1 CAAR -3to+3 CAAR -5to+5 CAAR -10to+10 CAAR -15to+15 
Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 
Constant -0.2250* -0.1927 -0.7435* -0.6207 -0.6351 -0.6990 -0.7655 -0.8050 0.1147 0.1068 
  (0.1330) (0.1599) (0.4385) (0.5324) (0.4510) (0.5530) (0.4747) (0.5771) (0.0794) (0.0961) 
Islamic Debt Offerings Size -0.0703 -0.1300 -0.2627 -0.4837 -0.2156 -0.4293 -0.4265 -0.6765 0.0378 0.0912 
  (0.1870) (0.1870) (0.6170) (0.6228) (0.6345) (0.6467) (0.6679) (0.6750) (0.1117) (0.1124) 
Islamic Debt Maturity -0.0036 -0.0113 -0.0092 -0.0454 -0.0198 -0.0255 -0.0353 -0.0920 -0.0071 -0.0152 
  (0.0660) (0.0656) (0.2179) (0.2185) (0.2241) (0.2270) (0.2359) (0.2369) (0.0394) (0.0394) 
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.2194*** -0.2264*** -0.6759** -0.6849** -0.6084** -0.6386** -0.6297** -0.6651** -0.1293** -0.1334*** 
  (0.0933) (0.0913) (0.3077) (0.3040) (0.3165) (0.3157) (0.3331) (0.3295) (0.0557) (0.0549) 
Firm Size 0.0450** 0.0426* 0.1448** 0.1290 0.1280* 0.1210 0.1446* 0.1326 0.0221 0.0183 
  (0.0229) (0.0238) (0.0753) (0.0793) (0.0775) (0.0823) (0.0816) (0.0860) (0.0136) (0.0143) 
Year 2003   -0.0083   0.0092   0.1430   0.1651   -0.0239 
    (0.0882)   (0.2338)   (0.3052)   (0.3185)   (0.0530) 
Year 2004   -0.0063   0.0021   0.1490   0.1512   -0.0169 
    (0.0786)   (0.2616)   (0.2717)   (0.2836)   (0.0472) 
Year 2005   0.0010   0.0449   0.1684   0.1772   -0.0309 
    (0.0759)   (0.2526)   (0.2623)   (0.2738)   (0.0456) 
Year 2006   -0.0898   -0.2500   -0.0916   -0.1250   0.0258 
    (0.0782)   (0.2606)   (0.2707)   (0.2824)   (0.0470) 
Year 2007   -0.0118   -0.0135   0.1188   0.1350   -0.0170 
    (0.0803)   (0.2674)   (0.2778)   (0.2899)   (0.0482) 
Year 2008   -0.0650   -0.1122   0.0089   0.0004   -0.0043 
    (0.0823)   (0.2743)   (0.2849)   (0.2973)   (0.0495) 
Obs. 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Wald chi2 7.87 16.51 7.29 14.29 5.47 10.84 6.50 13.25 6.65 14.00 
Prob>Chi2 0.0965 0.0860 0.1212 0.1600 0.2428 0.3703 0.1647 0.2102 0.1556 0.1728 
R-squared 0.1095 0.2050 0.1023 0.1826 0.0787 0.1448 0.0922 0.1715 0.0941 0.1795 
Root MSE 0.1056 0.0998 0.3482 0.3323 0.3582 0.3451 0.3777 0.3601 0.0630 0.0600 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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In conclusion, the results provided in Table 7.5 for the CAAR -3 to+3, CAAR -5 
to+5, CAAR -10 to +10 and CAAR -15 to +15 reveal no differences from the 
result for the CAAR -1 to +1. 
 
Table 7.6 presents the results for CAAR -1 to +1, CAAR -3 to +3, CAAR -5 to +5, 
CAAR -10 to +10 and CAAR -15 to +15. For Islamic debt frequency, only the 
coefficient for first issuance is a positive and significant at 5 % significance level. 
This positive reaction for the first issuance of Islamic debt indicates that the 
markets have confidence over the instrument and the issuers. Apart from that, the 
markets observe the support from Malaysian regulators and government in 
developing Islamic finance industry, including the Islamic debt market, hence this 
government’s supports provide bright prospect of this Islamic debt market. The 
positive reaction also might be due to the fact that Islamic debt is considered as a 
cheaper financing cost. This cheaper cost of Islamic debt issuance is a result of 
higher liquidity and lower transaction cost of this instrument. Furthermore, 
investing in Islamic debt as one portfolio investment significantly reduces the 
value at risk (VAR) portfolio when compared to investing in all conventional 
instruments (Cakir & Raei, 2007). Therefore, market might also think that 
investment in Islamic debt reduces their risk as Islamic debt is claimed as a secure 
investment. 
 
Furthermore, the non-significant impact for the second issuance and so on, 
implies that the market learnt from the previous experience. First, this may relate 
to the behavioural finance theory which once investors understand that their 
decisions are bad ones; they are likely to make much better decisions in future or 
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in other word it can be said as a learning process. However, according to 
behavioural finance theory investors are sometimes irrational in accessing and 
making decisions. The theory of behavioural finance was established by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) where they found the prospect theory. This theory 
implies that human apparently under uncertainty are not consistently risk averse 
but rather they are risk-averse in gains but risk-takers in losses. 
 
Second, the success or failure from the previous issuance leads the investors’ 
judgement. Third, there are some risks pose by the issuers, one of these risks is 
risks arising from changes in credit quality and the recoverability of amounts due 
from borrowers and counterparties are inherent in banking businesses (Wilson, 
2008). Adverse changes in global economic conditions, or arising from systemic 
risks in the financial systems, could affect the recovery and value of issuers’ 
assets and require an increase in issuers’ provisions. Issuers use different hedging 
strategies to minimise risk, including securities, collaterals and insurance that 
reduce the credit risk level to be within the issuers’ strategy and risk appetite. 
However, there can be no guarantee that such measures will eliminate or reduce 
such risks. Fourth, though Malaysia has enjoyed significant economic growth and 
relative political stability, there can be no assurance that such growth or stability 
will continue. 
 
For Islamic debt type, the coefficient for debt type, asset type and equity type is a 
positive, however only debt type is significant at 5% significance level. This 
indicates that when the issuers issued the debt type of Islamic debt, the markets 
react positively toward this type of debt. Though, the two other types are not 
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significant, but it is also positive. The significant result for debt type might be due 
to the fact that there is no transfer of ownership; hence this type of Islamic debt is 
easier than the other two types. Due to the different law and regulations in every 
country, therefore, there are doubts whether, under Malaysian law, a co-ownership 
interest in certain assets/projects can be effectively transferred. Accordingly, no 
assurance is given that any co-ownership interest in the relevant co-ownership 
assets has been or will be transferred to the Issuer. Thus, investors in emerging 
markets should be aware that these markets are subject to greater risks than more 
developed markets, including, in some cases, significant legal, economic and 
political risks. Accordingly, investors should exercise particular care in evaluating 
the risks involved and must decide for themselves whether, in light of those risks, 
their investment is appropriate. Generally, investment in emerging markets is only 
suitable for sophisticated investors who fully appreciate the significance of the 
risk involved 
 
Furthermore, for year effect, only year 2008 has a negative and significant effect 
on the abnormal return. The negative abnormal return may be caused by the 
global financial crisis effect. The results for CAAR -3 to +3 show no different 
than the result for CAAR -3 to +3, but only the year effect has a different. In the 
CAAR -3 to +3, apart from 2006, all year shows a negative and significant effect 
on the abnormal return. Furthermore, apart from CAAR -1 to +1 and CAAR -3 to 
+3, the rest of the CAAR provides insignificant results. This may indicate that the 
longer the span of the abnormal return, the more insignificant it becomes. This 
support the notion of the shorter span of the event window, the better the quality 
of the results to capture the effect of the event. 
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Table 7.6: Regression result for group 1 
Variables 
CAAR -1to+1 CAAR -3to+3 CAAR -5to+5 CAAR -10to+10 CAAR -15to+15 
Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 
Constant 0.0041* 0.0378** 0.0155* 0.1083*** 0.0226 0.0563 0.0222 0.0314 0.0045 0.0010 
  (0.0090) (0.0195) (0.0206) (0.0427) (0.0206) (0.0614) (0.0214) (0.0533) (0.0032) (0.0074) 
Islamic debt Frequency                     
First Issuance (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
  - - - - - - - - - - 
Second Issuance -0.0062 -0.0037 -0.0219 -0.0111 -0.0243 -0.0082 -0.0359 -0.0030 -0.0022 -0.0040 
  (0.0107) (0.0132) (0.0252) (0.0326) (0.0288) (0.0343) (0.0273) (0.0350) (0.0025) (0.0052) 
More Than Twice -0.0332 -0.0242 -0.0864 -0.0532 -0.0719 -0.0420 -0.0900 -0.0551 -0.0129 -0.0063 
  (0.0287) (0.0207) (0.0941) (0.0657) (0.0955) (0.0668) (0.1012) (0.0708) (0.0170) (0.0125) 
Islamic Debt Type                     
Debt Type (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
  - - - - - - - - - - 
Asset Type 0.0455* 0.0350 0.0728 0.0405 0.0890 0.0833 0.0976 0.0828 0.0042 0.0019 
  (0.0275) (0.0282) (0.0752) (0.0693) (0.0751) (0.0648) (0.0788) (0.0704) (0.0133) (0.0123) 
Equity Type 0.0017 0.0051 0.0297 0.0021 0.0350 0.0346 0.0437 0.0362 0.0058 0.0016 
  (0.0185) (0.0141) (0.0525) (0.0212) (0.0538) (0.0219) (0.0594) (0.0338) (0.0088) (0.0047) 
Year 2003   -0.0327   -0.0947*   0.0720   0.0763   -0.0004 
    (0.0247)   (0.0508)   (0.0670)   (0.0631)   (0.0072) 
Year 2004   -0.0280   -0.0901***   0.0839   0.0607   -0.0016 
    (0.0199)   (0.0382)   (0.0600)   (0.0502)   (0.0060) 
Year 2005   -0.0254   -0.0711*   0.0808   0.0579   -0.0081 
    (0.0224)   (0.0418)   (0.0615)   (0.0531)   (0.0091) 
Year 2006   -0.1094   -0.346   -0.1620   -0.2168   0.0449 
    (0.0670)   (0.2253)   (0.2341)   (0.2445)   (0.0394) 
Year 2007   -0.0309   -0.0890**   0.0513   0.0438   -0.0001 
    (0.0202)   (0.0425)   (0.0639)   (0.0559)   (0.0063) 
Year 2008   -0.0624***   -0.1227***   -0.0029   -0.0232   -0.0009 
    (0.0234)   (0.0398)   (0.0613)   (0.0569)   (0.0071) 
Obs. 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Wald chi2 4.05 17.32 1.81 18.93 2.80 14.43 3.47 8.70 3.14 3.84 
Prob>Chi2 0.3998 0.0676 0.7702 0.0411 0.5912 0.1543 0.4824 0.5603 0.5340 0.9541 
R-squared 0.0371 0.1145 0.0192 0.0906 0.0163 0.0702 0.0215 0.0846 0.0118 0.0850 
Root MSE 0.1098 0.1053 0.364 0.3505 0.3701 0.3599 0.3914 0.3786 0.0659 0.0633 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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Table 7.7 presents the results for CAAR -1 to +1, CAAR -3 to +3, CAAR -5 to +5, 
CAAR -10 to +10 and CAAR -15 to +15. All performance measures show a 
positive effect on return, however, only ROE and EVA are significant. The non-
significant result for Tobin’s Q is similar to Ibrahim and Minai (2009) which find 
a positive but not significant impact on return. The positive finding for firm 
performance may indicate that the market has more confidence in buying this 
security as they expect these firms will have more prospects in the future. 
Furthermore, all the issuers have to submit and publish their prospectus which 
includes not only their financial statement, but also their objectives and strategies, 
their competitive advantages and their risk managements. This includes a strong 
brand, experienced management, high growth and a high level of profit rate. 
When the issuers have all those clearly stated on their prospectus, the investors 
might have confidence in investing their money to this firm. Furthermore, CAAR 
-3 to +3, CAAR -5 to +5, CAAR -10 to +10 and CAAR -15 to +15 yield similar 
results as those for CAAR -1 to +1. Furthermore, all the control variables for all 
CAAR variations show no significant year effect. 
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Table 7.7: Regression result for group 1 
Variables 
CAAR -1to+1 CAAR -3to+3 CAAR -5to+5 CAAR -10to+10 CAAR -15to+15 
Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 
Constant 0.0365 0.3930 2.4442 2.6522 1.7625 2.2882 2.7586 3.3682 0.2989 0.3731 
  (0.0750) (0.7809) (2.3948) (2.4896) (2.4090) (2.5150) (2.5273) (2.6288 (0.4351) (0.4511) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0365 0.0350 0.2383 0.2560 0.1701 0.2323 0.2679 0.3400 0.0292 0.0378 
  (0.0750) (0.0789) (0.2360) (0.2516) (0.2373) (0.2541) (0.2490) (0.2656) (0.0429) (0.0456) 
Economic Value Added 0.0578** 0.0381 0.2616*** 0.2192*** 0.2867*** 0.2634*** 0.3132*** 0.2793*** 0.0458*** 0.0381*** 
  (0.0261) (0.0280) (0.0822) (0.0895) (0.0827) (0.0904) (0.0867) (0.0944) (0.0150) (0.0162) 
Return on Asset 0.3835 0.1958 0.2186* 0.1834 0.2220** 0.2036 0.2308* 0.2022 0.3605* 0.3004 
  (0.0372) (0.3853) (0.1170) (0.1228) (0.1176) (0.1241) (0.1234) (0.1297) (0.2125) (0.2226) 
Return on Equity 0.1854 0.2997 0.6615 0.9958 0.7558 1.1861 0.6698 1.1234 0.1210 0.1733 
  (0.4435) (0.4706) (0.1394) (0.1500) (0.1402) (1.5155) (1.4716) (1.5841) (0.2533) (0.2719) 
Year 2003   -0.0326   -0.0188   0.1174   0.1607   -0.0125 
    (0.0940)   (0.2995)   (0.3026)   (0.3162)   (0.0542) 
Year 2004   -0.0238   -0.0038   0.1490   0.1642   -0.0167 
    (0.0839)   (0.2672)   (0.2700)   (0.2822)   (0.0484) 
Year 2005   -0.0288   -0.0016   0.1262   0.1467   -0.0202 
    (0.0818)   (0.2607)   (0.2634)   (0.2753)   (0.0472) 
Year 2006   -0.0965   -0.1670   0.0207   0.0060   -0.0131 
    (0.0856)   (0.2729)   (0.2757)   (0.2881)   (0.0494) 
Year 2007   -0.0338   -0.0664   0.0678   0.0891   -0.0014 
    (0.0866)   (0.2761)   (0.2790)   (0.2915)   (0.0500) 
Year 2008   -0.0725   -0.1190   -0.0081   -0.0031   0.0011 
    (0.0882)   (0.2814)   (0.2843)   (0.2971)   (0.0510) 
Obs. 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Wald chi2 5.54 9.74 11.89 14.25 13.31 15.05 14.97 17.35 10.64 13.37 
Prob>Chi2 0.3535 0.5543 0.0363 0.2192 0.0206 0.1802 0.0105 0.0980 0.0589 0.2699 
R-squared 0.0797 0.1320 0.1567 0.1822 0.1722 0.1904 0.1895 0.2132 0.1426 0.1728 
Root MSE 0.1073 0.1042 0.3375 0.3324 0.3395 0.3358 0.3562 0.3509 0.0613 0.0602 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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Table 7.8, Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 present the regression results for group 2.  As 
can be seen in Table 7.8, the coefficient for Islamic debt offering is a negative, 
suggesting that the greater the amount of the debt offered, the lower the abnormal 
return, however, the result is insignificant. Many emerging economies are still 
over-reliant on their respective banking sectors as financiers. In such instances, 
the regulators would not be remiss in extending their support by introducing fiscal 
incentives, such as exemption of tax and/or stamp duty, to stimulate the Islamic 
debt market. This would undoubtedly provide a boost in the arm for a fledgling 
Islamic debt market. Unlike Malaysia where Islamic debt is exempted from stamp 
duty, taxes and other costs associated with listing, Indonesia is not yet 
implementing such measures to boost this market. Therefore, the greater the 
amount of debt, the higher the cost firms have to bear, and at the end these costs 
have to be paid by the investors. 
 
The coefficient for Islamic debt maturity is a negative and significant, suggesting 
that the longer the maturity, the lower the abnormal return. Generally, the longer 
the period of debt offered, the higher the rate offered, thus it may attract investors 
to buy this security. However as far as Islamic debt securities are concerned, it 
seems as if investor prefer to have shorter periods of maturity. The reason is that 
investors exercise caution when investing their money in a new instrument. 
Furthermore, since the maturity is short, the rate offered is lower than the long-
term debt rate, but nevertheless investors expect to have a fixed stream of income. 
This negative result might also be caused by the unstable inflation rate and 
interest rates. The inflation rate in 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008 is 6.40%, 17.11%, 
6.59% and 11.06% respectively; the lending interest rate charged by the bank in 
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2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008 is 14.12%, 14.05%, 13.86% and 13.60% respectively; 
meanwhile the Indonesian Bank rate in 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008 is 12.75%, 
9.75% , 8% and 9.25% (Indonesian Bank Website, 2012). 
 
The coefficient for debt to equity ratio is a positive and significant, suggesting that 
the higher the debt to equity ratio, the higher the abnormal return. The coefficient 
for firm size is a negative and insignificant, suggesting that firm size has no 
impact on the CAAR. 
 
For year effect, year 2004 yields a negative and significant for all spans of CAAR, 
suggesting that this particular brought about a negative impact on investors’ 
confidence towards the markets. The business survey index in 2004 was a positive 
index indicating economic expansion during that year (Indonesian Bank, 2004) 
and this may boost the confidence of investors. The Business Confidence Index is 
an indicator designed to measure the degree of optimism on the state of the 
economy that business owners are expressing through their activities of investing 
and spending. Decreasing business confidence often implies a slowing economic 
growth because business owners are likely to decrease their investments. The idea 
is that the more confident business owners and managers feel about the economy, 
their companies, their jobs and incomes, the more likely they are to make 
investments and purchases. When business confidence is measured on a scale 
between 0 and 100, an index level below 50 indicates that the number of business 
owners who are expecting their company’s performance to be weaker in the next 
year outnumber those who are expecting stronger performances. 
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However, economic activity is not the sole factor in affecting the confidence of 
investors towards the market. The political climate can also be a factor and in 
2004, a general election was held in Indonesia. The prospect of a new political 
party taking over and implementing new policies is inherent with an impending 
election and this may pose a concern to investors before, during and after the 
election that conditions may turn unstable. 
 
The coefficient for 2005 and 2007 is a positive but not significant, suggesting that 
there is no significant impact on these years on investors’ confidence. Although, it 
is not significant, the positive result is also supported by the positive index of 
business activities which indicates there was an expansion of economic activities 
during these two years. The expansion of economic activities is caused by the 
increase in domestic demands and stock availability. Moreover, this expansion is 
influenced by the pending orders in the manufacturing industry section, trades, the 
hotel and restaurant sector, new contracts, starting operations of projects, 
particularly big projects in the construction sector, the rupiah currency 
depreciation, an increase in marketing activities, and increases on operational and 
interest income in the finance, leasing and business services sectors. Furthermore, 
increasing business activities was also reflected by the increase in the 
demand/order volumes, selling prices/tariffs/interests, business situations and 
company financial conditions. Within the economic sector, all industries except 
mining and quarrying indicated expansion. The biggest contribution was from the 
manufacturing industry sector, followed by the finance sector. As for sub sectors, 
all sub sectors except the restaurant sub sector experienced expansion, with the 
biggest increase recorded in the trade sub sector. In the agriculture sector, most of 
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the sub sectors except the farm food crops sub sector experienced expansion. 
Within the manufacturing industry sector, all of the sub sectors experienced 
expansion or an increase in business activities (Bank Indonesia, 2004 and 2007). 
 
The coefficient for year 2008 yields a negative and significant effect on the 
abnormal return. This negative effect is also supported by the negative index of 
business activities (Indonesian Bank, 2008). This suggests that there was a 
contraction of the business activities and economy for 2008. In addition, this 
negative result might be caused by the slump in domestic and international 
demand as the effect of the global economic crisis caused the contraction of 
business activities in 2008. Other additional factors that caused a contraction in 
business activities were: seasonal factors, competition between similar products, 
and an unfavourable market situation. Furthermore, manufacturing industry sector, 
followed by mining & quarrying sector, agriculture, livestock, forestry & fishery 
sector, and construction sector contributed the greatest to the economic’s 
contraction. In the meantime, five other economic sectors continued to expand 
although the level of growth was slower than in the previous period. The biggest 
contribution was recorded by the financial, ownership & business services sector 
followed by the trade, hotel and restaurant sector, and finally, the transportation 
and communication sector (Indonesian Bank, 2008). 
 
A further factor that may have played a role in the negative effect in year 2008 
was the general election held in 2009. Generally, the period building up towards 
an election year affects the economic and capital market as the prospect of 
unstable political conditions or a change in government might affect the investors’ 
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confidence over their investments. Debt markets need a stable macroeconomic 
and political environment to survive and grow. Without either of these two 
rudimentary features, investors, both local and foreign, would not be inclined to 
put their money into any capital markets at all, not just the debt market 
specifically. To engender an appropriate base of issuers and investors, economic 
expansion must be robust enough while inflation and interest rates cannot be too 
lofty or volatile. In addition, a country must also have high savings and 
investment rates, as well as a high per-capita income, to support its developing 
debt market. 
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Table 7.8: Regression result for group 2 
Variables 
CAAR -1to+1 CAAR -3to+3 CAAR -5to+5 CAAR -10to+10 
Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 
Constant 0.1059 0.3553 0.3078 0.1947 0.4338 0.0282 0.3800 0.8683 
  (0.3235) (0.3054) (0.3540) (0.3674 (0.7892) (0.7461) (0.4364) (0.5540) 
Islamic Debt Offerings Size -1.1492 -2.5174 -1.7567 -0.8776 -1.1714 -0.9622 -0.1638 -1.4631 
  (2.0719) (1.5751) (2.3442) (1.8945) (3.0729) (3.8470) (3.0147) (2.8565) 
Islamic Debt Maturity -0.2050** -0.1231 -0.1478 -0.0370 -0.1255 -0.1660 -0.7332*** -0.3255 
  (0.1086) (0.1440) (0.1558) (0.1732) (0.2961) (0.3518) (0.2113) (0.2612) 
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.1183* 0.0687 0.1655** 0.0850 0.2436*** 0.1129 0.2215** 0.0434 
  (0.0630) (0.0587) (0.0806) (0.0706) (0.0990) (0.1433) (0.1099) (0.1064) 
Firm Size -0.0031 -0.0419 -0.0429 -0.0323 -0.0576 -0.0011 -0.0044 -0.0932 
  (0.0420) (0.0382) (0.0452) (0.0460) (0.0975) (0.0934) (0.0570) (0.0693) 
Year 2004   -0.0402**   -0.0730***   -0.0009*   -0.1531*** 
    (0.0208)   (0.0250)   (0.0509)   (0.0378) 
Year 2005   0.0209   0.0198   0.0372   0.0782* 
    (0.0240)   (0.0289)   (0.0586)   (0.0435) 
Year 2007   0.0043   0.0126   0.1180*   0.0205 
    (0.0290)   (0.0350)   (0.0710)   (0.0527) 
Year 2008   -0.0352*   -0.0421*   -0.0267*   -0.1247*** 
    (0.0199)   (0.0240)   (0.0488)   (0.0362) 
Obs. 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Wald chi2 12.44 24.40 5.40 26.26 8.76 8.69 49.65 35.92 
Prob>Chi2 0.0144 0.0020 0.2485 0.009 0.0674 0.3693 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.3015 0.6354 0.2333 0.6523 0.2503 0.3829 0.2644 0.7196 
Root MSE 0.0293 0.0212 0.0379 0.0255 0.0571 0.0518 0.0623 0.0385 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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Table 7.9 provides the regression result for the second equation. The coefficient 
for the first issuance of Islamic debt is a positive and significant, suggesting that 
the market reacts favourably towards this security. This positive market reaction 
might be caused by the fact that most investors want to diversify their portfolio to 
minimise risk. However, the second issuance of Islamic debt reveals a negative 
and significant coefficient and there are reasons for this. Firstly, the market has 
already experienced Islamic debt before and this security becomes less attractive 
for the second time. Moreover, the learning process that occurred during the first 
issuance enables the market to realise the risks and returns they can gain when 
they invest in this security. Secondly, there tends to be less transparency and 
implementation of corporate governance conducts. Domestic debt markets also 
fortify the financial industry, by promoting a climate of greater transparency and 
corporate governance. Just like in equities markets, entities which issue debts to 
the public are required to make disclosures regarding their operations, financial 
and management strategies. At the same time, such practices also enhance 
investor education, thereby facilitating more informed investment decisions in the 
market. Therefore, transparency and good corporate governance play a significant 
role in affecting investors’ judgement. Although the financial and non-financial 
activities of firms, including their corporate governance conduct, are supposed to 
be disclosed and thus subject to regulation,  a few firms in Indonesia have not 
fully complied. Some of these cases include the Duta Bank case, the Bapindo case, 
the Kimia Farma case, the Lippo Bank case, Century Bank, Bakrie Group and 
other cases. Most of these firms are well-known and well established; hence the 
impact of their fraud is significant in causing the market to lose confidence. In 
effect, such cases of financial fraud also raise serious questions about the efficacy 
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of corporate governance function, which leads to market distrust. Thirdly, the 
legal environment remains uncertain and largely untested by actual cases, and 
there are concerns about the legal transfer of title and foreclosure in case of 
default (Standard & Poor’s RatingsDirect, 2008).Moreover, the legal uncertainties, 
essential policy and regulatory divergences are critical in affecting the market 
favour and the market growth (Andreas, Peter, Paul & Amadou, 2008). Fourthly, 
it is complicated to structure the required underlying assets. Fifth, tax uncertainty 
is another factor as there are no explicit regulations that ensure that Islamic debt 
receives similar tax treatment to conventional debt. 
 
The coefficient for asset type is a positive and significant, suggesting that the 
market considers this security a secure instrument on the basis of its claimant 
priority over conventional debt and stock. However, when this Islamic debt 
instrument assumes the form of equity type, the coefficient is a negative and 
significant, suggesting that the market reacts less favourably towards this type of 
Islamic debt. For the year effect, only 2004 and 2008 yield a negative and 
significant effect on abnormal returns.  
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Table 7.9: Regression result for group 2 
Variables 
CAAR -1to+1 CAAR -3to+3 CAAR -5to+5 CAAR -10to+10 
Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 
Constant 0.0097 0.0304*** 0.0170 0.0021 0.0030 0.0433 0.0227 0.0923*** 
  (0.0150) (0.0093) (0.0179) (0.0169) (0.0377) (0.0282) (0.0431) (0.0256) 
Islamic debt Frequency                 
First Issuance (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
  - - - - - - - - 
Second Issuance -0.0240* -0.0011 -0.0340** -0.0270 -0.0793*** -0.1153*** 0.0433** 0.0983*** 
  (0.0127) (0.0225) (0.0157) (0.0219) (0.0200) (0.0463) (0.0207) (0.0226) 
Islamic Debt Type                 
Asset Type (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
  - - - - - - - - 
Equity Type -0.0025 -0.0012 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0064 -0.0515* -0.0564 -0.0394 
  (0.0196) (0.0132) (0.0238) (0.0199) (0.0427) (0.0300) (0.0479) (0.0268) 
Year 2004   -0.0446***   -0.0612***   -0.0238   -0.1284*** 
    (0.0144)   (0.0198)   (0.0264)   (0.0328) 
Year 2005   0.0040   0.0307*   0.0041   0.0559** 
    (0.0230)   (0.0173)   (0.0272)   (0.0260) 
Year 2007   0.0090   0.0109   0.1720***   0.0085 
    (0.0093)   (0.0169)   (0.0282)   (0.0257) 
Year 2008   -0.0473***   -0.0266*   -0.0372**   -0.1418*** 
    (0.0199)   (0.0231)   (0.0448)   (0.0322) 
Obs. 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Wald chi2 6.68 29.27 8.81 24.01 19.45 162.06 4.49 380.68 
Prob>Chi2 0.0355 0.0001 0.0122 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 0.1059 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0338 0.4783 0.0431 0.5854 0.0932 0.5433 0.1280 0.7431 
Root MSE 0.0345 0.0254 0.0423 0.0279 0.0628 0.0445 0.0679 0.0368 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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Table 7.10 provides the regression result for the third equation. Only CAAR -3 to 
+3 and CAAR -5 to +5 yield a positive and significant coefficient. The significant 
result suggests that investors highly regard firms that have previously issued 
Islamic debt. Moreover, the positive index of business activities indicates that 
there was business expansion during the year. As mentioned earlier, this business 
expansion was caused by an increase in domestic demand, the earnings increase 
of credit interest (in finance, leasing and business services sectors), and conducive 
weather patterns that brought about a good agricultural harvest. Indications of 
increasing business activities were also reflected in the better performance of 
macro indicators such as labour utilisation, company financial conditions, 
production capacities, access to credit, and selling prices. Furthermore, in the 
economic sector, almost every sector except the mining and quarrying sector 
experienced expansion. The biggest contribution to this expansion came from the 
trade, hotel and restaurant sector followed by the services sector, the finance 
sector, the leasing and business services sector, and finally, the transportation and 
communication sector (Business Survey Indonesian Bank, 2012).  
 
As far as the year effect is concerned, only 2004 has a significant impact, however, 
the effect is a negative. As discussed above, many factors affect the stock price 
movement, including political conditions, and not coincidentally, 2004 was the 
year of the general election, which consequently had a direct impact on the capital 
market. 
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Table 7.10: Regression result for group 2 
Variables 
CAAR -1to+1 CAAR -3to+3 CAAR -5to+5 CAAR -10to+10 
Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.1 Reg.2 
Constant 0.1620 0.0861 0.2493*** 0.2596* 0.7633*** 0.7490*** 0.0701 0.1205 
  (0.1053) (0.1396) (0.0729) (0.1523) (0.1586) (0.2167) (0.2626) (0.2963) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0120 0.0103 0.0152*** 0.0199** 0.0570*** 0.0593*** 0.0003 0.0067 
  (0.0080) (0.0108) (0.0060) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0171) (0.0198) (0.0231) 
Return on Asset 0.1545 0.0751 0.2687** 0.1691* 0.7377*** 0.4775** 0.2929 0.4189 
  (0.1586) (0.1632) (0.1324) (0.1522) (0.2450) (0.2210) (0.02965) (0.2936) 
Return on Equity 0.3156 0.1537 0.5487** 0.3444* 0.1495*** 0.9665** 0.5982 0.7932 
  (0.3211) (0.3309) (0.2683) (0.3087) (0.4961) (0.4480) (0.6000) (0.5951) 
Year 2004   -0.0537***   -0.0617***   -0.0515***   -0.1000** 
    (0.0127)   (0.0229)   (0.0210)   (0.0438) 
Year 2005   0.0002   0.0092   0.0177   0.1229*** 
    (0.0223)   (0.0139)   (0.0216)   (0.0050) 
Year 2007   0.0150   0.0126   0.1130***   0.0460 
    (0.0167)   (0.0170)   (0.0220)   (0.0400) 
Year 2008   -0.0456***   -0.0210   -0.0202   -0.0940*** 
    (0.0137)   (0.0151)   (0.0317)   (0.0344) 
Obs. 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Wald chi2 9.16 90002.14 39.38 90320.18 31.60 56.90 7.53 15.63 
Prob>Chi2 0.0272 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0568 0.0000 
R-squared 0.2502 0.5482 0.4494 0.6702 0.3655 0.6528 0.2560 0.6882 
Root MSE 0.0304 0.0236 0.0321 0.0249 0.0525 0.0389 0.0627 0.0406 
*** Sig. at 1% significance level, **Sig. at 5% significance level, *Sig. at 10% significance level. Standard error is in parentheses 
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7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the empirical results of the relationship between: (1) 
Islamic debt characteristics, (2) Islamic debt issuance frequency and Islamic debt 
types issued, (3) firm value and/or firm financial performance, and shareholders’ 
wealth. The multivariate regression analysis for event study was employed. 
 
The results for group 1 reveal that (1) the Islamic debt characteristics, which are 
debt to equity ratio and firm size, have a positive and significant impact on 
shareholders’ wealth, while the Islamic debt offering size and maturity have no 
significant impact on shareholders’ wealth. (2) With regards to the frequency and 
types of Islamic debt issued, only the first issuance of Islamic debt and Islamic 
debt-types have a positive and significant impact on shareholders’ wealth. (3) In 
terms of the firm’s value and/or firm’s financial performance, only EVA and 
ROA have a positive and significant impact on shareholders’ wealth. Overall, the 
debt to equity ratio, the firm size, the first issuance of Islamic debt, the debt-type 
of Islamic debt, and the firm’s performance have a positive and significant impact 
on shareholders’ wealth. These positive and significant impacts are supported by 
some key advantages of the Malaysian market. Firstly, Malaysia has a 
comprehensive regulatory and supervisory framework. Secondly, Malaysia has a 
wide investor’s base through which the issuers look to Islamic debt as an 
alternative way to tap into cash-rich investors from the Middle East. Thirdly, 
Malaysia has a liberal policy regarding foreign exchange rules. Fourthly, Malaysia 
has a wide base of expertise and talents in the Islamic finance industry. Fifthly, 
Malaysia provides tax incentives for Islamic finance instruments, particularly 
Islamic debt. Last but not least, Malaysia is committed towards a continuous 
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product development of Islamic financial instruments as debates continue among 
Islamic scholars about how Islamic debt complies with Islamic law. Such debates 
provide a platform for the on-going innovation of Islamic finance instruments and 
compel Malaysia to serve as a catalyst for future Islamic debt forms. 
 
The results for group 2 reveal that (1) the Islamic debt characteristics, which are 
Islamic debt maturity and debt to equity ratio, have a positive and significant 
impact on shareholders’ wealth while Islamic debt offering size and firm size have 
no significant impact on shareholders’ wealth. This result is slightly different to 
the result obtained for group 1, in which only debt equity ratio and firm size have 
positive and significant impacts. (2) As for the frequency and type of Islamic debt 
issued, only the first issuance of Islamic debt and Islamic asset-types have a 
positive and significant impact on shareholders’ wealth. This result is similar to 
the result obtained for group 2, however, there is, of course, no debt-type for 
group 2. (3) In terms of the firm’s value and/or firm’s financial performance; 
Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE have a positive and significant impact on shareholders’ 
wealth. This result is slightly different than the result obtained for group 1, barring 
the Tobin’s Q result and the lack of an EVA variable for group 2. Overall, the 
Islamic debt maturity, the debt to equity ratio, the first issuance of Islamic debt, 
the asset-type of Islamic debt, and the firm’s performance are factors that have a 
positive and significant impact on shareholders’ wealth. Unlike Malaysia, which 
has a number of advantages to support their Islamic capital market, particularly 
the Islamic debt market, Indonesia has few advantages. However, the positive 
results obtained of there being significant impacts are likely to do with the fact 
that Indonesia, with a population twelve times greater than Malaysia, has greater 
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opportunities in terms of size and growth in the future. Therefore, there is greater 
scope to develop this Islamic finance industry as one of main sources of corporate 
financing. 
 
The next chapter recaps on the thesis objectives, and provides a summary of the 
hypothesis and results. It discusses the contribution of this thesis to existing 
literature, the implications of its findings, and future research directions to which 
this study points. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION 
 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarises the discussion about Islamic debt, firm performance, and 
event study for group 1 and group 2. The structure to be followed starts with 
section 8.1 summarising the thesis objectives. Section 8.2 provides a summary of 
the hypothesis and empirical results. Section 8.3 outlines the contribution of this 
thesis to existing literature. Section 8.4 discusses the implications of this thesis’ 
findings. Section 8.5 provides future directions for research given the limitations 
of this study. And finally, section 8.6 provides the chapter conclusion. 
 
8.1 SUMMARY OF THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The study of Islamic debt has become an important aspect of Islamic finance as 
there has been growing interest in Islamic financial instruments both from Muslim 
and non-Muslim investors/countries. The growing interest in Islamic financial 
instruments, particularly Islamic debt, is driven by some factors. These factors 
include global competition, the need for cheaper financing, and the market 
expansion as new target markets are identified and tapped into, leading to the 
enhancement of the market structure and market size. However, some challenges 
and obstacles need to be met along the way. 
 
This study attempts to provide evidence of how the Islamic debt impacts on firm 
value and/or firm financial performance. In particular, this study first investigates 
whether there is a difference in company value/and financial performance 
attributable to the proportion of Islamic debt and non-Islamic debt. Additional 
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explanatory variables associated with Islamic debt characteristics affecting firm 
value and/or firm financial performance is also considered. Second, the market 
reaction to a firm announcing an issue of Islamic debt is provided, and a test 
examining whether the price movements during the Islamic debt announcement is 
also conducted to support the previous result. Third, how Islamic debt 
characteristics, the frequency of Islamic debt issuance, the Islamic debt type being 
issued, and the firm’s performance have an impact on shareholders’ wealth is 
considered. Furthermore, the differences between group 1 and group 2 samples 
are discussed. 
 
This study concentrates on secondary data collected from the IFIS database. The 
sampling period is 2000 to 2009 with quarterly data observation. During the 
sample period, there are 106 firms issuing Islamic debt for group 1 (Malaysia) and 
23 firms issuing Islamic debt for group 2 (Indonesia). However, due to incomplete 
data, only 80 firms are used as the sample for group 1, and 14 firms are used as 
the sample for group 2. Since there are three specific objectives for this study, 
different econometrics methods are employed according to specification testing 
results, endogeneity test results and linearity test results. A linear dynamic panel 
GMM and a linear panel correcting standard errors are employed to examine the 
impact of Islamic debt for group 1 and group 2 respectively. An event study 
analysis and a unit root test are employed to examine the stock market reaction on 
announcements of Islamic debt issuances. A Feasible Generalised Least Square 
and An Ordinary Least Square are employed to examine the impact of Islamic 
debt characteristics, Islamic debt issuance frequency and Islamic debt types, and 
firm performance on shareholders’ wealth for group 1 and group 2 respectively. 
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8.2 SUMMARY OF THE HYPOTHESIS AND RESULTS 
Table 8.1 provides a summary of the hypotheses tested regarding Islamic debt 
impact on firm value and/or firm financial performance. Table 8.2 provides a 
summary of the hypotheses tested regarding the impact of announcements of 
Islamic debt issuances on stock returns and the test of price movements. Table 8.3 
provides a summary of the hypotheses tested regarding the impact of Islamic debt 
characteristics, Islamic debt issuance frequency and Islamic debt types, and firm 
performance on shareholders’ wealth. 
 
Table 8.1: Summary of hypotheses results regarding Islamic debt impact on firm 
value and/or firm financial performance 
Variables Group 1 Group 2 
The debt structure of the 
firm 
 Islamic debt 
Reject H1.1o 
Suggesting that Islamic debt 
is positively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance  
Reject H1.1o 
Suggesting that Islamic debt 
is positively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
The frequency of Islamic 
debt issued 
 First issuance 
 
 
Reject H1.2o 
Suggesting that the first 
issuance of Islamic debt is 
positively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
 
 
Reject H1.2o 
Suggesting that the first 
issuance of Islamic debt is 
positively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
 Second issuance Cannot reject H1.2o 
Suggesting that the second 
issuance of Islamic debt is 
negatively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
Cannot reject H1.2o 
Suggesting that the second 
issuance of Islamic debt is 
negatively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
 More than twice issuance Reject H1.2o 
Suggesting that more than 
two issuances of Islamic debt 
is positively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
- 
The proportion of Islamic 
debt issued 
 Below the average 
 
 
Reject H1.3o 
Suggesting that the 
proportion of Islamic debt 
below the average is 
positively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
 
 
Cannot reject or can reject 
H1.4o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it 
can be concluded that there is 
no significant relationship 
between the proportion of 
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Islamic debt below the 
average with firm value/firm 
financial performance 
 At the average Reject H1.3o 
Suggesting that the 
proportion of Islamic debt at 
the average is positively 
associated with firm 
value/firm financial 
performance 
Reject H1.3o 
Suggesting that the 
proportion of Islamic debt at 
the average is positively 
associated with firm 
value/firm financial 
performance 
 Above the average Cannot reject H1.3o 
Suggesting that the 
proportion of Islamic debt 
above the average is 
negatively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
Cannot reject H1.3o 
Suggesting that the 
proportion of Islamic debt 
above the average is 
negatively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
The type of Islamic debt 
issued 
 Debt-type 
 
 
Reject H1.4o 
Suggesting that the debt-type 
of Islamic debt is positively 
associated with firm 
value/firm financial 
performance 
 
 
- 
 Asset-type Cannot reject or can reject 
H1.4o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it can 
be concluded that there is no 
significant relationship 
between asset-type of Islamic 
debt with firm value/firm 
financial performance 
Reject H1.4o 
Suggesting that the asset-type 
of Islamic debt is positively 
associated with firm 
value/firm financial 
performance 
 Equity-type Reject H1.4o 
Suggesting that the equity-
type of Islamic debt is 
positively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
Reject H1.4o 
Suggesting that the equity-
type of Islamic debt is 
positively associated with 
firm value/firm financial 
performance 
 
 
Table 8.2: Summary of hypotheses results regarding the impact of Islamic debt 
issues announcement on stock return and its test of price movements 
Variables Group 1 Group 2 
The impact of Islamic debt 
issuance on stock return 
Cannot reject H2.1o 
Suggesting that the market 
reacts negatively to the 
issuance of Islamic debt 
Reject H2.1o 
Suggesting that the market 
reacts positively to the 
issuance of Islamic debt 
Price movements/weak form 
market efficiency 
Reject H2.2o 
Suggesting that the price 
movements surrounding the 
announcement of Islamic debt 
is random/unpredictable 
Reject H2.2o 
Suggesting that the price 
movements surrounding the 
announcement of Islamic 
debt is not 
random/predictable 
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Table 8.3: Summary of hypotheses results regarding the impact of Islamic debt 
characteristics, Islamic debt issuance frequency and Islamic debt types, and firm 
performance on shareholders’ wealth 
Variables Group 1 Group 2 
The Islamic debt 
characteristics 
 Islamic debt offering size 
 
 
Cannot reject or can reject 
H3.1o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it can 
be concluded that there is no 
significant impact of Islamic 
debt offering size on 
shareholders’ wealth 
 
 
Cannot reject or can reject 
H3.1o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it 
can be concluded that there is 
no significant impact of 
Islamic debt offering size on 
shareholders’ wealth 
 Islamic debt maturity Cannot reject or can reject 
H3.1o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it can 
be concluded that there is no 
significant impact of Islamic 
debt maturity on 
shareholders’ wealth 
Cannot reject H3.1o 
Suggesting that Islamic debt 
maturity has a negative 
impact on shareholders’ 
wealth 
 Debt to equity ratio Cannot reject H3.1o 
Suggesting that debt to equity 
ratio has a negative impact on 
shareholders’ wealth 
Reject H3.1o 
Suggesting that debt to equity 
ratio has a positive impact on 
shareholders’ wealth 
 Firm size Reject H3.1o 
Suggesting that firm size has 
a positive impact on 
shareholders’ wealth 
Cannot reject or can reject 
H3.1o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it 
can be concluded that there is 
no significant impact of firm 
size on shareholders’ wealth 
Islamic debt issuance 
frequency and Islamic debt 
type 
 First issuance 
 
 
 
Reject H3.2.1o 
Suggesting that the first 
issuance of Islamic debt has a 
positive impact on 
shareholders’ wealth 
 
 
 
Reject H3.2.1o 
Suggesting that the first 
issuance of Islamic debt has  
a positive impact on 
shareholders’ wealth 
 Second issuance Cannot reject or can reject 
H3.2.1o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it can 
be concluded that the second 
issuance of Islamic debt  has 
no significant impact on 
shareholders’ wealth 
Cannot reject or can reject 
H3.2.1o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it 
can be concluded that the 
second issuance of Islamic 
debt  has no significant 
impact on shareholders’ 
wealth 
 More than twice issuance Cannot reject or can reject 
H3.2.1o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it can 
be concluded that more than 
two issuances of Islamic debt  
has no significant impact on 
shareholders’ wealth 
- 
 Debt-type Reject H3.2.2o - 
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Suggesting that debt-type of 
Islamic debt has a positive 
impact on shareholders’ 
wealth 
 Asset-type Reject H3.2.2o 
Suggesting that asset-type of 
Islamic debt has a  positive 
impact on shareholders’ 
wealth  
Reject H3.2.2o 
Suggesting that the asset-type 
of Islamic debt has a  positive 
impact on shareholders’ 
wealth 
 Equity-type Cannot reject or can reject 
H3.2.1o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it can 
be concluded that the equity-
type of Islamic debt  has no 
significant impact on 
shareholders’ wealth 
Cannot reject or can reject 
H3.2.1o 
Due to the non-significant 
result of the coefficient, it 
can be concluded that the 
equity-type of Islamic debt  
has no significant impact on 
shareholders’ wealth 
Firm performance Reject H3.3o 
Suggesting that firm 
performance (in particular, 
EVA) has a positive impact 
on shareholders’ wealth 
Reject H3.3o 
Suggesting that firm 
performance has a positive 
impact on shareholders’ 
wealth 
 
 
 
8.3 CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
The main objective of this study, as outlined in the first chapter, is to investigate 
the impact of Islamic debt on firm value and/or firm financial performance. This 
study contributes towards: 
 A better understanding of the impact of Islamic debt on firm value, and how 
the markets react to Islamic debt issuances. 
 In contrast to existing studies on Islamic debt, which primarily focused on 
legal aspects, this study concentrates on the finance aspects of Islamic debt, 
and hence the empirical evidence obtained may encourage future research 
with this study as a starting point. 
 This study has also shown how the markets react to the announcement of 
Islamic debt issuances and the results indicate that there is a significant 
reaction from the market. The few previous studies that examined this 
instrument in terms of its event study analysis fail to recognise the 
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contribution of this instrument or explain the market reaction towards 
issuances of this instrument. 
 This study demonstrates how this instrument affects shareholders’ wealth, 
and it finds that the impact is significant. 
 The robust econometric models employed are also a key contribution of this 
study. Given that studies on Islamic debt have never employed the 
econometric models used in this thesis; this project represents a pioneering 
piece of research in the sphere of Islamic debt. 
 
8.4 IMPLICATIONS 
The Islamic finance industry began with the Islamic banking establishment. As 
time passed, Islamic banking became widely accepted not only by Muslim 
customers but also non-Muslim customers. Furthermore, the development of 
Islamic banking pioneered the establishment of other sectors; Islamic insurance, 
Islamic debt and Islamic securities along with the establishment of Islamic capital 
markets. Moreover, the appetite among market players to invest their funds in the 
shariah-compliant instruments increased. As the Islamic debt market developed, 
the industry witnessed a wide range of products being engineered to meet the 
requirements of investors and borrowers. Therefore, the importance of applying 
finance analysis to Islamic finance instruments is vivid because this instrument 
also reacts in the same fashion as non-Islamic instruments. This implies that this 
instrument initially created to meet the needs of particular corporate and 
individual investors, has proven that it can be used by broader investors. 
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Furthermore, the significant findings in this study that Islamic debt contributes to 
higher firm value and firm financial performance lead to several practical 
implications for issuers, investors and regulators: 
 A better understanding of the impact of Islamic debt on firm value, and how 
the markets react to Islamic debt issuances. 
 This study has also shown how the markets react to the announcement of 
Islamic debt issuances and the reactions are significant. This conflicts with 
the few prior studies that have examined Islamic debt in terms of its event 
study analysis. The current work uses more robust empirical methods and a 
larger data set, suggesting the findings are more reliable. 
 The demand for Islamic debt which was driven by high levels of surplus 
savings and reserves in Asia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
looking for Shariah-compliant instruments was further enhanced by greater 
understanding of Islamic debt instruments and the clarity of the 
documentation, as well as credit ratings from international agencies. The 
results of this thesis research, providing clearer evidence concerning returns 
and risk, may encourage more firms to issue this instrument and may 
encourage more investors to invest in Islamic debt in the future. In particular, 
this instrument may attract more conventional investors for diversification 
purposes. 
 The study may change how people think and view Islamic debt, which is 
currently viewed as sacred or exclusive to specific groups and, therefore, 
Islamic debt should be appropriately utilised. The rising popularity of Islamic 
debt indicates that this instrument is viewed as prospective instrument in 
funding and investing.  
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 The study also shows Islamic debt is not just a matter of a name or that this 
instrument is simply changing “the bottle with the same water”. The 
fundamental principle of this instrument, which differs from conventional 
debt instruments, is the will/motive/intention of the parties involved in the 
debt contract. Though the will is unspeakable, however, the contract is 
indirectly legitimate/valid/legal in terms of shariah. 
 Noting that a few countries have issued some legislation relating to Islamic 
instruments, such as the UK, Hong Kong and Singapore, this legislation is 
aimed at regulating Islamic instruments’ issuance, especially to enable 
Islamic debt issuance. Moreover, the rising popularity of Islamic debt should 
encourage the market regulators to efficiently establish rules and regulations 
for Islamic debt issuance and trading, and therefore Islamic debt can boost the 
market efficiency through information transparency. 
 Since this instrument has obvious benefits both for issuers and investors, this 
study may enable Islamic debt to be more widely recognised as a viable and 
profitable instrument for would-be investors and issuers. 
 
8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
This section provides several recommendations for future research and it 
acknowledges the limitations of the current study. 
 For a start, the data used for this study were derived from 2000 to 2009; 
obviously, future studies can expand the length of the observation period and 
expand the data set. The explanatory variables used are limited to the 
availability of the data during the sample, therefore, there is a chance to 
explore more explanatory variables in the future and control variables used. 
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In addition, due to the small sample used for group 2, this study was unable to 
compare group 1 and group 2 results. However, the results for both groups 
may be seen as preliminary steps for future studies. Finally, the existing 
research questions might be expanded for future research 
 While this study has provided useful insight into capital structure and firm 
value in Islamic debt, the findings are based on research in two markets, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Future research could test this capital structure 
impact beyond these two markets. 
 This study considered only the corporate finance aspect; future research needs 
to consider corporate governance conduct of Shariah-compliant firms, and 
whether shariah compliant firms have different corporate governance. If there 
is a difference, then what is the contribution of shariah-compliance corporate 
governance on firm value or firm financial performance? 
 Future research needs to thoroughly examine the behaviour of the financial 
analysts/officers and the fund managers of shariah-compliant firms. This 
analysis may initiate a discussion or in depth interview with the financial 
officer and the fund manager for prospective studies. Considering how 
businesses choose an investment strategy, such as a short term momentum 
strategy that complies with the Islamic law, may be a potential research area.  
 Furthermore, whether a risk return model can be applied to Islamic 
instruments is a question that needs to be answered. In addition, net present 
value of cost of equity and cost of debt issue, and Islamic instruments’ IPOs 
are still potential opportunities for further research. 
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8.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a summary of this research objective and the 
hypotheses results and it has also discussed the contribution of this thesis to 
current scholarship in this area as well as outlining future areas of investigation. 
The findings of this thesis support the notion that (1) there is a significant positive 
relationship between Islamic debt and firm value/firm financial performance. This 
result also supports trade-off theory which suggests that leverage has a positive 
impact on firm value. Moreover, the investigation of the market’s reaction 
towards announcements of Islamic debt issuances supports the notion that (2) 
different types of debt have different impacts on market value. Furthermore, the 
examination of the impact of Islamic debt on the creation of shareholders’ wealth 
supports the notion that (3) different types of debt have different impacts on the 
creation of shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Finally, this study contributes to the existing literature in several ways.  This is the 
first study to investigate the impact of Islamic debt on firm value and/or firm 
financial performance. This study also fills a gap left by the few existing studies 
on Islamic debt: namely, how the announcement of Islamic debt issuances impacts 
stock returns and how the Islamic debt contributes to the creation of shareholders’ 
wealth. The larger samples, longer periods of observation, and robust econometric 
models employed in this study also distinguish it from previous studies in this 
area. 
 
Currently, little is known about market pricing of Islamic stock. This research 
clears up issues concerning (1) (2) and (3). There is much more that can be done, 
298 
 
as noted in the future research comment above. As the increasing globalisation of 
markets continues, more effort to analyse the Islamic security return and risk 
attributes will be undertaken by future researchers. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: List of the sukuk issuers from Malaysian listed firms 
No. Issuers No. Issuers 
1 ABS Logistics 41 KMCOB Capital 
2 ABS Plantation Assets 42 KNM 
3 ACP Industries 43 Kuala Lumpur Kepong 
4 AEON Credit Services 44 Kumpulan Guthrie 
5 Alam Maritim 45 Lafarge Malayan Cement 
6 Aman Sukuk 46 Leader Universal Holdings 
7 AmIslamic 47 Lingkaran Trans Kota Holdings 
8 Ample Zone 48 Malayan Banking 
9 Atlan Holdings 49 Malaysia Debt Ventures 
10 Axiata Group 50 Malaysian AE Models Holdings 
11 Bank Muamalat Syariah 51 Malaysian Industrial Development 
12 Bank Pembangunan Malaysia 52 Malaysian Merchant Marine 
13 Bina Darulaman 53 Maxtral Industries 
14 Boon Koon 54 MBB Sukuk 
15 BSA International 55 Merbok Hilir 
16 Bumiputera-Commerce Holdings 56 Mieco Chipboard 
17 Cagamas 57 Minetech Resources 
18 Chemical Company of Malaysia 58 MISC 
19 CIMB Islamic 59 MNRB Holdings 
20 Delloyd Ventures 60 MRCB Southern Link 
21 DRB-HICOM 61 MTD InfraPerdana 
22 Emas Kiara Industries 62 Muhibbah Engineering 
23 Englotechs Holding 63 Mulpha International 
24 Esso Malaysia 64 Naim Cendera Holdings 
25 Evermaster 65 Nam Fatt Corporation 
26 Formis Resources 66 Nucleus Avenue 
27 Gamuda 67 OCBC Al-Amin Bank 
28 Glomac 68 OCBC Bank 
29 Golden Crop Returns 69 Oilcorp 
30 Goodway Integrated Industries 70 OSK Property Holdings Berhard (OSKP) 
31 Guthrie Property Development 71 Padiberas Nasional 
32 Hijrah Pertama 72 PG Municipal Assets 
33 Hongleong 73 Pharmaniaga 
34 Hualon Corporation 74 PLUS Expressway 
35 Hubline 75 PLUS SPV 
36 Hytex Integrated 76 Poh Kong Holdings 
37 Ingress Sukuk 77 Premium Nutrients 
38 John Master Industries 78 Priceworth Wood Products 
39 Kencana Petroleum 79 Prinsiptek 
40 Kinsteel 80 Projek Lebuhraya Utara-Selatan 
313 
 
 
No. Issuers No. Issuers 
81 Sarawak Corporate Sukuk 94 TH Group 
82 SCB Develepments 95 
Time Engineering (Musyarakah One Capital 
Bhd) 
83 Serrisa Sinar 96 Tomei Consolidated 
84 Sime Darby 97 Top Glove Corporation 
85 Special Power Vehicle 98 Tracoma Holdings 
86 Standard Chartered 99 Tradewins Plantation 
87 Sunrise 100 TSH Resources 
88 Sunway City 101 TTM Sukuk 
89 Symphony House 102 UEM Builders 
90 Tadamun Services 103 UMW Holdings 
91 Talam Corporation 104 Wah Seong Corporation 
92 Tanjung Offshore 105 WCT Engineering 
93 Tenaga Nasional 106 Weida 
 
Appendix 2: List of the Sukuk Issuers from Indonesia listed firms 
No. Issuers No. Issuers 
1 Adhi Karya 14 Indorent 
2 Aneka Gas Industry 15 Matahari Putra Prima 
3 Apexindo Pratama Duta 16 Mayora Indah 
4 Bakrieland Development 17 Metrodata Electronics 
5 Bank Bukopin 18 Mitra Adiperkasa 
6 Bank Muamalat 19 Multi Nitrotama Kimia 
7 Bank Syariah Mandiri 20 Perusahaan Listrik Negara 
8 Berlian Laju Tanker 21 PTPN IV 
9 Berlina 22 Ricky Putra Globalindo 
10 Ciliandra Perkasa 23 Salim Ivomas Pratama 
11 Ciptadana Sekuritas 24 Sona Topas Tourism Industry 
12 Citra Sari Makmur 25 Summarecon Agung 
13 HITS 26 Titan Petrokimia 
 
 
 
